




PSYCHOLOGY AND THE CHURCH



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PSYCHOLOGY AND THE CHURCH

BY

E. J. BICKNELL	L. W. GRENSTED	W. R. MATTHEWS
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G. H. DIX	C. E. HUDSON	C. F. ROGERS

AND

O. HARDMAN (Editor)

WITH AN INTRODUCTION BY


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EDITOR'S PREFACE

THERE are many books dealing with the psychology of religion in general, and more than a few dealing with certain aspects of the Christian religion in particular: but hitherto there has been none that treats of the application of psychology to the whole range of the life and worship of the Catholic Church as seen in the Anglican Communion. This book represents an attempt to supply this deficiency.

The writers have not sought in conference an agreed point of view, nor have I judged it desirable to eliminate everything in the nature of overlapping. But we began by carefully considering one another's essay-plans, with a view to securing cohesion, and we submit our work, each accepting responsibility only for his own contribution, in the hope that it will usefully serve the practical purpose we had in mind—the purpose, namely, of removing some of the difficulties and of making available, especially for the clergy, some of the lessons, of a new way of thought which it will be very dangerous to neglect.

I desire to express my gratitude to those who, in the midst of heavy work, have shared with me in making this book, and particularly to the Bishop of Southwark, who has kindly written an introduction to the papers.

O. HARDMAN.



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INTRODUCTION

FIFTY years ago psychology was the province of a few experts, whose highly technical works were, as a rule, read only by a small circle of students. To-day it is the most popular and widely discussed of all the sciences. Books on various aspects of the New Psychology pour out from the publishers month by month; many of them have a large circulation and run through several editions. In the daily press, in fiction, and in ordinary conversation, terms borrowed from psychology are frequently used and its problems are freely discussed.

This sudden change in the popular estimation of psychology is due to several causes. It is partly due, of course, to the thorough and scientific investigations which have been made by its leading exponents and to the valuable conclusions which have been based upon them. But research and success in discovery do not of themselves necessarily lead to widespread interest and general acceptance. Other causes have assisted psychology in gaining in such a remarkable manner the popular ear. It has appealed to the imagination by its psychotherapy; the cures which have been wrought by the application of mental treatment to cases of shell-shock and to other nervous diseases have become generally known, and have kindled hope that psychical treatment will succeed when all other remedies have failed. The New Psychology has also shown the significance of dreams, and of habits and tricks of conduct which previously had seemed as inexplicable as they were familiar; and

by the interpretation it has offered of ordinary but obscure experiences it has made its appeal to the man in the street. Moreover, its emphasis on the unconscious and hidden depths of human personality has attracted those who are always ready to find satisfaction in strange and mysterious phenomena.

A science which within a few years has made such rapid advance and has gained such a large measure of popular support may readily be excused if it is inclined to lose a due sense of proportion, and to make claims in the first flush of success which will presently be found to have been unjustifiable. At the moment psychology is very ready to claim all departments of knowledge as its own, and to express with no uncertain voice its conclusions on matters of education, medicine, morals and theology. It is from psychology that the most dangerous attacks are now made on Christian faith and conduct. The general tendency of many psychological writers is to regard the objects of religious faith simply as projections of the human mind without any corresponding realities; to treat religion as purely subjective; and to refuse any objective reality to the Christian conception of God and the spiritual world. They are not content with describing some of the processes through which religious faith has been developed; they claim to explain it, and explanation is often used by them as a means of explaining away. Just as at one period in its history modern physical science attempted to apply its own special methods to religion and to every other aspect of life, so psychology is often inclined to imagine that it holds the key to every problem of thought and conduct. The attitude of some psychologists to sin is subversive of all that has been taught by Christian moralists; the danger which they attach to the repression of the instincts is made by them the ground for regarding as natural acts of sexual immorality, and of justifying the immediate gratification of impulses which the Christian

has always taught should be controlled and disciplined.

This criticism of Christian faith and morality must be met. In doing this, it must be made clear that there is no necessary conflict between religion and psychology. Christianity is not opposed either to psychology or to the New Psychology; the conflict is with some psychological theories which are connected with the New Psychology, but which certainly are not essential to it. The Christian theologian should recognise fully the value of psychology within its appropriate sphere: but he will resist it when it attempts to usurp the province of the philosopher. It can collect mental facts and describe mental processes: but it must leave to philosophy and metaphysics the right of passing a final judgment on their validity. Religious experience must not be dismissed as merely subjective; we have the right to argue from it to the validity of belief in God, as we argue from perception to the reality of an "external world." The Christian can moreover claim that psychology in various ways justifies and confirms his faith; for instance, he can quote psychology as showing how essential religion is to man's nature. Dr. Selbie writes in his *Psychology of Religion*: "The psychology of religion makes possible a new and deeper appreciation of the intimate part played by religion in man's make-up and development. . . . The instincts and tendencies which find their ultimate expression in religious ideas and practices, however crudely set forth, are known to be universal, and are therefore to be regarded as rooted in man's nature as such. We can therefore no longer see in religion something imposed on man by interested parties, priests, medicine men, or even by the pressure of social needs and the herd instinct. It belongs to his most intimate self." The Christian moralist must meet his psychological critics by showing that man's advance in morality has been

marked by the progressive control of the instincts by intelligence, and by the sublimation of animal instincts into the noblest fruits of human life and character. He will, moreover, contend that experience proves that man can never regulate his instincts or develop harmoniously his whole personality without the help of God.

But it would be a grave mistake if the relationship of the Church to the New Psychology was chiefly marked by suspicion and hostility. There is much in its teaching which should be gladly welcomed and eagerly appropriated. The Church should be ready to learn from the New Psychology anything that may help it in the accomplishment of its task. Professor Matthews says very truly in the first essay of this volume, "The industrialists and the advertisers have not been slow to realise the importance of the new knowledge. The children of the world have often been wiser than the children of the light. Let us hope that in this case it will not be so." But it is not only the industrialist and the advertiser who have learnt from the New Psychology; the parent, the schoolmaster, and the physician can all draw from it some contribution to enable them to carry out more efficiently their responsibilities. It is already clear that the Church has much to gain by applying to its own life and work some of the assured results of modern psychology. There are three great departments in the ministry of the Church in which some knowledge of psychology is important. First it should be of value in the exercise of the teaching office of the Church. Our preaching, and still more our instruction in the Bible Class or Sunday School, would often be more effective if, in the presentation of our message, we avoided some of the pitfalls against which psychology warns us, and if we adopted some of the suggestions it can offer as to the best method of approach. Secondly, public and private worship can receive help

from psychology; worship must of course be always regarded mainly as an act of offering to God, but the manward side of it must not be ignored; the nature and the length of the services, the ceremonial, the prayers, the hymns, should all be considered in the light of the effect they may have on the congregation. Thirdly, some knowledge of psychology ought to be acquired by those who have to deal with the spiritual needs and development of individuals. We have at present no authoritative books on moral theology, and the clergy are given very little help in their difficult task of assisting those who come to them for spiritual counsel and guidance. Serious blunders are sometimes made, which would have been avoided if there had been an elementary knowledge of psychology. Though here it is necessary to strike a note of caution, for the last state would be worse than the first if men who had acquired a slight knowledge of psychology attempted mental treatment which should be left to trained experts. The result of some knowledge of psychology would often be shown by the clergy realising that mental or physical treatment by the physician is required as well as spiritual help from the priest.

It is important that Churchmen generally should appreciate more fully both the value and the limitations of the Church's ministry of healing. There is danger lest, through ignorance of recent psychological discoveries and methods, we may claim as distinctively spiritual what is really due to the scientific employment of psychotherapy; while, on the other hand, we may fail to use the opportunities which psychotherapy offers for the closer co-operation between the priest and the doctor.

This volume of essays gives an answer to many of the questions which arise out of the relationship between Psychology and the Church. The writers of the earlier chapters deal with the claim of some of the protagonists of psychology to express a final judg-

ment on the validity of religious faith, and they meet some of the criticisms which have been advanced against both faith and prayer. Later chapters deal with the different departments of the Church's work which can receive help from psychological teaching: the various writers on public worship, education, preaching, moral development, spiritual healing, and reunion show how the new science has a real and useful contribution to make on all these subjects. Naturally not every statement that is made in these chapters will meet with general approval. There are arguments and statements here and there which, personally, I am unable to accept; but I have no doubt that the book will prove a valuable and stimulating contribution to an important and difficult subject. I am sure that many besides myself will be most grateful to the editor and his collaborators for a book which with knowledge and self-restraint applies so comprehensively the results of psychological advance to the faith and work of the Church.

CYRIL SOUTHWARK.

I

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL STANDPOINT
AND ITS LIMITATIONS

BY

W. R. MATTHEWS, M.A., D.D.

I

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL STANDPOINT AND ITS LIMITATIONS

PSYCHOLOGY may be said to be both the oldest and the youngest of the sciences. Systematic investigation began in the West, so it is generally held, when Socrates turned from the speculations of the "physical" philosophers to study what he thought was knowable—the nature of man. The process of classification and definition of concepts which he inaugurated started with the mental and moral life of human beings. The main object of Greek reflexion was to carry out the word of the oracle, "Know thyself." This note is unmistakable. As Professor Pringle-Pattison has said, the leading thought of Plato and Aristotle is the supremacy of the *psyche*, the conviction that thought and reason are the most significant realities of the world. Science itself then begins with psychology, with the study of the mind. But psychology is also the youngest of the sciences. It is only within living memory that it has fully established its claim to be one of the natural sciences, based on observation and experiment. For almost the whole period during which rational thought has been systematically pursued, the theory of mind has been treated as a branch of metaphysics, depending for its conclusions on the general principles of philosophy. England has the honour of having produced the most influential pioneer in the movement towards the psychological standpoint. When Locke proposed to examine the limits of knowledge by an investigation of the powers of the mind

according to "the historical plain method," he was laying down a programme for a psychology based on observation. It was not, however, until the latter part of the nineteenth century that psychology followed the example of physics, and, separating itself from the parent stem of philosophy, began to flourish as an independent study with the same purpose as its sister sciences—the establishment, through observation of facts, of causal laws.

Young things, when they sever themselves from parental tutelage, frequently manifest a melancholy tendency to arrogant self-assertion. Not only do they tend to forget the home from whence they came, but they sometimes react violently against the opinions and customs that were current there. Wise men do not take these symptoms too seriously, for they know that they are the less engaging signs of growth. Perhaps this phenomenon can be traced in some psychologists to-day. It is at least true that there are some who seem to hold that their science must ultimately supplant philosophy and theology. And this opinion has spread among the masses of the half-educated, who are easily impressed by confident assertion and a parade of long words. How often one hears the phrase "Psychology teaches us" spoken in a tone which suggests that the infallible authority has been found at last.

It would be absurd to attempt to minimise the importance of the achievements of psychology or the new power and insight which they have brought us, and most absurd to do so in the opening essay of a volume which aims at applying some of its results in the field of religion. Such an attempt is far from the present writer's intention; but it may be useful, in view of exaggerated pretensions, to consider what kind of help we may expect from psychology in solving our ultimate problems, and what limitations, if any, may be assigned to its power.

I

Psychology, as we have said, claims to be regarded as a natural science. It asserts its right to a place in the hierarchy of disciplines, among which are parcelled out all the phenomena of the universe. Now it is obvious that each science has a group of data with which it is primarily concerned. It is true that no science can be regarded as completely isolated from all the rest. Chemistry runs over into physics and so on, but the main concern of each study is one particular aspect of reality. We must ask, then, what are the specific data of psychology? From what special aspect of the universe does it take its start? It is somewhat surprising to find that we are met here at the very beginning with a serious difficulty. We reply to the question: It is concerned with mental phenomena. But at once the further question arises: What do we mean by this? We are confronted with a view which has had great influence, which would hold that, in effect, there are no such things as mental phenomena. On the naturalistic or materialistic hypothesis, so-called mental events are not events at all in the full sense. Huxley invented the word "epiphenomena" to describe the status of mental events on this view, intending to imply that they are effects but not causes. They are like the shadow cast by a train, which has no influence on its progress. If this theory were correct, it is clear that psychology could not claim to be one among the natural sciences, since the course of the world would be sufficiently described without its aid. From the point of view of an attempt to give a causal explanation of the changes which take place in the real world, reference to psychical phenomena would be a mere irrelevance. No doubt some study could be given to the causes which produced these strange by-products, but its results would not be a contribution to any general view of reality. This standpoint

may appear absurd; and, indeed, in its extreme form it would now find few advocates; but an important school of psychologists, the Behaviourists, advocate a view which is not essentially different. According to them, consciousness should be assumed, at least for purposes of research, to be negligible, and psychology should restrict itself to the objective study of behaviour, taking its place contentedly as a branch of biology.

We may respect such views as attempts to avoid the dualism of mind and matter which most definitions of psychology presuppose. But the gain is secured at the price of violent paradox. It is possible no doubt that the dualism is not ultimate, but it exists for the common experience which is the starting-point of science. There are mental phenomena and the "inner sense" is different from the "outer sense." It is plainly incredible that the aspect of reality which we describe as conscious experience should be negligible or incapable of being investigated. Psychology has, in fact, been the study of events in mind. Psychology, as Professor James Ward says, is the science of experience, and in the last resort of individual experience.¹

If we adopt a definition of this kind we are led to observe an important difference between psychology and all other sciences. Like them it is empirical, but unlike them it is subjective. In them we take our position without question in the objective world, but in psychology we are dealing with the processes of that mind by which the objective world is known. It follows from this that the data of our science have a totally different character from those of other sciences. What are the facts from which we must start? They are the facts of individual experience. It is moreover clear that we can have direct acquaintance only with our own experience, and it follows that all psychology rests, in the last resort, on introspection. It would, of

¹ *Principles of Psychology*, p. 28.

course, be untrue to hold that psychology has no subsidiary sources on which to draw. The reports of other people about their experience, the observation of their behaviour under arranged conditions, the study of the behaviour of animals, all these furnish valuable data. But they are secondary sources. They derive their meaning from the knowledge we have of our own experience. They can have no significance apart from that. We have no clue to interpret them except one which we find within.

The fundamental importance of introspection compels us to ask how far this operation may be relied upon to give accurate information. A moment's reflexion will show that, apart from obvious practical difficulties, there are unfortunate theoretical perplexities about introspection. Perhaps insufficient attention has been given to the psychology of the psychologist while he is psychologising: it is, however, a subject which will repay reflexion. Can I really know as an object what I am at this moment experiencing? Can my mental state be at the same time the object of another mental state—that of knowing? To experience, to know that I experience, to know what I experience, and to know how I experience, are different experiences. It would seem obvious, though it is denied by some psychologists, that I can know what I experienced only when the experience is gone. What I know is the memory of the experience, and not the experience itself. And, moreover, the memory itself in order to be analysed must enter into another complex mental state—that of introspection—and be thereby, to an indefinite degree, transformed. There is, further, another disability to which introspection is subject. Experience is, almost certainly, a continuous process. What happens in our mental life is not a succession of sharply defined experiences, but one unbroken experiencing in which elements blend and fade indiscernibly into one another. In introspection, however,

we artificially mutilate this living process. We say to the vital movement, Stand still, that I may look at you. Introspection begins with a necessary and unavoidable falsification.

These remarks are made with no sceptical intention. It is not denied that real and valuable knowledge can be obtained by the processes of mind. But the difficulties about introspection should warn us of the inherent limitations of psychological explanation. The conceptual scheme reared on the basis of data thus acquired may represent, but must also in some degree misrepresent, the reality of mind.

Before we leave this part of the subject we must glance at a topic which has played a great rôle in the history of philosophy—the “transcendental subject.” This formidable phrase is the technical expression for a very obvious and simple fact. All knowledge involves the relation of subject and object, of knower and thing known. But when the knowledge in question is knowledge of self or of the experience of a self, we are brought into a baffling complication. There seem to be two selves in the transaction, the self that knows and the self that is known—the “transcendental” and the “empirical” ego. It is impossible here to enter into a discussion of the very difficult problems that arise, but it is obvious that the knowing self cannot be identical with the known self, and that psychology can deal only with the “empirical ego.” It seems then to be an inevitable conclusion that there must always be an element in the self, and that the central and constitutive element, which cannot be scientifically known. There is no means of estimating the degree of ignorance and imperfection which this limitation involves; we can only recognise that a complete description of mind is necessarily beyond the power of scientific investigation.

We will now proceed to consider the method and aim of psychology regarded as a natural science. It has the same purpose as other sciences, and that purpose may roughly be described as "explanation." This word, however, is ambiguous, and there are at least two meanings which need to be most carefully distinguished. There is the explanation which answers the question *How?* and that which answers the question *Why?* I am, for example, at this moment sitting at a desk and writing this sentence. I may explain this fact by giving a complete account of the events which led up to it, both physical and mental; but I may also explain my action by referring to the purpose which I have in view. Scientific explanation is of the former type: it answers the question *How?* not the question *Why?* It is not concerned with any teleological view of the universe, it does not raise the question of the reason for reality being what it is; it is concerned simply with the actual events and the connexion between them. Thus scientific explanation consists in the reduction of the infinite variety and complexity of the world presented in experience under general conceptions and formulas. A phenomenon is "explained" when it is shown to be an example of a general law which covers a great many other phenomena. It is often said that science is "descriptive." The word is accurate as a partial definition, but it may be doubted whether it does justice to the full significance of the results of science, since the descriptive simplifications which it reaches give to mankind power over phenomena and gravely affect the philosophical constructions which each age has to make for itself.

In the pursuit of this ideal of simplification and generalisation, the sciences which deal with the more complex types of phenomena have been led to adopt a very important method. They have postulated the

existence of what Professor T. P. Nunn has called "scientific objects," and what we will call "hypothetical entities." By hypothetical entities I mean those of which we have no direct experience, but which are assumed for the purpose of explaining phenomena which we do experience. Thus the atom, the electron, the luminiferous ether, are all hypothetical entities in this sense. Now the history of science shows us these entities undergoing a process of constant reconstruction. Some which were confidently accepted in comparatively recent times have quite disappeared. The chemists of the eighteenth century made use of a supposed fluid called "caloric" to explain the phenomena of combustion. Similar entities are not difficult to discover in contemporary physics. The ether which, until a few years ago, was accepted as almost certain appears to be in danger of losing its position in the world of scientific realities. The atom is another hypothetical entity which is suffering modification in the advance of scientific theory. We need not raise the question whether the reality of any hypothetical entity could ever be established: it is sufficient to note that all such entities with which we are made acquainted in the physical sciences have undergone revision, and are undergoing revision as the sciences progress. The hypothetical entities which are adopted at any given stage in the development of science are those which are most useful for the purpose of generalising phenomena and dealing with them. The history of science makes it probable that the concepts which are taken as fundamental now will in the future be radically transformed or supplanted by others. But we may observe a law in the development of hypothetical entities. As Professor Nunn has pointed out in his Presidential Address to the Aristotelian Society (1923), the evolution of "scientific objects" appears to take them always further away from the type of existence of which we have knowledge in perception. They

become more and more abstract. Thus caloric is not difficult to imagine. It is closely analogous to fluids within our experience. The ether and the atom, however, have departed further from the imaginable, from concrete experience, while, at the same time, they have become ever more amenable to mathematical treatment and precise calculation. We might sum up the life history of a hypothetical entity in the words "from mythology to mathematics."

All this has a direct bearing on the significance of psychology. It is pursuing the same course as its sister sciences, and the further development will, we can scarcely doubt, be the same. In order to generalise phenomena it has conceived entities which cannot themselves be perceived or experienced. Recently these "scientific objects" have been increased by the very fruitful one of the Unconscious. It is highly important that these entities should be recognised as hypothetical. They are not given in experience, they are deduced from it, or rather they are invented to explain it. Nor can it be doubted that the science is still at the "mythological" stage. The Freudian "Censor" bears the marks of mythology to the most casual eye. The others, though less obviously anthropomorphic, are very far from the stage in which mathematical formulation is possible; but if the history of science has any light to throw upon the probable course of scientific thought, it may be confidently predicted that they will move from mythology towards mathematics. They will be transformed.

These reflexions must incline us to a certain scepticism about the hypothetical entities of modern psychology. Without doubting their usefulness we may doubt their reality, at least in the form in which they are now presented. On the other hand, it would be a mistake to carry our scepticism to the extreme point of writing them down as mere "fictions." Though it would be rash to regard them as established realities, they must,

in some degree, correspond with reality, since they have all, even including the Freudian "Censor," enabled us to gain a new control over the course of events.

3

We will now address ourselves more directly to the question, What are the limits of psychological enquiry? In so doing we are to consider not the actual limits, due to ignorance, but its inherent limitations, due to the nature of the study itself. The answer to our question is that, in one sense, there are no limits. There is no mental phenomenon, no experience, which falls outside its province. Nothing is so sacred or so intimate that it can claim exemption from scientific analysis; and it would be at once foolish and useless to say to the psychologist, Thus far and no farther, when he approaches the moral and religious consciousness. But though there are no limits to the phenomena which psychology can investigate, there are limits to the questions which it can answer. The problem with which we are confronted is, in fact, the general one of the relation between philosophy and science. On this question the prevailing view among scientific men used to be that metaphysics consisted of baseless speculations which could usefully be ignored by science, and it was the fashion to contrast the solid gains of scientific knowledge with the fluctuating constructions of philosophers. This attitude is being abandoned. The progress of physics itself has led to the raising of metaphysical problems; and particularly through the implications of the theory of relativity, the exponents of natural knowledge have found themselves compelled to entertain speculations about matter, space and time which have long been familiar to philosophers. The true position comes more clearly into view. Though the results of the special sciences have great importance as data for philosophy, they come

at last to problems which are beyond the scope of their method. They cannot determine the ultimate nature of Reality.

This principle is nowhere more evident than in psychology. The empirical study of mental phenomena raises metaphysical problems more directly and more obviously than any other science. It suggests, though it cannot answer, the question of the nature of mind, the place of the individual consciousness in the whole order of the universe and the validity of the concepts which mind creates.

We may illustrate this point by referring to a subject which is specially relevant to the purpose of this volume—belief in God. It is doubtless possible to give a psychological “explanation” of the origin and development of the idea of God, both in the race and in the individual. Though such explanations are to a large degree hypothetical, they may have much probability. In any case it is clear that there is no theoretical impossibility in the way of an adequate psychological account of belief in God. It is frequently assumed that this has some bearing on the validity of the concept; that if we can trace the stages by which it has developed we have gone some way to show that it is worthless; that religion has some interest in maintaining that its origin is mysterious.

This is sheer illusion, as can readily be seen if we compare the concept of God with another concept which has less emotional interest. Most of us are convinced that there is an “external world,” an order of nature, an objective reality which is independent of our minds. Psychology can analyse this belief and trace the process by which the idea of “the world outside” is built up. It can show how the “sense data” are organised and interpreted in experience as “things” and “events.” It can show further how the generalised conception of “Nature” arises. But it cannot decide the question whether there is really an

objective world of objects corresponding to our perceptions. That there is such a world is one possible hypothesis, but the growth of the belief could be "explained" without any objective reference. Yet it would obviously be absurd to appeal to psychology as proving "subjective idealism." From the psychological standpoint we can neither prove nor disprove the existence of the outer world.

The belief in God is closely analogous. It is said that the idea of God is a "projection" of the mind, and in support of this contention it is urged that we can account for the idea without the need to suppose that it is evoked by any reality outside the mind. But, as we have seen, the idea of an external world is in the same sense, a "projection." Of course the idea of God is a "projection"; of course it is possible to trace the manner in which the conception is formed. But the question we want to have answered is, Does the projection hit any reality? That is the question which psychology cannot answer. Both in the case of belief in an external world of objects and in that of belief in God the decision rests with philosophy. But there is more to be said. If as philosophers we come to agree with common sense and hold that perception gives us a true, though inadequate, knowledge of real existence, then it is difficult to see any logical ground for denying the same limited validity to religious experience. If we allow the lower kind of experience to convince us of an objective reality, we should, unless we can give good reasons for treating it in a different manner, be prepared to admit that the higher kind of experience is not without its objective foundation.

The so-called argument from religious experience has therefore great value. It is certain that it cannot be shaken by psychology. The only radical attack which could be made upon it would come from an extreme subjectivist metaphysic which would deny all objective validity to our experience. Nevertheless,

the analogy which we have drawn out above should warn us that the argument is open to grave dangers. It is easy to fall into the assumption that vivid or persistent experiences can be taken at their face value. But our knowledge of the external world of matter is not gained in this manner. It is only by the application of rational criteria to experience that, at any level, we can enter into a secure knowledge of Reality.

In these introductory remarks we have dwelt, perhaps excessively, on the limits of psychological enquiry. It seemed useful to do so because there are many who entertain an exaggerated notion of what psychology may do, expecting that it will decide for them questions which have been the standing problems of Metaphysics and Theology. But, as we have tried to show, psychology is in the same position as other natural sciences. Its conclusions furnish data for philosophical reflexion, but they cannot be a substitute for it. In maintaining this position we do not in the least minimise the practical importance of psychology, or the need for its application in the religious work of the Church. It is not too much to say that recent advances in the science have put new instruments in the hands of all those who seek to influence the minds and hearts of men. The industrialists and the advertisers have not been slow to realise the importance of the new knowledge. The children of this world have often been wiser than the children of light. Let us hope that in this case it will not be so. Psychology can give us considerable guidance in the subject of worship, and of the way to deal with minds distressed or burdened. It should be possible to reach a definite decision, based on scientific grounds, on some hotly disputed practices such as confession. It would be no exaggeration to say that no pastor of Christ's flock should consider himself adequately equipped for the work until he has gained some real acquaintance with the more important developments of modern psychology.

II

THE PROGRESS AND PRESENT POSITION OF THE STUDY OF PSYCHOLOGY

BY

L. W. GRENSTED, M.A., B.D.

II

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Nothing is more difficult than to estimate the movement and direction of a science at the time of its greatest activity. History is best written in those periods of quiet when the successes of the past are in process of consolidation, and when there is little or no effort to discover or to occupy new fields, nor any of the zest and excitement which such discovery brings. The pioneer is seldom the best historian. Often, indeed, he fails even to record accurately the discoveries which he has made.

Psychology is at the present moment in just such an era of quest and discovery. In every direction pioneer work is being done, and the output of literature is already such that even professional psychologists find themselves obliged to specialise. Some are experts in education, some in industrial psychology, some in psychotherapy. A few are working along biological lines, trying to correlate the work of the mental observers with that of the neurologist. And book after book is being written by men who have little acquaintance enough with the whole range of psychological enquiry, and whose practical work, often of the very highest value, will require a stiff theoretical testing before it can be made the basis of any broad generalisation.

The most that can be claimed for this essay is that it is written from an observer's point of view, and on the basis of what, it is hoped, may be taken as a fairly

typical selection from the literature of the subject. To deal with all the ramifications of the most recent psychology would in any case be impossible, and it will be of more value, especially as a contribution to a collection of essays such as those collected in this volume, to make some attempt at the classification of the various tendencies which seem to be observable in the history of psychological investigation, in the hope that this may reveal the real direction of its movement at the present day.

I

As with all sciences, the problem of psychology has been largely one of definition and scope. Even to-day there is no agreement as to the definition of psychology, and undoubtedly many of the problems which arise in this connection for the philosopher and for the theologian are simply due to the continual trespassing by psychologists upon fields which are not their own. It is, of course, impossible and undesirable that the sciences should be kept in separate watertight compartments. The world is one, and not many. Geology, biology, chemistry, and the rest, all overlap, to their great gain. But psychology overlaps them all, just because it deals with the mind of geologist, biologist, and chemist alike. For the same reason, and in an even greater degree, it overlaps the field of philosophy (itself in sore need of exact definition), since both clearly deal with mind; and though it is true that psychology deals rather with process and philosophy with the truth or reality which lies behind process, there seem to be few psychologists indeed who can keep the distinction clear. Whence arises some confusion (and not a little recrimination) between psychologists and philosophers, a confusion which is perhaps at its greatest when we pass to the sphere of religion. For it is here, where prescriptive rights are strong and well entrenched, that psychology makes

some of its boldest claims. And if the assertions of certain psychologists are wild indeed, they must not blind us to the real scientific value of their method, or to its great usefulness in the understanding and practical guidance of the religious life.

The beginnings of psychology must thus be sought among the beginnings of conscious scientific enquiry, and that takes us back to the great Greek philosophers, Plato and Aristotle. Empirical science, of course, goes back in a sense to the first attempts at observation and experiment. The first experiments in cookery by the first married couple were, in their degree, science, just in so far as they provided guidance, and warning, in connection with similar experiments to follow. But psychology, with philosophy, came later, when man began to ask questions about the mind which controls these experiments, whether as energy inspiring them, as reason directing and comparing them, or as feeling appraising them.

In this connection the name of Aristotle stands supreme. Under the inspiration of Plato, but upon very different lines, he systematised the field of knowledge, and thus created the method of modern science. His importance for psychology is that he treats the mind or soul as an object which can be investigated like any external object, and not merely as the thinking or feeling subject. His *Logic* and his *Ethics* are definitely psychological enquiries into the ways in which mind works, and in many respects, as pieces of observation and even of interpretation, they have stood intact to the present day. The "Faculty Psychology" of the last century was unquestionably the lineal successor of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, and had not inherited by any means all the qualities of that deservedly famous treatise. Aristotle's list of "virtues" was a first attempt at that classification which has culminated in the modern study of the so-called instincts. And in his principle of "moderateness," the ethical *via*

media, he saw, what some psychologists of to-day have missed, that it is not enough to sort out the primary impulses upon which behaviour rests. They must be controlled to right expression in the pursuit of right ends. Anger, the psychological principle of anger, is in us all, but we must not give it either too much or too little scope. We must be neither wrathful nor wrathless, but rightly angry (*Eth. Nic.*, iv. 11). There is something else, then, other than the virtues themselves which brings about this moderation, conforming impulse to the right standard of life. And here Aristotle simply assumes the soul, with mind or reason (*nous*) as its expression, and, rightly, leaves for metaphysics (the name is his own) the problem thereby raised.

There is little need to stay over the period between Aristotle and Descartes, the real founder of modern psychology and philosophy alike. The Schoolmen simply took over the main principles of the Aristotelian system, and elaborated them with but little real advance. Psychology was for them simply the science of the soul, and the soul was accepted as an entity without serious question, on the basis of the Christian revelation. As a result, its scope was inextricably confused with that of philosophy and theology, and little development was possible. The metaphysical questions raised by Aristotle were left unsolved, while his Logic and Ethics became standard textbooks. From the Logic was developed the whole scholastic system of dialectic, based upon the principles of the syllogism. The list of virtues from the Ethics was combined with the "Theological Virtues" of 1 Cor. xiii. into an elaborate system, in which the functions of the soul were much more fully described, but still upon wholly unscientific and unsystematic lines.

Nothing more could be done until the nature of the soul itself came under discussion freed from theological assumptions. This was the task undertaken by Descartes, followed, in England, by Locke. It is from this point that modern psychology begins. The problem of the soul, its relation on the one hand to the body (Descartes suggested that they interacted in the pineal gland), and on the other to mind or consciousness, was faced anew and in a spirit of free enquiry unknown since the time of Aristotle himself.

The most important result of this new movement of thought was the gradual extrication of psychology as a science from philosophy as a method *sui generis*. Descartes in his darkened room did more than renew the ancient quest for the ultimate ground of Reality. He found himself faced by the fact of mind as at once the means of that quest and the assurance of its ultimate success. *Cogito, ergo sum*. It was bad logic, as a succession of critics have proved, but it was an admirable starting-point for a metaphysical enquiry. And this enquiry, begun upon such a basis, was clearly an impossible one, unless it was accompanied by an investigation of the nature of thought itself, an investigation which speedily developed into a general investigation of mind, the organ of thought.

Such were the circumstances of the birth of modern psychology. Descartes did little more than thus bring it to the birth. Its passage through infancy to a robust life of its own is marked by the writings of Locke and of the group of British thinkers who carried on his work, the most famous being Bishop Berkeley and David Hume. From Hume the main stream of progress divides. In one direction it passes out through Kant to the manifold developments of modern philosophy, idealist, realist, and pragmatist. In the other it leads to the Mills, Bain and Spencer, the

typical representatives of the scholastic period of modern psychology. It is not necessary to deal with these various writers, but the main principles upon which their work rested are fundamental to any understanding of the position to-day.

Locke's *Essay concerning the Human Understanding* is the foundation upon which the whole structure is built. In this book he undertakes an elaborate investigation into the nature of mind and the source of its very varied contents. His discussion forms the starting-point for the two main types of the older psychology, the Faculty Psychology and the Association Psychology, resting respectively upon the principles that there are certain faculties or powers innate in the mind, and that ideas are linked together in accordance with certain laws, known as the laws of Association.

The mind, for Locke, is primarily a void, the mere possibility of experience. It is like a blank sheet of paper, upon which experience, through its two modes of sensation and reflection, may write. From this twofold action of experience arise the ideas which constitute our conscious mental life. The senses convey to our minds from external objects those sensations which are the basis of such ideas as those of colour, taste, warmth, hardness, and other sensible qualities. The mind responds to these sensations both actively and passively, by means of its various innate faculties—*e.g.*, those of perception, retention, discerning, compounding, and abstracting. In this way the whole system of ideas is evolved, simple and complex. In part they come from without and thus correspond directly with things as they are, and in part from within, depending, equally directly, upon the innate constitution of the mind.

Each part of this theory raised large philosophical questions, which occupied Locke's successors until a deadlock was reached. Berkeley showed that

Locke's distinction between the external and internal sources of the ideas could not stand analysis. It is impossible in the last resort to argue that Locke's so-called "primary qualities"—*i.e.*, bulk, situation, figure, number, and motion or rest—are any more inherent in things themselves than the "secondary qualities"—*e.g.*, colour, sound, scent—which clearly depend upon the constitution of our senses. We cannot, in fact, Berkeley argues, know things as they are. Hume carried Berkeley's analysis still further, and showed that the same criticism can be applied to mind itself, regarded as an object of knowledge. We can know neither the mind itself nor its faculties. Only the experienced series of ideas remains, and how that series becomes coherent or continuous remains a mystery. Thus Hume brings Locke's sensationalism to the philosophical cul-de-sac which was inevitable from the very first, and Kant, "awakened from his dogmatic slumber," set to work in defence of sanity and ordinary common-sense to attempt the analysis of experience anew, and discover in what sense the plain man may be justified when he speaks of the existence of the world, the self, and God.

With the work of Kant, philosophy comes to its own once more, and the separation of philosophy and psychology becomes an accomplished fact. It is important to note this stage in the historical outline, because psychology has, for the most part, been content to acquiesce in the separation and thus, quite unwittingly, to base its speculations upon the philosophy of Locke and his school, sublimely ignorant of the fact that that philosophy is more than a century out of date. It has assumed mind, with innate faculties, and it has assumed the ideas as the basic elements of experience, without any clear thinking about their essential character. The results have been little less than disastrous. If psychologists to-day are so widely sceptical in their conclusions as to ultimate reality, it is not merely be-

cause they have been engrossed in the prodigious experimental development of their science, but also (as happened to the geologists and biologists before them) because they have given too little attention to the primary question of the nature and meaning of the very fact that there is an experience to be investigated, or that they themselves are there to conduct the investigation. And, after all, in the end, even to a psychologist, it is the psychologist that matters.

Locke's psychology was thus more lasting than his philosophy, being less critically examined. In its two main aspects it held the field almost to the end of the nineteenth century.

In the first place, he gives shape to the Faculty Psychology, already outlined, though quite unscientifically, by Aristotle and the mediæval Schoolmen. Locke devotes his first book to a destructive criticism of the theory of innate ideas, which had been largely used for the purpose of Christian apologetics. No idea, whether general and abstract or particular and simple, can conceivably be said to be in the mind from the first as a formulated idea. The modern exponents of racial symbolism would do well to take Locke's argument to heart. But the principle of mental activity underlying the formation of the idea must be there if the idea is to be formed at all. Faculties, not ideas, are innate, being part of the very constitution of the mind itself. Perception, retention, and the rest, clearly proceed from the mind, and not from any outside source. The blank sheet of paper may be blank, but nevertheless it is so constituted that we can only write upon it in certain quite definite ways. And thus the ideas which form our mental experience are the product partly of sensation and partly of these so-called faculties, the modes of the operation of mind. Locke works out his scheme of these modes on the basis of logical process, and it is interesting, in view of later developments, that he throughout compares and

contrasts man with the animals, allowing, for example, that animals have the faculties of perception and, in some degree, retention, but altogether denying them the faculty of abstraction.

The suggestion that the faculties should be analysed on the basis of mental process was a sound one, and has borne fruit in modern philosophy, especially in the discussion of the Categories. But the later psychology found the invention of faculties only too easy. It sounded like an explanation of morality, or art, or religion, to say that the mind had a moral, an æsthetic, or a religious faculty, and the confusion has been perpetuated in more recent times by the similar invention of instincts to explain activities of many kinds, activities which bear no relation to one another, or to the proper field of instinctive behaviour. The Faculty Psychology received considerable support from the physiological investigation of the brain, with its apparent differentiation of function on anatomical lines. For the most part it was subject to little criticism, and it held the field until quite recent times, when it gave rise to, and was displaced by, the study of instinct.

In the second place Locke's discussion gave rise to the doctrine of the Association of Ideas. Here, indeed, Locke had a predecessor in Hobbes, but it is his chapter on the subject in the later editions of the *Essay* that determined the subsequent tendency of English psychology. The starting-point is the simple and obvious fact that there is coherence in the mind. Mental elements, termed by Locke ideas, arising from the twofold process of perception and reflection do, as a matter of obvious fact, cohere in judgments and recur in memory. And certain principles, such as similarity and contiguity, can be seen to determine these relationships. The scent of roses may be associated with a certain name, because we first saw the bearer of that name in a garden full of roses. Two

people may be closely linked together in our minds for no other reason than that their noses are the same shape.

Association is clearly enough a fact, but it is a fact that has had far more than the honour which is its due throughout the classical period of psychology in this country. The most thorough-going attempt to make the principle of association explain everything was that of David Hartley in *An Enquiry into the Origin of the Human Appetites and Affections, shewing how each arises from Association, with an account of the Entrance of Moral Evil into the world. To which are added Some remarks on the Independent Scheme, which deduces all obligation on God's part and Man's from certain Abstract Relations, Truth, etc. Written for the use of the young gentlemen at the Universities. Lincoln, 1747.* This portentous programme is carried out by Hartley on the basis of three principles: (a) that there are vibrations in the brain substance; (b) that the principle of association governs the action of the Soul; and (c) that this principle depends upon the cerebral vibrations. For Hartley everything mental is capable of association with ideas. Ideas are, it would seem, identified with vibration, though it is vibration on a miniature scale. Sensory vibrations give rise to a disposition of the medulla to "diminutive vibratiuncles," and it is these that are linked by the laws of association. Thus he explains the connection of words with meanings. Assent to a proposition is due to an "inveterate association." Affections are accounted for by the association of the ideas of pleasure and pain with sensations, or with the ideas resulting from sensations. In short, association is the one principle needed to explain human behaviour. "All reasoning," says Hartley, "as well as affection, is the mere result of association."

The obvious flaw in Hartley's system is his failure to analyse the complex nature of human consciousness. He can confuse ideas and vibrations as happily as the

most modern of Behaviourists, and with just the same blindness to the problem involved. He has no intention whatever of being a materialist, though his discussion inevitably leads to that conclusion. And indeed, even apart from the very unsuccessful doctrine of vibrations, any thorough-going Associationism is likely to end in materialism of some sort, since it must depend for its success upon the application to mental process of laws of causation just as rigid as those which science postulates in the material world.

Whether "the young gentlemen at the Universities" found Hartley's medullary vibratiuncles easy to understand we have no means of knowing. At least he exercised a considerable influence. Joseph Priestley and Erasmus Darwin adopted his theory, vibrations and all, and elaborated it with considerable insight.

But it was in the following century that the Association theory really came into its own, in the writings especially of the two Mills, Bain and Spencer. In these writers Hartley's confused theory of vibrations is abandoned, and a definite distinction is made between the physical and the mental. It is seen clearly that the laws of Association are mental laws, having no proper application in any other than the mental sphere. And these laws are worked out perhaps as adequately as was then possible. The weakness of this school of psychology does not rest here so much as in its assumption that there is nothing in the mind except sensations, ideas, and associations between sensations and ideas or between ideas and ideas. The analysis of the idea is itself hopelessly inadequate. It is the mere residue when sensation has faded, a faint image of sensation, apparently like in kind to sensation itself. No sufficient account is given of the emotional tone or value of ideas, and still less of their meaning or relation to reality. Conation or effort seems itself to be reduced to an association of the idea of an act with the idea of the pleasure to be gained thereby. For James Mill

the ideas are the simple terms from which all else is compounded. Conation, cognition, and emotion or feeling have to be explained, often by considerable ingenuity, in terms of ideas. We can now see that this inverts the true order of analysis. Whether we retain the term "idea" or not (and it has certainly done enough damage in its time), the units of mental life cannot be treated simply upon the basis of sensation and concept. It is safer to realise that even in the simplest terms or elements to which mental experience can be reduced there is at the least a fourfold complexity, of which the idea proper is only the conceptual aspect. We can distinguish, for purposes of analysis, the objective stimulus of perception, the conceptual activity of cognition, with its reference in the present to past and future, the emotional activity of feeling, and the practical activity of conation. These can never be wholly separated, though there may be difference of emphasis. And any one of the four may be taken as fundamental for purposes of analysis. The idea of a feeling is no more real or important than the feeling of an idea. A clear appreciation of this would have saved the psychologists of this school from some of their worst blunders, especially in connection with Hedonism. It is not the quest of the idea of pleasure that dominates human life, but the pleasure of the quest for some value, meaning, or reality which must be determined by quite other than hedonistic standards.

This equation of experience with the series of ideas has given rise to all manner of confusions. From the time when Hume put it, almost satirically, in its simplest and crudest form, it has played a very great part in modern theory. Questions of all kinds speedily arose. What is the meaning of saying that we can have the same idea a second time? What is the permanent element in the idea, capable of being linked by association with other ideas and so of being revived? And, above all, how and where are ideas stored when we are

not actually conscious of them? Such questions drove psychologists back upon various solutions. Some simply said that ideas are capable of existing in two conditions, conscious and unconscious. Others preferred to avoid the obvious difficulty of saying what on earth an unconscious idea might be, and talked of a marginal consciousness or subconsciousness. For such writers the idea does not pass into complete unconsciousness, but remains unchanged in essence, only differing in the degree of our awareness. Of which it can only be said that it is simply untrue to all experience.

A closely parallel solution was to make the distinction between the conscious and the unconscious a distinction in the mind rather than in the ideas themselves. In such systems as that of Herbart consciousness was regarded as a kind of illuminated region of the mind. Ideas were said to pass into this region across "the threshold of consciousness," and at other times to remain in a kind of darkened antechamber. To the philosopher such language as this seems to border on mythology, and some modern psychologists, such as McDougall, are trying to escape from its influence. The objections, of course, are easily seen, and rest upon nothing more recondite than the obvious fact that philosophy and psychology alike are forms of conscious activity, and are therefore incapable of thinking about the unconscious without altering it in its most essential character—viz., that of unconsciousness. Theories of marginal consciousness are open to exactly the same objection. The psychologist cannot attend to his marginal consciousness without bringing it to the centre of attention, and then it has at once ceased to be marginal. Our whole knowledge either of an Unconscious or of a Subconscious must be inferential and not direct. They are hypotheses, for the solution of problems, not observable facts.

In recent psychology the cult of the Unconscious is

very strong. Philosophers for the most part are contributing little except criticism, often of a rather contemptuous kind. The criticism will not be wasted if it keeps the eyes of psychologists open to the really speculative character of their hypotheses. But there can hardly be any question that the hypotheses in themselves are justifiable. They may, in the end, involve the reconsideration of the nature of the mind, and a revision of the whole philosophical system of ideas. But in view of the fact that idealism has never proved capable of a wholly coherent statement, the philosopher has little reason to complain. The Unconscious, even if we change its name, has come to stay.

Before passing to the more specifically modern developments, we should note in passing the importance for psychology of the concurrent progress of physiology. Descartes, with his conjecture as to the purpose of the pineal gland, has had a host of successors. We have already noted Hartley's identification of ideas with vibrations, and at about the same date we have a whole series of investigators into the structure of the brain and the nervous system, setting out with the definite hope of proving that thought is a kind of glandular secretion. The hope was doomed to disappointment. No such secretion could be isolated, and no gland or cortical area seemed capable of assuming the rôle of mediator between mind and body. Nevertheless, the investigation has been extraordinarily fruitful. The psychology of the last century was greatly under its influence, most notably, perhaps, in the case of Bain. Both the Faculty Psychology and the Association Psychology lent themselves readily, if somewhat dangerously, to illustration of this kind. The former found support in the localisation of cerebral function, starting from the work of the phrenologists, led by Francis Gall. The various sections of the brain were mapped out, at first very unsuccessfully, but later with great scientific precision. It may,

indeed, be said that this alliance proved fatal to the Faculty Psychology in its older form, since the recognition of the auditory, visual, sensory, and motor areas did not in the least confirm the various suggested schemes of faculties. Phrenology proper is now a mere parlour game, and the Faculty Psychology has vanished, only to reappear in another guise in the modern discussion of instinct. When journalistic psychologists and popular preachers speak of "the religious instinct," or "the artistic instinct," or "the moral instinct," they call up ghosts which should long ago have been well and truly laid.

The alliance of physiology with the Association theory was much more successful, so much so that the physiological study of the nervous system is now a necessary preliminary to the work of an ordinary psychological laboratory. The importance of this study of "neurones" and "synapses" and "reflex arcs" is indicated by the fact that a very large proportion of the brain, consisting entirely of nerve cells interlacing in apparently almost unending complication, is now known as the "Association area." And it is clear enough that, whatever association may mean in its mental aspect, here is the mechanism by which in actual practice it is able to operate. We have first of all the simple reflex arcs, centred in the spinal column, whereby a stimulus is met by the appropriate response without reference to the controlling brain. And then, in increasing complexity, we have the neurones which pass up the spinal cord, some to the cerebellum and some to the various areas of the cortex, the latter alone reaching consciousness. The functions of this complex system have been observed and tabulated with great accuracy, and there has been a tendency in some quarters to regard this physiological study of the nervous system as the only true psychology. In particular, the theory of mechanical reflexes, especially in the form of "tropisms," has had a considerable

vogue. To this theory we must return later on, when our review of modern theories reaches Behaviourism, an eccentricity not of the nineteenth, but of the twentieth century.

3

It is clear to any observer, even if he is only a reader of the daily press, that at the end of the nineteenth century there was a sudden stir in the psychological world, a stir which had the effect of arousing public interest to an unprecedented degree. In the last few years the word psychology has been upon everybody's lips, and articles and books have been poured out in an apparently endless stream. Probably the tide of public interest, the kind of interest that is not prepared to think very hard, or to read very widely, is past the full, and psychologists can now turn from the profitable business of giving popular lectures and writing hasty and ill-considered books to the more serious task of finding out the actual position of their own science to-day.

It is not easy to estimate rightly all the reasons which have led to this sudden popularity. Probably it is to some extent accidental, and due to the concurrence of a group of causes which might have occurred separately without producing any such result. We cannot, for example, leave out of account the fact that William James, whose massive *Principles of Psychology* forms the link between the old and the new, was a great literary stylist as well as a great psychologist. Individuals sometimes count for a good deal in the history of thought. But two main factors of a general character must be taken into account, both being concerned with the widening and defining of the proper field of psychological enquiry.

In the first place, we have the enormous extension of the range of psychotherapy. This has excited very wide interest owing partly to the startling cures which

it has been able to record, and partly to the almost equally startling theories by which it has sought to explain them. The real importance of psychotherapy for the general theory of psychology has been that it has forced psychologists to study abnormal as well as normal human behaviour. The older psychologists set up a more or less arbitrary standard of normal human conduct, a lay-figure closely related to the "economic man" of the sociologists, a personage who would be of some value, if any actual man had ever resembled him. But in the latter part of the nineteenth century various writers, and notably Francis Galton and William James, introduced a new factor into the discussion by venturing to study the abnormal. Galton described and discussed, on associationist lines, such out-of-the-way phenomena as number-forms and colour-hearing, while James gave attention to a number of cases of dual personality, and also analysed, with an unrivalled brilliance of description, some of the more striking phenomena of religion in his *Varieties of Religious Experience*. Side by side with this, largely as a result of the growth of humanitarianism, went a new interest in people of abnormal mentality, from the point of view of treatment and cure. And this interest led to a study of a number of regions in the everyday life of normal men and women, which had usually been left on one side as of no particular significance, the most noteworthy being their dreams.

The development of this aspect of psychology started with Charcot in the school of the Salpêtrière at Paris. Charcot's attempts to study hysteria in his patients were based originally upon the theories of Mesmer, but his work gave the impetus to two of his pupils—Janet, who followed him in Paris, and who especially studied the problems of dissociated personalities, and Freud, who, working with Breuer at Vienna, developed his well-known theory of hysteria as due to

the repression of the sex-instinct. In pursuance of this theory, based as it was on the actual treatment of hysterical patients, he wrote his famous, if somewhat exasperating, book on dream interpretation, the well-known *Traumdeutung*, following it by his *Psychopathology of Everyday Life*, in which he applies the same general theory to common everyday slips in speech and conduct. It may fairly be said that these two books have been the main factor in arousing popular interest. Important as they are in this respect, they are not of great importance for technical psychology, since they simply use the methods and presuppositions of the Association Psychology. And though Freud's theories are in form revolutionary, it has been said, and truly enough, that he carried his revolution through by methods fifty years behind the times. The main significance of all this group of writers has been that they have forced upon psychotherapy the truth of the maxim, *Nihil humani alienum a me puto*. We must not leave the abnormal out of account. It is indeed only an aspect of the normal and must be studied with it. And the very fact that abnormal human behaviour is usually due to an isolation and exaggeration of some one factor common to normal humanity makes "Abnormal Psychology" abundantly useful for the study of normal individuals. As in many other branches of science, extreme cases are often the best means of testing a theory.

The second main factor in the sudden development of modern psychology has been the definite recognition that animal and human psychology must be studied together. This has been called the principle of Biological Continuity. It has been undoubtedly due largely to the impetus given by Darwin. Although Darwinism has itself never proved capable of a completely coherent statement, it has at least shown that the human body must be studied in relation to animal bodies, and especially to those which most nearly

approach man both in form and in behaviour. Modern psychology has applied this same principle to the study of the mind, with very striking and valuable results. In the older writers instinct was regarded as the special prerogative of the animals, while human conduct was supposed to be regulated by intelligence. A certain number of writers in the latter part of the nineteenth century recognise that instinct plays some part in human life too, and latterly Bergson, in his *Creative Evolution*, has gone so far as to suggest that the one great hope for human progress is that man should recover that intuitive and instinctive mode of reaction to his environment that he has so largely lost. But recent psychological thought tends to believe that man has his instincts, exactly as the animals have them, and that they are by no means lost or replaced by intelligence, but are, in fact, the driving forces upon which the energy of all life depends. This conception largely underlies the work of the Freudian psychoanalysts, though they are too busy with the detail of their theory to deal adequately with this fundamental point. The principal workers in this field have been W. McDougall and A. F. Shand, who have attempted the task of describing and differentiating the types of instinctive behaviour observable in man, and W. H. R. Rivers, whose *Instinct and the Unconscious* was a first attempt to correlate their results with recent enquiry into the history of the evolution of the structure of the nervous system.

It is interesting to note that the analysis of instinct replaces the older Faculty Psychology, with which indeed it has some affinity. But the Faculty Psychology was derived primarily, as we saw, from the analysis of the mental processes of judgment, while the modern psychology of instinct starts rather from the analysis of behaviour, and of the feelings specific to various types of behaviour. And this change constituted a revolution in psychological method. It set the science

free from the tyranny of the theory of ideas and opened the door to a wider conception of the general character of mental process. For modern psychology the cognitive process occupies only a middle position in the complex unity of what is sometimes termed a "mental element," following upon the apprehension of some stimulus and issuing immediately in the response of conation, the impulse which issues in action. And this whole process is accompanied by its appropriate feeling-tone, or "affect" as it is commonly called.

Starting from this general conception of mental process, McDougall, in his *Social Psychology*, is able to classify the instincts in man by means of the characteristic behaviour in which each of them results, and the characteristic emotion or feeling-tone which accompanies that behaviour. He defines the instincts in the most general terms as "innate specific tendencies of the mind that are common to all members of any one species." In the case of each instinct, the typical behaviour is evoked by a particular kind of stimulus. Thus fear, with its twofold motor reactions of flight and immobility (both well exemplified in a hare frightened by dogs), is typically aroused by anything sudden and strange, especially if accompanied by a loud noise. In some people this reaction to a thunder-clap is never completely controlled. At every peal there comes the preliminary leap of the heart, which is the first stage of flight, and the accompanying emotion of fear. In fact, so immediate is this physical reaction that, according to one theory (put forward by W. James and Lange), the emotion is simply the sensation of its first stages. It is perhaps hardly likely, in view of the dominant rôle which is now being assigned to the emotions, that the James-Lange theory will stand, but the general description of instinctive behaviour may be accepted for the present, subject to criticism in detail.

McDougall's list of the primary instincts in man may be tabulated as follows:

<i>Impulse.</i>	<i>Affect.</i>
Flight	Fear
Pugnacity	Anger
Repulsion	Disgust
Curiosity	Wonder
Self-assertion	Positive self-feeling or Elation
Self-abasement	Negative self-feeling or Subjection
Parental Instinct	Tenderness
Sex	
Feeding	
Gregariousness	
Acquisition	
Construction	

together with some simple primitive responses such as crawling and sucking.

McDougall argues that all other emotions and instinctive reactions can be reduced to the above, combined in various ways. Admiration, for example, is wonder combined with self-abasement. If fear is added it becomes awe.

The general principles from which McDougall started have been very generally accepted, though he himself in his recent book *An Outline of Psychology* has pointed the way to their criticism and restatement. The details of his list have been subjected to searching examination by A. F. Shand, in his *Foundations of Character*.

Shand regards practically all the items in McDougall's list as complex, and thinks that the term "instinct" should be reserved for the simple primary combinations which are each found in several of the higher emotional systems. Thus the same innervation of

the muscles serves both fear and anger. He then arranges the list of the simpler combinations in a series of increasing complexity:

Impulses.

Repose and exercise
Self-assertion and self-abasement

Appetite.

Sex
Feeding

Emotions.

Fear	Curiosity
Anger	Joy (with Sorrow)
Disgust	Repugnance

It will be noted at once that there are both additions to McDougall's list and omissions from it. The changes are largely due to Shand's theory of the Sentiments, which is his great contribution to recent psychology. He points out that these simpler emotions tend to be grouped together by reference to some object, and that some of McDougall's "instincts," notably the parental instinct and the gregarious instinct, have this character. They have, in fact, the feature that they bring together the tendencies of the other simpler impulses, and relate them in the one case to the child, and in the other case to the human society as their object.

Shand argues that this indicates the general characteristic of mental development. The whole life of the organism is gradually unified by the formation of these sentiments, of which the most typical are Love and Hate. It has now become customary to adopt this terminology. Psychologists speak of the Herd-sentiment rather than of the Herd-instinct. We

can even speak of the Ego-sentiment or the God-sentiment, indicating thereby those mental dispositions which regulate and direct the primary impulses, appetites, and emotions by reference to either the self or God. And thus the function of religion can be very simply stated. Religion (objectively regarded) exists to foster the God-sentiment.

It should be noted that this theory presupposes, but does not prove, the reality of the object about which the sentiment is formed. Some psychologists have written as though they had explained the Ego (and themselves therewith) away altogether by tracing the stages in the growth of the ego-sentiment. It is worth while to point out that they have done nothing of the kind. If the ego is the object about which the sentiment is formed, then, clearly, the object must precede the formation of the sentiment, not only logically, but in solid reality. And the same is true of God. The fact is that psychology is not directly concerned with such questions as are raised by the problem of the existence of the ego, the world, and God. But psychology does at least point us always to an object beyond the immediate self of experience. It looks beyond itself, and at least leaves open the door for metaphysics. And by that same door Faith may enter in.

The relation between these two extensions of modern psychology—that is between the Associationism of the Freudians and psychotherapists generally, and the amended Faculty Psychology of the students of instinct—is at present very obscure. In each of these directions a great deal of pioneer work has been done. The fields are well mapped out. But the underlying problems are by no means solved. The Associationists find themselves compelled to assume, for the sake of scientific precision, that some one or other of the instincts—to use that term in the broadest sense—constitutes the fundamental impetus of human be-

haviour, and that the stream of associated mental imagery is both the symbol of this fundamental impetus and the means whereby it finds expression. The idea, they urge, tends to bring about appropriate action. Imagination, say Coué and his interpreter Baudouin, and not will, is the dominant force in life. But they are in no sort of agreement as to which of the instincts must be treated as fundamental. The Freudians, with even more enthusiasm than their master, make sex predominant, though they extend the usage of that term to include large areas of the life of the child which are certainly remote from the sexual impulse as developed in adult life. Sidis in America and, on rather different lines, Rivers in England, have looked rather to fear, or, on broader lines, to the group of self-preserved impulses. Adler has dwelt especially upon the self-assertive impulse, arguing that the other impulses are expressions of the will to power. There is a good deal to be said in favour of this last view, which adapts itself well to the general grouping of the instincts adopted by Shand. But it is of some importance here to distinguish the developed self-assertive impulse, as described by McDougall, with its characteristic physical signs, from the more fundamental self-assertion which is seen in every effort made by an organism, even the very simplest, to fulfil and satisfy the varied impulses of its life.

It is probably true to say that psychologists in general are coming more and more to think that the truth is not wholly with any one of these schools. The Freudian theory was based largely upon the study of hysteria, and it is doubtless true that the hysterias of civil life can, in many cases, be traced to conflicts connected with sex. But the recent war gave us a whole host of examples in which the conflict was concerned with quite different causes, and notably with fear. And Adler is probably quite right in claiming that in many of the cases where sex is involved, it is not primary,

but that some form of the demand for self-assertion is the real cause of the trouble. It is thus probably true, as indeed it is *a priori* probable, that any of these fundamental impulses may be the disturbing factor in a case of mental disorder, and if this is so it follows that, so far as the needs of the Association theory are concerned, we must look to the whole group of instincts rather than to any one as predominant. And we must expect that, in different individuals, at different times, and in different environments, we shall find marked differences, as our war experience of the neuroses has shown, in the extent to which the various instincts are finding expression alike in normal conduct and in the formation of neuroses.

The divergence of the various schools on this point is symptomatic of the general position of recent psychology. It has been immensely successful on the descriptive side. There has been a great amount of careful introspection and of accurate laboratory work. New methods of investigation have been invented, such as the method of free association, with its precise noting of reaction times. The application of these methods, especially to industry and to education, has gone on apace, as, for example, in the study of fatigue and of vocational tests. But the more fundamental discussion as to the nature of mental process is not nearly so far advanced. There is, indeed, a good deal of danger that the very dogmatic assertions of some psychologists as to the ultimate meaning of life (or, in some cases, its lack of ultimate meaning) may be accepted without sufficient challenge, on the ground of their great knowledge of descriptive psychology. It must never be forgotten that description is not explanation, a mistake which science has often made, though less commonly to-day than fifty years ago.

It may broadly be said that the central issue for modern psychology is the problem long ago raised by Aristotle when he analysed the four types of cause:

material, formal, efficient, and final. As to the first two of these, modern psychology raises no doubts. It accepts the principle of cause and effect and applies it to mind as confidently as science in general has ever applied it to material things. But the questions of the motive power and of the purpose of life remain, and here lie the main issues for psychology to-day.

The problem of the efficient cause has already come across our path in our attempt to relate the psychology of instinct to the Association Psychology of the analytical schools. Even within the units of mental life, the "mental elements," we must at least ask the question, Why does apprehension pass over, by the way of cognition and affect, into conation and action? We can see, by descriptive psychology, the presence of the material and formal causes. We can investigate stimulus, environment, and mental disposition. But, when all is said, why does anything happen? Is there a driving impulse, and is there anything that can be called purpose?

These two questions must be taken separately. On the first a great deal has been written, and the debate is still keen. There have been parallel movements here in psychology and in philosophy, movements which have, in some degree, affected each other. Among the philosophers there has been a movement in the direction of "Creative Evolution," to use Bergson's phrase. The Neo-Idealism of Croce and the Italian School conceives reality as the eternally creating self-expression of ideas. In the Realism of S. A. Alexander, as set forth in his recent Gifford Lectures, reality itself, starting from the lowest level, that of "space-time," is eternally producing that higher thing that is to be, rising to new and unforeseen levels. Bergson himself conceived the driving force of life, the *élan vital*, as operating rather from the past, an inherent creative tendency which thrusts forward against the static resistance of a dead universe until

its living resources are exhausted. Bergson hints, though it is no more than a hint, at the possibility that the life-impulse may, in the end, be victorious, conquering even death itself in its onward rush.

The problem has been forced upon psychology mainly by the needs of psychotherapy. The healer of the mind must know whether he has an ally in the mind itself, a life-force which is alike the source of the disorder and, if rightly handled, the source of the cure. It has been customary, though not at all fortunate, to name this life-force the "libido," a term used alike by the Freudians and by the followers of Freud's pupil and critic, Jung. The unhappy sexual connotation of the word has caused a good deal of unnecessary misunderstanding, though, of course, it makes it peculiarly well adapted to the Freudian system. In connection with the libido, two main questions arise. In the first place, are we to regard the libido, with Freud, as a life-energy fixed in kind and capable of using the instinct-channels provided for it only in certain specific ways? In this case it is simply a force, unknown in its exact nature, but strictly the equivalent of the steam in a locomotive or the electrical current in a dynamo. Or are we, with Jung, to see in the libido something closely akin to Bergson's *élan vital*, a power with the character of free creation, continually striving to build up a unified mental structure in harmony with environment? There is all the difference in the world between the two positions, a difference which finds expression in the widely different theories and methods of psychotherapy as practised by the followers of Freud and Jung respectively. It is ultimately upon Jung's broader theory of the libido that the whole complex system of cure by suggestion depends.

The place of suggestion in modern psychological practice is very great, and it is important in connection with the problems of religion, especially in connection

with prayer and worship, but it is impossible to give it more than a few lines here. Suggestion depends upon the principle that an idea or mental image presented to the mind tends to be accepted by the mind without question, and to result in the appropriate response unless there is reason to the contrary. In the various systems of psychotherapy advantage is taken of this "primitive credulity" of the mind to varying extents, and a considerable technique has been evolved for the purpose of rendering suggestion effective. The Freudians claim that psycho-analysis proper does not involve any element of suggestion, but Freud himself has admitted that the prestige of the method, and of the analyst, together with the hope of cure, are factors which cannot be ignored. And the critics of the Freudian method declare, not without some plausibility, that the results of the Freudian analysis are not wholly derived from the patient, but are at least in part suggested by the analyst, often quite unconsciously. Jung and the Zürich School admit the place of suggestion, but urge that it must be given along lines which represent the patient's own constructive effort towards mental health. This is to be discovered by analysis, since it lies in the unconscious. The popular auto-suggestion school, led by M. Coué, has little psychological background, but falls more or less into line with the followers of Jung in its insistence that hetero-suggestion must become auto-suggestion before it can be effective. There has been some little danger in religious circles that prayer may be confused with auto-suggestion, from which it differs in practically everything that is of importance. Conscious intercourse with a personal God has little resemblance to a mechanical implanting of ideas, however pious, in the Subconscious, even though that may be one of its secondary results.

The whole theory of suggestion is thus simply an extension of the general discussion of mental mechan-

ism. And the very elaboration with which this mechanism has now been analysed has led to a series of attempts to explain mind on wholly mechanistic lines. These attempts fall into two main classes. In the first place there are the Freudian analysts, who obtain their results by a rigid application of the old Associationist determinism, dealing with the mind exactly as science had dealt with matter. The law of cause and effect is unconditionally accepted, and freedom, with value and meaning, are thereby banished. The revolt of the Zürich School, with its conception of the libido as free and creative, is of the first importance here (despite Jung's own disastrously ill-informed handling of religion in his *Psychology of the Unconscious*, which unfortunately omits to reckon with the existence of historical facts and accepts Drews as a typical Christian theologian!). The fact is that Freud, with all his masterly power of detailed observation, has left out some of the most fundamental elements in human personality, and has thereby simplified it to the point of unreality. The majority of psychologists to-day, so far as they accept analytical methods at all, prefer the leadership of Jung.

In the second place we have Behaviourism, for which we are indebted to our brethren in the United States. It is difficult to deal patiently with a system so persistently perverse and blind to the essential facts. The Behaviourists find their test in McDougall's definition of Psychology as the science of behaviour, but make a use of the definition which its originator never contemplated, and which has led him to modify it in his latest work, *An Outline of Psychology*. They assume that the physical aspects of behaviour are the only aspects of any importance, and thus they reduce psychology to a form of biology, and almost of physiology. Here we have again that influence of the study of brain anatomy which we found affecting the older Association Psychology in Hartley and Bain. And though

the study is more detailed and more accurate in description, it remains as unsatisfactory as ever in its treatment of the fundamental questions of the nature of consciousness and of freedom, with its corollary of moral responsibility. Some writers of this school, such as J. B. Watson in his *Psychology from the Standpoint of the Behaviourist*, simply treat consciousness as irrelevant. It may occur as an "epiphenomenon," but we can say nothing about it. The only thing that matters is the study of behaviour, and behaviour is governed entirely by "conditioned reflexes." One prominent exponent of this type of psychology, E. B. Holt, in *The Concept of Consciousness*, goes even further, since he denies the most outstanding fact of consciousness—viz., the fact that it is conscious, and reduces all experience, whether of effort, knowledge, desire, or feeling, to movements of particles or of streams of energy. But this, as the Freudians would say, is merely a regression into psychological infantilism, recalling David Hartley's unhappy "vibratiuncles," and without the inconsistencies which enabled Hartley to retain a sane view of human life in the end. For, after all, even if consciousness were always a consciousness of vibrations or of movements of particles, which is, at the least, by no means certain, it is simply meaningless to say that it is itself a vibration or movement. The veriest moment of introspection, despite Holt's lengthy explanation of the way in which the illusion came about, is sufficient to destroy his case.

Bergson's refutation of mechanistic theories, in his *Creative Evolution*, seems to be conclusive, though probably they represent a mode of thought which will be with us to the end. But what of the alternatives?

McDougall, in the book just quoted, has recently put forward a strong plea for the recognition of purpose as the central factor in behaviour, and though he has not yet developed his case fully (his promised second volume has not appeared at the date when these words

are written), there is no doubt that the psychology of the future must take purpose into account. Of course Bergson's drastic criticism of "finalism" must be taken into account, but the finalism with which Bergson deals is merely an inverted mechanism, a pull from in front substituted for a push from behind. This is not purpose in the sense intended by McDougall. Purpose is in itself a thing present rather than future, though always looking to the future. It is a free creative activity, and by that very fact introduces into human behaviour an element that is unpredictable. This, however, does not mean an element of mere arbitrary chance, which is the least free of all things. That which is purposed must be purposed in accordance with the law of cause and effect. In fact it is by the aid of that law that it finds its freedom, as T. H. Green has shown (*Treatise on Political Obligation*, Introductory Lecture).

It is easy to see that this thesis put forward by McDougall is in line with many of the accepted facts of human behaviour. It is especially clear that the activities of the instincts are invariably directed to ends beyond themselves, either to the preservation or the reproduction of the organism or the species. In the same way Jung's theory of the libido, which in this respect agrees with that of Adler, reveals it as a creative and constructive impulse looking to the adaptation of the organism to its environment. The very mental disorders which form the field of psychology are themselves regarded as efforts at self-adaptation by the organism. Illness is frequently, if not always, an attempted solution of some problem created by man's environment, and the cure is sought by an alternative solution, a solution to which the patient's own mental tendencies supply the clue (so, at least, Jung has suggested, with considerable practical success). Clearly a psychology which omits purpose, like a psychology which omits consciousness, fails in its own first and

foremost obligation as a descriptive science. A true psychology must cover all the facts and not merely a selection.

McDougall includes purpose, or direction towards an end, in his definition of behaviour, thus contrasting behaviour proper with mechanical reflex action. He has no difficulty in showing that even the lowest forms of life, the *Amœba* or *Paramœcium*, show many of the marks of behaviour, and that this is even more clear as we rise to the *Insecta* and the *Vertebrata*. His latest definition of instinct is as follows: "An innate disposition which determines the organism to perceive (to pay attention to) any object of a certain class, and to experience in its presence a certain emotional excitement and an impulse to action which finds expression in a specific mode of behaviour in relation to that object." Here the relation of instinct to an object, end, or purpose is definitely recognised. As against Bergson, McDougall urges that intelligence is not an alternative to instinct, but its companion and ally. Intelligence is developed in the higher animals to provide for that plasticity in the attainment of the purposes of instinct without which the adjustment of the species to its environment would become dangerously rigid. The elaborate instinctive behaviour of the *Yucca* moth renders it wholly unfitted to play any large part in the life-order of the world. Those species which have the most generalised instincts, served by the most adaptive intelligence, stand by far the best chance in the struggle for dominance. This does not, of course, mean that these generalised instincts are not powerful, or that they play but a small part in the life-history of the individuals of such a species. Even in man they are fundamental. And from the very beginning, and throughout, they are, in the broad sense, purposive, directed, however unconsciously, towards ends beyond themselves, and finding their proper climax in the conscious purposes of adult human life.

This brings us to some of the problems with which the psychology of to-day is faced, problems closely related, and in each case passing ultimately beyond the scope of psychology proper and into the sphere of philosophy. The first is this problem of the purpose or end of life. It has crossed our path again and again, in various forms. Partly it appears as an inner demand of the organism itself, continually looking beyond itself to some higher thing, as in the *élan vital* of Bergson, the libido of Jung, the instincts (resting upon a fundamental life-energy which operates through them), of McDougall. Partly, as in Shand's theory of sentiment-formation, it is the external demand of some object drawing the primitive instincts into emotional dispositions directed towards that object. Psychology has interested itself in the analysis of the emotional dispositions, and on this side there is still much to be done. But the analysis of the object is probably more important still, not merely for the theoretical issues involved, but for the actual guidance of life. It at once appears, upon the least reflection, that the only objects which are capable of undertaking this rôle of sentiment-formation are personal, ourselves, others, God. All other objects are secondary, and can only become objects for the unifying of mental disposition in relation to one or other of these three. As the Freudians rightly say, though they give an unnecessarily limited meaning to the phrase, it is the "love-life" alone that really counts.

The second of these problems is that of the nature of the Ego or Self. Just as in theology we are faced with the fact that life may be self-centred, withdrawn from the love of others or of God, which is the sin that is unto death, so in psychology we find that the Ego may become its own object, in some cases with disastrous results. The problem of the nature of the Ego

has been forced upon the analytical psychologists by the group of intractable disorders which seem to depend upon this withdrawal of the Ego from object-reality to the object-self. Freud has endeavoured to give even this a sexual turn by calling it Narcissism and connecting it with childish auto-sexuality. But in his later work (e.g., in his *Introductory Lectures on Psycho-analysis*) he practically admits that the psychoses, as these disorders are termed, involve causes distinct from those which underlie hysteria and anxiety-neurosis. He has attempted an analysis of the ego in its relation to the group in his *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego*, in which he makes all group psychology go back to the relation existing between the "primitive horde" and the father-leader, the development of the individual ego from its original self-centred state being due to the pressure of the "ego-ideal," the common mind of the group for its members. There is, of course, no doubt that the life of the family, and of the wider social organism, exercises an almost all-powerful influence upon the development of the individual, but this is not the same thing as the development of the fact of his individuality. Given self-consciousness, we can easily see how it comes to be filled with content. But the origin of the Self-consciousness itself remains as much a mystery as ever. The problem has been handled by a good many writers of different psychological schools, but all the discussions that claim to give a solution fail in the same vital point. They confuse the subject-ego with the object-ego, and think that they are explaining the existence of self-consciousness when they are merely explaining its states. The sooner psychology recognises self-consciousness as the central and irreducible fact from which all investigation must begin, the better for psychology.

This does not, of course, mean that there is no task for biology and psychology in this connection. The

whole history of the differentiation of the biological unit is in itself a most interesting one. It would be fascinating to work out the psychology of a colony of coral polyps, if we had any means of entering into its experience from within. But external study of its behaviour takes us no part of the distance. Even when we come to the animals nearest to man, the monkey and the dog, we still stand outside their consciousness, and can make no inference from their behaviour as to its existence. As a direct datum of intuition we find it in our own lives, a fact not to be explained away, and a starting-point for a train of metaphysical enquiry which lies wholly beyond the scope of psychology.

And so we come to the third of the problems which psychology is facing to-day—the problem of moral responsibility. The fact of moral responsibility is unquestionably an element in normal human experience. But what is its meaning? Again the psychologists explain it, to the point of explaining it away. The problem is closely bound up with those of the purposive character of life and of the existence of the ego. Moral responsibility finds its place readily enough in the experience of an ego capable of purposive self-development. And it will not unnaturally relate itself to the fact that the individual ego has its place as the member of a group. But this is by no means the same thing as to say that conscience is merely the pressure of the “herd-instinct” resting upon a basis of paternal admonitions. These things account, doubtless, for much of the content of conscience in any given case, but that is all. The fact of the existence of conscience, with its implication of an absolute standard of moral values, lies beyond the explanations of a merely descriptive psychology.

Our general survey of the progress of psychology may close at this point. The later essays in this volume will deal in detail with the application of the various

theories to the problems of religion, so that there is no need to point the moral here. The history of psychology is certainly a story lacking its last chapters, and it is by no means clear yet how the plot will work out. But that is because it is an adventure of humanity, and humanity, despite the Behaviourists, is free.

III

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF PRAYER AND
RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE

BY

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III

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF PRAYER AND RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE

THE utmost that a psychological study of prayer and religious experience may be expected to yield is a description of these phenomena. A description, however, is not an explanation. Psychology is not concerned with objections to prayer, but with the fact and the analysis of its content. When we attempt to move from description to explanation, we pass the bounds of psychological enquiry and enter into the realm of philosophy and metaphysics. It may be impossible, however, to keep this investigation of the psychology of prayer and religious experience strictly within its legitimate limits, and that because some psychologists have ventured from the results of their enquiries to deduce conclusions of a highly disputable character. On psychological grounds, for example, the ultimate validity of religious experience and the objective reference in prayer is seriously challenged. The hypothesis that our beliefs are a subjective delusion and our prayers examples of auto-suggestion is put forward in all good faith by some writers as the best explanation which a psychological analysis of the data yields. Clearly, then, psychologists, in reaching these conclusions, have passed beyond descriptions of the data to theories adequate, in their opinion, to explain them. They have thus thrown out a challenge to the defenders of religious beliefs and have raised afresh ultimate questions. The reality of the supernatural, the objective existence of God, the meaning and value of finite individuality, and its relation to ultimate

reality—these clearly are problems for the philosophy of religion and cannot be settled offhand only by the unaided evidence psychology furnishes. The data for the defence or the repudiation of Theism are derived from many and varied sources. Every science, psychology included, may furnish its quota, but the verdict reached will not be one based only upon a descriptive analysis of mental and spiritual states and religious experience apart altogether from other evidence. Even if the psychological analysis of the prayer life and religious experience were to yield irrefutable evidence of the purely subjective character of man's communion with the Unseen and justify at the utmost its merely psychological objectivity, this would not in itself be the death-blow to Theism. It would simply demonstrate the negative character of the approach to Theism *via* psychology. It would be a warning that nothing beyond a psychologically objective reference could be deduced from a psychological investigation of the data of religious experience. It would leave the problem of the ultimate objectivity of God unsolved, and the question whether man in prayer can and does reach Him would have still to be discussed apart from anything psychology could furnish for or against the Theistic hypothesis.

It will be the aim, then, of this Essay to examine the psychology of prayer and religious experience, having in view these negative conclusions some have drawn from their study. We have felt it necessary, however, at the outset to utter this caution as to the very limited scope of psychological enquiries into spiritual states, and their non-conclusive character as evidence for the hypotheses some have sought to substantiate by their means. We hope to show, moreover, that the psychological data, carefully analysed, by no means substantiate the purely subjective character of religious experience, and certainly do not yield anything like conclusive evidence of the illusory

nature of man's communion with the Unseen, nor do they justify our dismissing the prayer life as an æsthetic sentiment or a product of auto-suggestion.

The apologetic character of our work is thus due not to our own failure to recognise the strictly descriptive function of religious psychology and the very limited nature of the results we may be expected to reach from such a study. It is rather due to the fact that this has not been observed by some who have strayed beyond their legitimate tasks as psychologists, and have endeavoured to prejudice the validity of the Theistic argument by means of conclusions drawn quite illegitimately from psychological data and by introducing explanations which, strictly speaking, lie outside the boundaries of psychological enquiry.

It may be well at the outset to give in brief outline the kind of explanation of religious experience and the prayer-life with which we are presented by certain modern psychological theories and the findings of some psycho-analytical investigations.

In essence they amount to this—viz., that religious experience is purely subjective; the fruit of certain temperaments in the case of persons of varied intelligence and culture. It is due, we are given to understand, to the urge or libido, the life-impulse; it is the expression of the dream fantasies of the race or the subconscious desires of the individual. Thus Jung in his *Psychology of the Unconscious* finds the true explanation of Christianity in racial dreams. He thus reduces it to an illusion of the experient, the creation, in fact, of the experiencing mind. Here we have the real significance of myths and religions. They are transformations of the libido, interpreted in the widest sense of that term, the equivalent, if we will, of Bergson's *élan vital*. This is the hypothesis which solves the problem of the origin and worth of religion. It is a product of earth. In its origin it is "fantasy-thinking." In its reference it is a dream-created super-

natural. As to its intrinsic worth or ultimate validity, we must answer the question by the value we attach to that stuff that dreams are made of. We must, in any case, give up the attempt to seek for the metaphysical origins of religions. We are assured that we can find all we want and a sufficient "explanation" in its psychic and physiological origins. Moreover, to find it there is plainly of great value, since we are moving strictly all the time within a province open to "scientific" investigation. We have not to seek for the "Given" in some metaphysical entity called "Heaven" which forever eludes the grasp of the scientific explorer. The "Given" is within the scope of the psychology of religion, and the method of psychological investigation called psycho-analysis in the hands of the Vienna or the Zürich schools is all we need to employ in order to enable us to lay bare the phenomena of religion and to dissect religious experience and the prayer-life. By such a method we are at least enabled to reveal it for what it really is—viz., fantastic forms created by the life-force, the unconscious activity of the libido. Thus religion takes its place with myth, magic, art, poetry, music, dreams and neuroses of all kinds, the product of what is at bottom that formidable stream of natural instincts and desires of a fleshly kind which is the real basic source of our life. The fairest forms of art, the finest products of literature, all the fruit of æsthetic activity, are sublimations of the instincts. So the purely natural and animal instincts, on this hypothesis, may become sublimated into the supernatural—that more purified and elevated cuckoo-land of fair dreams and hopes. Truly a wonderful sublimation which can produce the spiritual from the natural, the moral from the sensual, heaven from earth, that which is above nature from that which nature is! In dealing with all these psychological theories, whether in the hands of psychologists generally or in those of the psycho-analysts in particular, we have always to re-

member that they are based upon a whole-hearted acceptance of a thoroughgoing evolutionary theory, and, so far as we can judge, necessitate a whole-hearted acceptance of Naturalism. The lowliest beginnings in the subconscious "emerge" finally in forms which bear the stamp of heaven itself upon them, and Freud will undertake to show us exactly how it is done. First the *libido*; then that against which it reacts, the *censor*; issuing in *repression* or, if rightly directed, *sublimation*. Thesis, antithesis, synthesis! What would we more?

Many of us may have found Jung's *Analytical Psychology*, if in places unpleasant reading, at least suggestive of a scientific investigation. We are bound to confess, however, that we are strongly tempted to wonder whether he means us to take his *Psychology of the Unconscious* seriously. Yet there seems to be no doubt whatever that it is meant to be a scientific investigation. We are left wondering whether the allegorical method in Biblical interpretation ever reached the height of improbability attained by this author. In any case the Biblical exegetes did not work in the name of "science," whilst Jung does. His English translator, Miss Beatrice M. Hinkle, tells us in the preface that in *Wandlungen und Symbole der Libido* Jung has plunged boldly into the treacherous sea of mythology and folklore in order to apply psychologic analysis to the productions of the ancient mind and that of the common people in order to reveal the common bond of desire and longing which unites all humanity. He is thus seeking to bridge the gaps presumed to exist between ancient and widely separated peoples and those of modern times. The discovery of this undercurrent affecting and influencing ancient and modern races, we are told, is Jung's starting-point for a new ideal, a new goal of attainment which can be intellectually satisfying as well as emotionally appealing—the goal of moral autonomy. We are thus promised

"a new evaluation of the whole of human life." Jung offers us "an understanding not only of the symptoms of a neurosis and the phenomena of conduct, but the product of the mind as expressed in myths and religion."

Psycho-analytical study thus proposes to present us with a completely new reading of the true place and significance of religion and prayer in our daily life. Science, by the method of psycho-analysis, is to produce a religion free from all needless superstitions, rooted and grounded in empirical reality, open to the test of scientific investigation, and furnishing for one and all a new way of developing our personalities "by converting certain psychological tendencies which could produce useless symptoms or destructive actions into valuable productions." Thus the magic word of the future, which is to define our life's task and produce the scientific "Utopia" in place of the nebulous "Kingdom of Heaven," is the word *Sublimation*, which is defined as "the utilisation of the energy of libido freed by removing the repressions and the lifting of infantile tendencies and desires into higher purposes and directions suitable for the individual at his present status." The religion of the future has, then, we assume, for its central task not the regeneration and sanctification of men through Divine agency and supernatural Grace, but rather the remaking of man by himself. Ignorance of the "battle of the tendencies" within him and lack of knowledge of how to utilise these forces to the best ends alone prevents to-day the advent of the Superman. Psycho-analysis in all seriousness proposes to dispel our ignorance and increase our knowledge in this direction.

We trust that we may not be accused of attempting anything in the nature of exaggeration in this outline sketch of the aim and scope of Psycho-analytical Psychology. All we wish to do at this stage is to see clearly what is at issue for religious belief if we accept

any such psychological description of its origin and any such descriptive analysis of its content. It constitutes a real challenge to the Christian hypothesis as to the meaning of religious experience and the prayer-life.

Let us see, then, what is the Christian hypothesis and what are its religious implications.

I

What is prayer? A religious definition of prayer would be that of the Psalmist: "Unto thee, O Lord, do I lift up my soul." In this sense prayer is an activity of the whole human personality in its effort to respond to, and to form contact with, and to hold on to Another, after whom it is consciously or unconsciously seeking, with whom it has at least some vague if indefinable communion. The reference, then, in all true prayer is to an Object other than itself towards which the soul is drawn by an impulse which St. Augustine best described when he said: "Thou hast made us for Thyself, and our hearts are restless until they find a rest in Thee." The motives which give rise to this spiritual activity in the quest after the Living God may be varied. There is the sense of dependence, the feeling of weakness and consequent need for help from supernatural powers. There is, again, the effort of the soul to secure deliverance or salvation by casting itself upon what it feels to be a hidden but beneficent Power greater than itself and able to help. However varied the motives to prayer, they are one and all secondary and subordinate to the primary urge of the soul-life, itself seeking to form contact with the source of its inmost being and the principle of its deepest life. "Thou couldst not have sought Me, had I not already found thee." Why? because "in Him we live and move and have our being." We are His offspring.

"Religion," says Auguste Sabatier, "is an intercourse, a conscious and voluntary relation, entered into by a soul in distress with the mysterious power upon which it feels itself to depend, and upon which its fate is contingent. This intercourse with God is realised by prayer. Prayer is religion in act; that is, prayer is real religion. It is prayer that distinguishes the religious phenomenon from such similar or neighbouring phenomena as purely moral or æsthetic sentiment. Religion is nothing if it be not the vital act by which the entire mind seeks to save itself by clinging to the principle from which it draws its life. This act is prayer, by which term I understand no vain exercise of words, no mere repetition of certain sacred formulæ, but the very movement itself of the soul, putting itself in a personal relation of contact with the mysterious power of which it feels the presence—it may be even before it has a name by which to call it. Wherever this interior prayer is lacking, there is no religion; wherever, on the other hand, this prayer rises and stirs the soul, even in the absence of forms or of doctrines, we have living religion."¹

All this is a description of prayer in the language of religion, but it is sufficient if from it we conclude that we must be careful, in seeking to define prayer, not to confine it narrowly to any one of its many forms or aspects. The forms prayer has taken are a revelation of the richness of the experience of which they are the expression. We have not exhausted its meaning when, for example, we have named petition, intercession, thanksgiving, worship, and adoration as forms in which it expresses itself. We have ever to bear in mind the fact that in itself it transcends all its forms and overflows them. To describe it adequately would be to describe in all their infinite variety the relations of the human soul with God. The material for such a

¹ Quoted by William James, *Varieties of Religious Experience*, p. 464. Auguste Sabatier, *Esquisse d'une Philosophie de la Religion*, 2me ed., 1897, pp. 24-26, abridged.

description is to hand in religious biographies, the world's sacred books, the accumulated data from the comparative study of religions, the varieties and uniformities of religious experience as these have been disclosed in the history of man's religious life. It has been left to our own day, however, to witness an attempt at a systematic study of these sources. Pioneers like William James, Starbuck and others paved the way, and now there is a rapidly growing accumulation of material which is being scrutinised and sifted with a view to the building up of something in the nature of a science of religion. It is hoped that a minute analysis of religious experience in its varied forms over a wide field may enable us to deduce the principles and formulate the laws which govern this realm of man's nature. We are thus possibly in sight of a study of religion as an empirical science. Let us assume, however, that all this psychological investigation issues in something like a successful elucidation of the laws which govern the prayer-life and the principles which underlie man's religious experience. Should we have succeeded in exhausting the meaning of prayer? Would it not still present us with elements and aspects which baffle psychological analysis? This raises the whole question of the limits of descriptive psychology. Can it ever explain knowledge at all? If the answer is in the negative, it is a strong point against those psychologists who have attempted to undermine the evidential worth of religious experience from an analysis of the data and a psychological description of their processes.

Now the limits of descriptive analysis are, or should be, becoming increasingly recognised in all branches of psychology. Is any emotion, we may ask, ever exhausted in a description of it? Are not all these descriptive analyses of feeling states and mental activities, when dissected by the psychologist's knife, simply the bare bones and inanimate tissues of an experience

which, somehow, like life itself, escapes from and eludes the grasp of the physiologist and the anatomist? No introspective observation of our states of feeling and our emotional experiences, it may be urged, can ever yield us the full content of the living experience as lived. The analysis is always subsequent to, and not contemporaneous with, the feeling analysed. We should submit that, because of this time-interval between experience felt and experience analysed, the psychological observer is for ever doomed to let escape just that in the experience which constitutes its fullest reality, and which we venture, therefore, to name the transcendental element in it. And if this holds good for all feelings, it is valid pre-eminently for the religious feeling. Why? Because in the religious feeling man is stirred to the very depths of his inmost being, and chords are vibrating in this experience in a way of which no subsequent descriptive analysis can give others any adequate idea.

“ Oh, could I tell, ye scarcely would believe it !
 Oh, could I only say what I have seen !
 How can I tell, or how should ye receive it !
 How till He bringeth you where I have been ! ”

If experience must always transcend a description of it and contain more than words can express, then no empirical description of prayer, however exhaustive, can fully cover its content.

Psychologists may claim that their scientific approach to the study of the phenomena with which they deal enables them to ignore such a hypothetical entity as the soul as a thing in itself apart from its activities, and, in fact, the only knowledge we have or can have of it from the empirical standpoint is a knowledge of its activities. Hence the modern “ psychology without a soul.” The data with which the psychologist deals are intellectual, emotional, and volitional activities. He knows nothing of an Ego behind these activities and presumably the source of them. He is concerned

with sensations, perceptions, volitions, thoughts, emotions. Professor James expressly discarded the idea of an abiding substance, the soul, as necessary or useful to the psychologist. For the empiricist, the self is a "stream of consciousness." It may, though it need not, be more. In any case the question is one for philosophy and not for psychology to settle. We are not here concerned to traverse the arguments for or against the existence of a self or soul as the more adequate hypothesis to account for the unity and continuity of consciousness. Our point for the moment is this. If, as we are told, the hypothesis of a soul is unnecessary in psychology and is needless for expressing the actual subjective phenomena of consciousness as they appear, it follows that a psychology so circumscribed and purely empirical can never claim the last word on the subject of the ultimate validity and objective reference in all experience. If psychology overlooks the individual in describing his states and ignores the creative activity of the mind itself in all descriptions of resultant mind-states, then it is disqualified to pass a judgment upon what is or is not contained in the full content of an experience, religious or otherwise. The experient alone can claim to know what the content of his experience is, and even he cannot fully describe it. An external observation or even an introspective examination of self-consciousness may quite easily miss that in it which makes it what it is.

In his endeavour to vindicate the evidential worth of religious experience, and more particularly the mystical element in religion, Dr. Rufus Jones has pointed out that there are many forms of human experience in which the data of the senses are so vastly transcended that they fail to furnish any real explanation of what occurs in consciousness. This, he contends, is true of all our experiences of value, which apparently spring out of synthetic or synoptic activi-

ties of the mind—*i.e.*, activities in which the mind is unified and creative. Dr. Rufus Jones calls attention in this connection to the true significance of Leibniz's famous addition to the scholastic formula that there is nothing in the mind that has not come through the senses, *except the mind itself*. Modern study of human personality, he says, has emphasised the creative activity of the mind, which is always an important factor in experience and one that cannot be ignored in any of the processes of knowledge. An important conclusion follows. If psychology ignores this factor and claims that in its purely descriptive function as a science it cannot do otherwise than reject hypothetical entities, then Dr. Rufus Jones is right in his contention that the prevailing psychologies do not explain knowledge at all. "The behaviourists," he writes, "do not try to explain knowledge any more than the astronomer or the physicist does." The psychologist who reduces mind to an aggregation of describable "mind-states" has started out on a course which makes an explanation forever impossible, since knowledge can be explained through unity and integral wholeness, never through an aggregation of parts, as though it were a mental "shower of shot." His conclusion is that "Knowledge is always Knowledge of an object, and mystical experience has all the essential marks of objective reference, as certainly as other forms of experience have."

To the same effect Dr. Waterhouse in his thesis on *The Philosophy of Religious Experience* has warned us that the significance of religion in life is not revealed wholly by its extent. In some part, at least, he says, it is found in its subjective intensity. No psychological analysis of a sensation can reproduce its "feltness," and no objective representation of religion can do full justice to the actual experience.¹ And again, he reminds us that whilst it is impossible

¹ P. 29.

to present to those who have not felt it, the quality or tone which yields to the experient the deepest conviction of the worth and reality of his experience, psychology can at least mark its outward effects by not overlooking the individual and his experience.

Let us now turn to the more careful consideration of the dynamic effects on human life and conduct which result from prayer and religious experience. Our question is this, What more precisely is the effect upon the human when it achieves real contact with what it thinks is the Divine ?

Here we shall follow closely one whom we have come to trust as a sure guide in the treatment of what he has aptly called "spiritual energies in daily life." Dr. Rufus Jones has laid us all under a sense of gratitude for the way in which he has treated the mystic's experience of God, and its effects in human life. He points out that there are many different degrees of intensity, concentration, and conviction in the experiences of different individual mystics, and also in the various experiences of the same individual from time to time, and he warns us that it is a mistake to regard the state of ecstasy as *par excellence* mystical experience. "The calmer, more meditative, less emotional, less ecstatic experiences of God are not less convincing and possess greater constructive value for life and character," he says, "than do ecstatic experiences which presuppose a peculiar psychical frame and disposition. The seasoned Quaker in the corporate hush and stillness of a silent meeting is far removed from ecstasy, but he is not the less convinced that he is meeting with God. For the *essentia* of mysticism we do not need to insist upon a certain 'sacred' mystic way, nor upon ecstasy, nor upon any peculiar type of rare psychic upheavals. We do need to insist, however, upon a consciousness of commerce with God amounting to conviction of his presence."

What is the result? Take the case, for example, of Brother Lawrence, who, as we are reminded, was not an ecstatic; but simple and humble as he was, he acquired through his experience of God "an extraordinary spaciousness of mind."

"The more normal, expansive mystical experiences," Dr. Rufus Jones says, "come apparently when the personal self is at its best. Its powers and capacities are raised to an unusual unity and fused together. The whole being, with its accumulated submerged life, *finds itself*." Again our author points out that there are many human experiences which carry a man up to levels where he has not usually been before, and where he finds himself possessed of insight and energies he had hardly suspected were his until that moment. One leaps to his full height when the right inner spring is reached. And, again, we are familiar, he says, with the way in which instinctive tendencies in us, and emotions both egoistic and social, become organised under a group of ideas and ideals into a single system which we call a sentiment, such as love, or patriotism, or devotion to truth. So also are we familiar with the way in which a well-trained and disciplined mind, confronted by a concrete situation, will sometimes—alas! not always—in a sudden flash of imaginative insight discover a universal law revealed there and then in the single phenomenon. Literary and artistic geniuses supply us with many instances in which, in a sudden flash, the crude material at hand is shot through with vision, and the complicated plot of a drama, the full significance of a character, or the complete glory of a statue, stands revealed.¹

It is along these lines that Dr. Rufus Jones bids us seek to understand the most important mystical experiences. "They occur," he tells us, "usually not at the beginning of the religious life, but rather in the ripe and developed stage of it. They are the fruit of

¹ *Op. cit.*, pp. 137-142, abridged.

long-maturing processes." "Clement of Alexandria called a fully organised and spiritualised person 'a harmonised man,'—that is, adjusted, organised, and ready to be a transmissive organ for the revelation of God."¹ "Clement's 'the harmonised man' is always a person who has brought his soul into parallelism with divine currents, has habitually practised his religious insights, and has finally formed a unified central self, subtly sensitive, acutely responsive to the Beyond within him. In such experiences which may come suddenly or may come as a more gradual process, the whole self operates and masses all the cumulations of a lifetime. They are no more emotional than they are rational and volitional. We have a total personality, awake, active, and 'aware of his life's flow.' Instead of seeing in a flash a law of gravitation, or the plot and character of Hamlet, or the uncarven form of Moses the Law-giver in a block of marble, one sees at such times the moral demonstrations of a lifetime, and vividly feels the implications that are essentially involved in a spiritual life. In the high moment God is seen to be as sure as the soul is."

Such is Dr. Rufus Jones's subtle and penetrating descriptive analysis of the mystical experience, and it affords us all we need in our approach to a study of the psychology of prayer and inspiration. Whether such experiences are to be regarded as normal or abnormal is a question to be answered by a pragmatic test. "An experience," he says, "which brings spaciousness of mind, new interior dimensions, ability to stand the universe and the people in it, and capacity to work at human tasks with patience, endurance, and wisdom, may quite intelligently be called normal, though to an external beholder it may look like what he usually calls a trance of hysteria, a state of dissociation, or hypnosis by auto-suggestion."

¹ P. 140.

Bearing these considerations in mind, let us now examine the implications of the Christian hypothesis that in the prayer-life and religious experience there is a real Object with which man achieves communion. Prayer in this case is not a monologue but a dialogue. Man in prayer speaks to God. God hears prayer and answers. How far is this reference to an Object legitimate? Is there really existing a God or gods with whom the soul of the religious man in prayer forms contact, or is the whole process purely subjective and illusory?

An adequate answer to such questions would, of course, take us far beyond the limits of a psychological study. For our present purpose we must confine ourselves simply to an examination in outline of the distinctive features of religious experience, and such an analysis of its content as will serve to enable us to adjudicate upon its fitness as data for an appreciation of its evidential worth.

Now, in the first place, what is the verdict of religious experience over a very wide field as regards the objective reference in prayer and worship? From many current works of an apologetic character on this question we may select for our purpose that of Dr. Waterhouse, who, we think, is on strong ground when he asserts that, in whatever way the religious relationship is expressed, it is always held to be a relation between a human subject and a god or gods actually existent. The objective existence of the gods is unwaveringly believed in at all stages. When the belief wanes the religion breaks down. If religion be a form of auto-suggestion, it has existed only because of the entire ignorance of mankind of that fact. Recognition of it would instantly have been fatal to religion.¹ And again: "If the idea of God refers to no objective reality,

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 58.

if man's faith is but the echo of his own heart's cry, religion has not been simply an unparalleled blunder, it has been the most piteous tragedy of humanity. . . . Unless faith brought its own justification to the faithful, religion would have perished as magic has perished amongst educated races. Neither the rational nor the pragmatic criterion, after all, has the last word in religion. Through all its vastly differing expressions, from lowest to highest, there is a psychological unity in the religious consciousness. It seeks human values through a superhuman ground of value. That is its most fundamentally common characteristic, and through all its long history it has always been satisfied that it has not sought wholly in vain."¹

This is certainly a striking fact. The man of prayer prays because he believes, and the reality and intensity of his prayer is the measure of his belief as well as that of his need. Convince him that the gods are fictitious and the Unseen World a land of fair hopes and illusory dreams, and his prayer life will sooner or later reflect the death-sting administered to it. A creeping paralysis of the prayer life is the issue of unbelief. Whatever others may think or say about the objective existence of the Deity, the man who prays witnesses by that fact to his own belief in the real existence of God. But this fact does not necessarily exclude the hypothesis that prayer is auto-suggestion. The verdict of the man of prayer is not itself a proof of the existence of God, nor is his belief any guarantee of the objective reference in prayer. Prayer may quite well be a form of auto-suggestion without his knowing the fact.

Let us look, however, a little more closely at the argument. Is prayer auto-suggestion? If the two were identical, the question is whether the habit of prayer would persist after the experimenter had definitely harboured in his consciousness the conviction that there really was no God to whom he was praying.

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 75.

Would he continue with any real ardour or intense spiritual wrestling to seek for Grace when he had come to the conviction that it was self-generated, and a product of his own manufacture? How long would a man continue to derive benefits from a series of false self-suggestions after he had come to believe that they were false—*i.e.*, after he knew that he was deliberately deluding himself? This raises the real issue as to whether the efficacy of auto-suggestion does not depend ultimately upon the truth of the idea suggested. For example, would Coué's method as expounded by Baudouin in *Suggestion and Auto-suggestion* really work if the ideas suggested to the subconscious mind were utterly false and known to be so? If in prayer-life there were no such thing as supernatural Grace coming from a real God in answer to prayer, would the habit of prayer survive amongst intelligent people? We have long been familiar with the reflex action of prayer, but this has only been regarded as a by-product in an experience which first and foremost is an activity of the soul outward from self towards a definite goal other than self. The question is whether such reflex action of prayer would continue or could continue apart from its indissoluble connection with the primary reference in prayer of the soul to God. If the valuable by-product, in reflex action, of prayer is bound up with the reality of the whole prayer-experience in its objective reference, in all probability it could not, and evidence could be produced that it does not, continue without it.

The assumption in all prayer, as we have seen, is the existence of a real Object, God, with whom the soul seeks to come into contact and with whom it believes itself in prayer to hold communion.

Now let us assume for a moment that this hypothesis is the true key to the phenomenon of the prayer life: can we point to any subjective results from such communion, and, if so, is their character such as to militate against

the rival hypothesis of the illusory nature of the prayer-experience ?

The question is, What kind of results may be reasonably expected from such a source ? Can we point, for example, to any fresh knowledge of or real insight into Divine Truth ? Have we any body of knowledge claiming to be derived through Revelation and Inspiration, Prayer and Communion, and of such a character as justifies us in maintaining that it could not have come to us from any other than a Divine source, and that it cannot be accounted for in human experience in any other way ? Has prayer in any well-authenticated cases given to the world new light or new discovery in any sphere of knowledge, sacred or secular ?

It would be difficult to answer these questions in the affirmative, and to attempt to do so would in any case involve us in an excursion into the whole field of comparative religion. We should have, moreover, to examine minutely the whole history of the People of God with a view to demonstrating the unique character of Jewish Ethical Monotheism as a revealed religion. We should have to canvass the argument, for example, of Dr. Hamilton, and defend the validity of his thesis in claiming for the Jews a privileged position as the mediators of a special Divine Revelation through Inspiration in contrast to the methods adopted by God for other races whom He enabled to discover Himself in and through His immanent activity in the Gentile world.

Such a line of enquiry, even if satisfactorily and exhaustively pursued, would scarcely yield the sort of decisive evidence we feel we need, if we are to present it to psychologists as a conclusive refutation of the thesis that prayer is auto-suggestion and nothing more. Would any evidence be conclusive ? We think not. The kind of evidence which would satisfy a scientific mind working merely with empirical data can never be furnished by religion, since the Supernatural, *ex hypo-*

thesi, cannot be demonstrated merely in terms of sense-experience, and God can never be so produced in time and space as to be available for physiological examination or psychological analysis.

The thesis that prayer is auto-suggestion and that its fruits show no necessary reference to a Supernatural Objective Source, a God with whom man has come into intimate touch through prayer, and from whom he has received authentic tidings and otherwise undiscoverable news of things Divine, can only be met by showing that the Christian hypothesis is a better and more probable explanation of the facts.

The utmost we can hope to do is to examine the nature of the effects of prayer in human life. Whether people have been the unconscious subjects of delusion and self-hypnotism, or whether verily they have been touched by the finger of God, is to be answered by a study of the effect of prayer in human life. What then is the effect upon human life when it achieves what it believes to be real contact with the Divine at a sensitive point?

That, broadly speaking, prayer has had beneficial results in human life will scarcely be disputed. We want, however, to point in particular to the revolutionary effects of religious experience, and ask whether such results can be adequately explained on the hypothesis that the saints have grown in grace and in the knowledge of our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ simply by prolonged internal talk with themselves and an unusual capacity for self-communing with their own subliminal consciousness? Dr. W. S. Bruce has a helpful treatment of this question in his work on the *Psychology of Christian Life and Behaviour*. In his chapter on the Psychology of Prayer he reminds us that in the evolution of a Christian life prayer is always a correlate of the transformed character, and he goes on to show that auto-suggestion can never explain the fact of continuance in prayer.

"Every saintly life," he says, "the longer it is lived, finds prayer ever more helpful. What is the explanation? It is found in the region, not of illusion, which is weakening, but in that of resultant power. Illusion only exhausts our spiritual energies. It depresses and it ends in doubt. The power generated in prayer confirms resolution and strengthens morality. All neuropaths, as Professor W. James shows, are pithless weaklings. The men of prayer have ever been the men of power."

But not only is the place of prayer the place of power to the individual. It is also the place of a force which generates power in the Church and Nation. History justifies such an assertion, as Dr. Bruce goes on to show; and he gives an apt quotation from the late Professor Gwatkin's Gifford Lectures to the effect that "this illusion has been the great nation-making, nation-binding, nation-breaking force in history."

What is the conclusion? "Such moral forces," says Dr. Bruce, "do not spring out of auto-suggestion. They have their source in something more firm and abiding than subjectivity or the subliminal consciousness. That source is nothing less than Reality. And the universe backs this experience."

The argument is that an experience of prayer and fellowship with God which achieves such revolutionary results in human life both individual and national has a most genuine title to the name of reality, and is scarcely covered by the new explanation of the prevalence of prayer put forward by Psychology.

What is the value of this argument? Its strength may be perhaps the better appreciated if we dissociate it from a form in which it is sometimes put, and which we feel only tends to weaken it in the eyes of those who have reached the conclusion that prayer only rests on suggestions and auto-suggestions of a purely psychical origin.

It is suggested that the experient's own explana-

tion of the phenomenon has evidential value. Is this so?

Dr. Bruce, speaking of those who pray, tells us that men pray from some sense of inward necessity coupled with the assurance that the need of which they are conscious will in this way, and in no other, meet its satisfaction. "They are convinced," he says, "that in prayer something for their benefit is genuinely transacted. They are sure that they talk to some One, or some Force; that it is a dialogue, not a monologue; not solipsism; not a mere meditation, but an act of communing with one who is willing to answer." And again, speaking from personal knowledge of the religious experience of common people, he says that if we could only penetrate these experiences and report some of them, "the poorest crofter on the hillside, the humblest dweller in the city lane, would possess undying interest for us. We should discover most uncommon experiences of communion with God in common people, which, if correctly told, would rival those of Jacob Boehme, of St. Francis, of George Fox, or of Fred W. H. Myers."

It is well for us to bear this in mind, because it enables us to dismiss the charge brought against the religious experience of the outstanding characters of history, that it is merely mysticism and presumably worthless from the point of view of evidential value. Professor Pratt, in his able treatment of *The Religious Consciousness*, has shown the real continuity in content between the humblest experiences in the prayer life and the intenser forms met with in the religious biographies of the more famous Mystics. The one he calls the milder form of mysticism, and the other the more intense. In this way we are enabled to link on mysticism proper with its antecedents, and to show that the prayer-life in all its forms is really a unity of experience. If this is so, then what is known as mysticism cannot be isolated and treated as an abnormal

phenomenon, nor can it be rejected as simply a rare type of experience, since it is differentiated from normal religious experience in degree only, and not in kind.

Now we should admit at once that the verdict of the experient is not in itself of much worth, still less is it in itself a proof, and the only proof that can be adduced, of the objective reference in prayer. This would amount to saying that the experient himself alone could give an explanation of the experience, and that his explanation was the only one that carried with it any guarantee of its truth. It must be what he says it is, because after all it is *his* experience, not *ours*, and he alone is competent to explain to us what it really was. Were we to accept the argument in this form we should simply end in pure solipsism, and we should be forced to accept as objectively true the claims of those who admittedly are suffering from delusions of any kind without their being themselves aware of it. The argument from experience on these lines would be of little value.

What we can say is that in a very real sense the experient alone can claim to know the content of the experience, since, as we have seen, there is no possibility of reproducing in descriptive form an exhaustive account of the "feltness" of a feeling. The experient's own explanation of the experience is to this extent entitled to a fair hearing, and cannot lightly be dismissed in the absence of conclusive proof from other sources that his interpretation is plainly erroneous.

If then the verdict of men of prayer and the mystics is, broadly speaking, unanimous, it ought to carry some weight in helping us to decide between the rival hypotheses of subjective illusion or objective reality: but it is not conclusive, and by itself is of little evidential worth.

What we can do, however, is to test mysticism, as we have tested its milder forms, by the question of its

fruits. If mysticism be merely religious hysteria, will this account for its results in life and conduct? Dr. Bruce is right when he says that the supreme test of the truth of such intuitions lies in their results for life and conduct. He puts the case strongly when he says that "these are highly ethical and individual. They invariably deepen the sense of sin. There comes a stronger dislike to all that is evil: a desire, often an intense craving, after God-likeness, a devotion to Christian service, a growing delight in the life of prayer and communion. These are the fruits of faith which are incontestable. They are proof of the reality of the experience. Epilepsy and hysteria have never produced them. Hypnotism in its effects is as far from them as the heavens from the earth. Uncontrolled emotionalism never strengthens, but weakens. It is a mark of the degenerate more than of the mystic. It never creates men like St. Paul or St. Dominic or St. Augustine or Savonarola. With these men faith was a life-force, co-operating with reason and every other power of the mind. They could reason with cogency. But their reasoning had a power and their life an influence which cold, hard thinking has never attained. Their experiences of spiritual life gave them an enthusiasm and a weight of character that made them great spiritual forces in their day and generation." "It is doubtful," he adds, "whether any Christian leader of great power ever was without a large element of the mystic in him. It has usually been the secret springs of his influence. He was 'not disobedient to the heavenly vision.'"¹

Now it is not necessary from our point of view to overstate the case, and we are well aware of the force of the counter-argument which would point us to the immense harm religion has wrought in human life and conduct. Mysticism in particular has laid itself open in its history to the charge that its fruits have

¹ *Op. cit.*, pp. 179-180.

often been of a barren and unprofitable character. These are serious charges and part of the general indictment urged against religion in all ages. Their reappearance in the argument from psychology as to the illusory character of religion was to be expected. We admit the weight of the charge, but we think it can be met. Perhaps the most suggestive treatment of the whole question is to be found in Baron F. von Hügel's *Essays and Addresses*, more particularly his two weighty papers on "Religion and Illusion," and "Religion and Reality," which will repay any amount of time spent upon their study. Mr. H. Balmforth in his lucid and searching treatment of the problem, "Is Christian Experience an Illusion?" gives us a convenient summary of the general indictment which we will reproduce.

"Another closely allied group of objections to the validity of religious experience with its claim to know supreme and unchanging Holiness," he says, "dwells on the effects on social well-being of supernatural religion, which, it is alleged, has largely ignored or tried to tyrannise over wholesome legitimate human activities. Wherever we look among the higher organised religions (to say nothing of more primitive types), there is evidence of narrow-minded obscurantism and other anti-social ignorances, follies and crimes, not merely proceeding from men who happen to be religious, but caused by their religion. Human sacrifice, the fires of Moloch, the temple prostitution, devil-terrors and grovelling fears of all kinds, are hideous inhumanities of primitive superstition which have not left themselves without a progeny in the more advanced religions to vex mankind and bar its progress. Religious intolerance has been one of the greatest scourges in history. Jewish fanaticism fought against art and Hellenism. The Mohammedans burnt down the great library of Alexandria on religious grounds. Most important of all, Christendom has to answer for

a long tale of sins against the advancing spirit of enlightenment. The death penalty for the heretic, however conscientious and upright, was first imposed in the fourth century, to become terribly frequent against the Albigenses, and an organised part of social machinery under the Inquisition. Short of the cruel death at the stake, torture, imprisonment and confiscation were freely employed. 'Religious' was occupy much of the historian's time, and in France, Germany and the Netherlands there was plenty to give sting to Montaigne's quiet irony, 'It is setting a high value on one's opinions to roast men on account of them.' Protestants and Anglicans were as culpable as Roman Catholics. Luther had no mercy for Anabaptists, nor Calvin for Servetus. Three or four persons were burnt at Norwich in Elizabeth's reign for unchristian opinions, and at Tyburn and elsewhere numbers of Roman priests suffered death for their faith. Roger Bacon, Bruno, Copernicus, Galileo, made courageous efforts to correct scientific error and establish truth: they all met ecclesiastical censure; and none can read the story of religion's relations to science without shame and sorrow. How is it possible, we are asked, to reconcile a valid experience of supreme Wisdom and Goodness with all this criminal folly done in the name of that supreme Reality? Is it not a sufficient indictment of superhuman religion to point to its history and its fruits? *Tantum religio potuit suadere malorum.*"¹

It is a serious charge, we repeat, and one that cannot be ignored by those who wish to press the argument for the validity of religious experience upon the ground of its beneficent results in human life and conduct. It can, however, be met, and to meet it we should have to refer, for example, to works like Brace's *Gesta Christi* or Mozley's *Achievements of Christianity* to remind ourselves of the debt the world owes to religion.

¹ *Op. cit.*, pp. 42-4.

Mr. Balmforth devotes a chapter to the *Crimes of Religion*, and frankly faces the worst that can be said, in his endeavour to substantiate the contention that the crimes of religion, distressing as they are, do not actually invalidate the truth of religious experience. He urges four considerations.

1. The true facts of human nature in its historical development, as von Hügel shows, are that man's advance is uneven; now one energy, now another, spurts ahead, but a harmonious progress is hardly ever found. And this is true both of nations and of individuals. Intellectual and æsthetic development need not, and as a matter of history does not, keep pace with ethical and spiritual advance.

2. Man's moral responsibility has not always been what it is now, and an historical study of ethics and religion would show moral advance in comparison with what had preceded, where we now, from a higher altitude, can see nothing but a defective morality. If, as von Hügel says, we were always to compare the conviction, command, or practice of one time, race, or country, not with those of much later times, or of quite other races or communities, but with the closely or distantly preceding habits of one and the same race or community, we should discover that in many cases which now shock us the belief that God had spoken was attached to genuine, if slight, moves or to confirmations of moves in the right direction; and in all such cases the belief was, so far, certainly well founded.

3. Religion is actually responsible for much less crime than appears on the surface. Here Mr. Balmforth turns the results of modern psychological enquiry into the mainsprings of human motives against the psychologists themselves. The reasons given for human conduct are not necessarily the ground of such actions. In normal life, as Mr. Balmforth shows, we can detect everywhere the same gap between the reasons

assigned and the motives actually operative in human action. So it is when we examine the psychology of religious persecution, intolerance, and hostility to new truth, with their train of evils. "Frequently," says our author, "these things have not proceeded from the religious complex at all, though done deliberately and avowedly in the name of religion. They have masqueraded under the cloak of religion, but they have emerged from quite other sides of man's psychic life."

4. We have to make allowance for the historical fact of the tares amongst the wheat. Christianity has had to struggle with the handicap of large numbers of unconverted or partly converted adherents, and this has seriously weakened the corporate character and insight of the Church. The general Christian conscience has been dulled, and as a necessary consequence the religious experience of the Church as a whole has never had that purity and intensity which it should have had, and therefore its refining influence on moral action and moral insight in Europe has been laboured and slow with grave set-backs.

"Such considerations as these," Mr. Balmforth rightly says, "do not lessen the grave burden of guilt which lies on the shoulders of religious societies. Only a disingenuous special pleading can evade the plain lesson of history that religion has been stained throughout by crime. But they do tend to cut the ground from beneath the feet of the critic who seeks to deny the validity of religious experience on the basis of this criminal record. Imperfections and dimness of religious apprehension can most readily be admitted; but that admission would be made without hostile attack. To go beyond that is to go beyond the rights of the case and the weight of evidence."

We have felt it necessary to reproduce somewhat fully Mr. Balmforth's treatment of the question, relying as he does upon Baron von Hügel's general argument, because we think that along these lines a

sound defence of the Christian hypothesis can be sustained in face of the worst that can be urged against it from this standpoint.

We should claim, then, that on the whole the fruits of prayer and religious experience have been beneficial in human life and conduct. Further, that the counter-argument of the ill-effects of religion in human history, whilst weighty, is not conclusive evidence against the Christian hypothesis of the reality and objectivity of the source from which it is claimed such fruits are ultimately derived—viz., a Personal God in communion with His finite creatures. We have also seen that an examination of the character of the effects wrought in human life and conduct as the result of such communion does not justify us in claiming that we have data furnished from this source of an undeniably supernatural kind. We cannot, in other words, point the sceptical psychologist to these fruits and maintain that they bear unmistakably marks of their Divine origin, and that their presence in human life cannot be otherwise accounted for except on the Christian hypothesis. We have to admit that their evidence is rather indirect than direct. We agree entirely with the conclusion reached by Dr. Rufus Jones, that “mystical experience does not supply concrete information. It does not bring new finite facts, new items that can be used in a description of “the scenery and circumstance” of the realm beyond our sense horizons. It is the awareness of a Presence, the consciousness of a Beyond, the discovery, as James puts it, that ‘we are continuous with a More of the same quality, which is operative in us and in touch with us.’”¹

Leuba, in his book on the *Belief in God and Immortality*, gives the results of his questionnaire as to the form or image or symbol under which God is conceived, and he says that two-thirds of the men and nearly half the women disclaimed any mental

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 153.

image of God. The larger number of the remainder distinguished between image, or symbol, and reality. In a remarkably large number of cases, however, a description in sensory terms was held to represent God adequately. That young people having reached the mental development of college students should think of God as "actual skin and blood and bones, something we shall see with our eyes some day" is, he says, almost incredible; but the evidence is compelling. Seven per cent. held apparently to a thoroughly anthropomorphic conception of God.¹

It is worth while quoting his figures: "Of 290 men, 39 per cent. imagine God in human form. To 80 of these the form is a mere symbol; to 20 it is a reality; while 7 find it impossible to decide whether the image represents the reality or is a symbol. Of 640 women, 34.5 per cent. picture God in human shape. Of these, 166 state definitely that the image is a mere symbol, 42 think it actually represents the reality, while 13 cannot decide." Again, on the question of the personal or impersonal nature of God, Leuba tells us that as many as 31 per cent. of the men, and only 11 per cent. of the women conceived God as impersonal. If the "doubtful" cases are added, the percentages rise to 40.5 per cent. for the men and to 15.7 per cent. for the women.

Now, if in prayer and religious experience we are in touch with a real God, how are we to account for such a diversity in the description of Him given by those who presumably have had a genuine experience of Him in the prayer life?

We put the question simply to show the justice of Dr. Rufus Jones's remark as to the meagre stock of knowledge the genuine mystic reports. The notorious difficulty of expressing in words or of giving others any adequate idea of the experience is sufficient to account for the diversities and even contradictions

¹ *Op. cit.*, pp. 204-5.

in the accounts given by religious people of the God with whom they claim to have been in communion.

"It was not an accident that so many of the mystics hit upon the *via negativa*, the way of negation, or that they called their discovery 'the divine Dark'!"

We are not, then, to expect concrete information as the fruit of the mystical experience. What are we to expect? Let Dr. Rufus Jones answer the question for us, since no one is more competent:

"The most striking effect of such experience is not," he says, "new fact-knowledge, not new items of empirical information, but new moral energy, heightened conviction, increased caloric quality, enlarged spiritual vision, an unusual radiant power of life. In short, the whole personality, in the case of the constructive mystics, appears to be raised to a new level of life, and to have gained from somewhere many calories of life-feeling, spiritual substance.

"We are quite familiar with the way in which adrenalin suddenly flushes into the physical system and adds a new and incalculable power to brain and muscle. Under its stimulus a man can carry out a piano when the house is on fire. May not, perhaps, some energy from some source with which our spirits are allied flush our inner being with forces and powers by which we can be fortified to stand the universe and more than stand it! 'We are more than conquerors through Him that loves us,' is the way one of the world's greatest mystics felt."¹

Such is the religious explanation, and we should submit that a review of the phenomena of the prayer life, the mystical experience both in its milder and more intense forms, and religious experience generally whether viewed in its varieties or its uniformities over a wide field, justifies the rejection of the hypothesis that it can all be accounted for adequately as the fruit of self-contemplation, self-communion, self-introspec-

¹ *Op. cit.*, pp. 153-4.

tion, auto-suggestion or subjective illusion of a purely psychological origin. At least we are entitled to say that the evidence derived from a psychological investigation is not conclusive against the Christian hypothesis, and, if anything, points rather in that direction. In other words, the objective reference and the ultimate validity of the experience is not ruled out, and we are free, therefore, to attempt to substantiate it on other grounds, and submit it to a philosophical treatment, in spite of anything that psychology as such may say against it.

3

It remains to say a word on the question of some recent constructive efforts to substantiate the religious explanation, and we will suggest that psychology itself in its study of human life and behaviour really allows room for the Christian hypothesis as the best explanation of the phenomena of religious experience.

Of current attempts at such a task we should single out that of Dr. Waterhouse in his dissertation on *The Philosophy of Religious Experience*, from which we have already quoted, and the work of Dr. R. H. Thouless in his *Introduction to the Psychology of Religion*.¹ Both are very promising, and give us helpful lines of argument along which we believe that a sound apologetic may be built up. We should like to include also the work of Mr. Balmforth, to which we have already referred, and that of Dr. Rufus M. Jones. The treatment of the question by Dr. Rufus M. Jones which we have followed throughout this essay, although it comprises only a few pages in his book on *Spiritual Energies in Daily Life*, contains more suggestive thought than can be found in many larger works, and will repay the closest study. It is much to be hoped that a comprehensive treatment of the whole problem may be forthcoming in view of the fact that the issues raised

¹ This essay was written before Dr. Selbie's work appeared.

by psychological study and the theories put forward by the Psycho-analysts go to the very root of the whole Theistic problem and present a more searching challenge to religious belief, in our opinion, than anything we have so far been called upon to meet in the whole history of Christian apologetics. The difficulties of the challenge are enormous, since at almost every turn the psychological investigations open out into the field of metaphysics and question all the postulates of a Christian philosophy. The defence, therefore, cannot be conducted strictly within the limits of psychology, but must be carried on in the larger sphere of the philosophy of religion and embrace all the arguments for or against Theism, and must meet a new Naturalism fortified by such evidence as psychologists believe they can furnish in support of it. We are thus faced to-day not simply with a denial of the adequacy of the Theistic belief, but with such an explanation of it as deprives it of any ultimate reality. Psychology, by explaining religion in its origin, development, and the variety of its forms, succeeds in explaining it away. This is a more deadly attack than a mere denial. If the explanation is adequate, the triumph of Naturalism is complete. We should have to admit that, on the premises of Psycho-analysis, all religious experience was an illusion, and could lay no claim to ultimate reality. What we shall have to do sooner or later is to submit these premises to a most searching examination and attempt to refute them. This is a formidable task, but it must be undertaken, since the issues are vital for Theism and must be faced.

We cannot now examine, even in outline, the efforts at a constructive apologetic made by, for example, the two writers referred to, but we cordially recommend them to the careful attention of those of our readers who wish to pursue the study of the subject in greater detail. All we can attempt here is to indicate what we think is a fruitful line of enquiry opened out by

that vast trans-marginal field which the psychologists refer to as the subconscious or the unconscious, and which is only just beginning to be explored. The question we want to ask in the light of this is, whether man has any way of approach, except through the senses, to knowledge of reality. Is the assertion of some psychologists true when they maintain that "all conscious processes are based on sense-stimulation, and all thought as well as perception depends on reaction to sense-stimulation"? Such a statement raises metaphysical issues of a highly disputable kind and involves a theory of knowledge by no means universally accepted. Let us revert for a moment to the dictum of Leibniz in his appropriation of the scholastic principle, *Nihil est in intellectu quod non fuerit in sensu, nisi intellectus ipse*.¹

Have we, in view of this revelation of the creative activity of the mind itself in all knowledge, fully accounted for the whole of man's experience when we have laid bare that only in it which can be adequately accounted for as derived from sense-stimulation? We will not now criticise the concept of the "subliminal region," nor contend for the unity and continuity of consciousness through all its supposed states and stages. Probably in the end we shall see reasons for rejecting any artificial boundary lines dividing the self and postulating arbitrary lines marking off the various levels of consciousness. Without, however, binding ourselves to any acceptance of the hypothesis of the subconscious, and referring to it as the supposed origin of much which emerges into consciousness and the presence of which is otherwise difficult to account for, at least we can claim that the psychologists are themselves teaching us to believe that we are greater than we know. If we are the possessors of a consciousness of which we are unconscious, then we are open on all sides to impressions which we can receive from

¹ *Nowv. Ess.*, II. 1, 2.

any and every world in which we live and move and have our being. Besides the unconscious which links us to the animal kingdom and gives us our roots in the lower stages of the anthropological tree, there may be also a supraliminal sphere to which the deepest in us has access, and to which we may become vitally linked by invisible but real ties in so far as man, by means of his highest faculties—what in theological language we should name his spiritual self—is enabled to reach out to the Beyond which is in him. If the subconscious witnesses to his origin from below, and, as the Psycho-analysts remind us, smells of the earth, our habitation, the sensual and the beastly, the supra-conscious witnesses to his higher destiny above, and both together reveal to man his true place as a being poised between two worlds and linked to both—the one from which he has come, and the other towards which the urge of life bids him ascend.

Now the man of prayer and the mystic in the experiences of the religious life claims to have access to this other world of spirit through the exercise of his highest faculties. Through a spiritual activity he finds himself *en rapport* with a spiritual environment, just as through a psychical activity he finds himself adjusted to the world of sense-impressions. If we admit the validity of the one world, the external world, on the evidence of sense-experience, why are we forbidden to claim an equal validity for the other, the spiritual world, on the evidence of religious experience? Not that we wish to postulate a kind of sixth sense by which man is enabled to intuit God and experience the Divine. All we contend for is an extension of the avenues of knowledge beyond physiological and psychological sense-stimuli, and to claim that by an activity of his whole personality at its highest levels man can apprehend reality in a richer and fuller degree than is possible for a less richly endowed being—*e.g.*, the animal or the merely psychical man. We should

defend in this connection the Pauline distinction between the psychical and the pneumatical, and claim that what is hidden from the carnally minded can be spiritually discerned. Bergson has been urging upon us the need for man "to sink into his own inner nature and try to catch the deepest meaning and worth of his experiences in their duration through time." He would teach us that we can pass from a conceptual to a metaphysical and intuitive level, thus reaching "a foretaste of eternity in the midst of the fluctuations of the world and the illusions of sense."

One thing at least is clear. Psychology is revealing something of the unfathomed depths of human personality. Something more than a psychological analysis is needed to reach the deeper levels of our life. Man's range is not only outwards to the world of appearance, and inwards to self-introspection, but upwards to the world of ultimate Reality; and he can form contact with this last only because of his Divine endowment, as made in the image of God, and destined to become a partaker of the Divine nature. Authentic tidings of such a world, though gained as the result of a direct intuition of the Divine in religious experience, cannot be communicated except by a process of translation, and hence the form in which they reach the laboratory of the psychologist bears little resemblance to their actuality. The real difficulty of the mystic, as we have seen, is to translate his knowledge. The categories available for his use are fatally infected with materiality. The thought-forms at his disposal are necessarily spatial and temporal. Hence his problem as to how to describe in temporal and spatial imagery a reality which, in its very nature, is not extended in time. Hence he is forced to employ metaphors and to use the language of symbols. He must needs speak in parables or become ensnared in anthropomorphisms. We should not be surprised at Leuba's discoveries as the result of his *questionnaire* method. When, by

an intuitive process, "God ceases to be a proposition and becomes an experience," the subsequent effort to translate this into the thought-forms of our terrestrial life breaks down, and a man finds himself employing symbols to clothe an experience which as such transcended and overflowed all the vessels in which he strove to confine it. If psychologists then set to work upon all that is left, and fail by analytical methods to discover its real content, their negative conclusions are no proof of the unreality of the experience. The transcendental element in it has escaped them, and with it goes the only proof the mystic could offer, and which he is precluded from offering because he cannot. The human spirit grounded in God and rooted in the Divine Reality knows that it has taken hold of the Divine, and experienced it at a sensitive point. How to convince others of that fact is a task beyond him. He must speak to others in parables, and must not be surprised if the result is as of old in the case of them that are without—viz., "because they seeing, see not; and hearing they hear not, neither do they understand."¹

4

In conclusion, whilst the main object of our essay has been to dispute the negative conclusion of some psychological and psycho-analytical theories regarding the objective validity of religious experience and the prayer-life, we do not wish by any means to suggest that this new science and its methods have nothing to teach us on the question of the religious life and our human methods of developing it. Religion in company with other branches of human knowledge and action is being rethought out in psychological terms, and we are bound to question its precise bearing upon the life of prayer and Christian experience. What can it teach us, and what is its practical application? We

¹ St. Matt. xiii. 13.

do not accept it as a new religion or a modern substitute for religion. Can it be used, nevertheless, as "a new weapon added to the Christian armoury"? We think that it can, and that it is being offered to us as a new scientific method which deserves and will repay our careful study and use. We do not propose here to enlarge upon its practical application, but we must content ourselves with referring our readers to a book, *e.g.*, like Dr. W. S. Bruce's *The Psychology of Christian Life and Behaviour*, which attempts to map out the bearings of Psychology upon all sides of the Christian life, secular no less than religious, and which claims, we think rightly, to be a help to parents, teachers, Christian workers and preachers in their daily duties. Side by side with this book we should like to mention that of Professor F. R. Barry, who in his *Christianity and Psychology* deals with some of its practical and theoretical implications for religion and theology. There is also an earlier work by Mr. T. W. Pym, *Psychology and the Christian Life*, and a study of *Christian Auto-suggestion* by Mr. R. E. Roberts, which may be found helpful. We venture to suggest that all those who are engaged in the religious education of the young, and not least those responsible for Confirmation Classes, should make themselves acquainted with the empirical study of the growth of the religious consciousness which Dr. E. O. Starbuck gave us in his *Psychology of Religion*. These are but samples of a large and rapidly growing literature, the reading of which ought to convince even the most conservative and cautious Christian believer—who may be suspicious, or even contemptuous, of psychology—that this new science, rightly regarded not as a rival but as the handmaid of religion, is really reminding us of long-neglected treasures in the Gospel, is throwing fresh light upon religious phenomena such as conversion, is making fruitful suggestions regarding the training of religious sentiments and the consolidation

of religious attitudes. Many methods of prayer receive confirmation from this new science, and Catholic practice in the prayer-life will find in the suggestions of psychology much by way of scientific justification.

Whilst we reject the hypothesis that prayer is auto-suggestion, we may quite well entertain the idea that auto-suggestion is one of its forms. Along this line we may legitimately speak of *Christian* auto- and hetero-suggestion as in accord with the principles of healing set forth and applied by our Lord Himself. We may thus for practical purposes adopt the maxim, "Christianise your Coué, and Coué your Christianity." The daily thoughts for Christian auto-suggestion given at the end of Mr. R. E. Roberts's little book afford an outline sketch of the kind of use to which the principles of M. Coué and the Nancy School may be put by a Christian believer in his prayer-life. It is sadly true that many Christians to-day are living below the level of their Christian heritage. Were we, in the prayer-life, to dwell more upon the thought of the riches of our possession in Christ Jesus, we should be enabled to enter more fully into the vitality of the Evangelical doctrine of assurance. We shall cease to be obsessed by doubts and misgivings, and in place of timorous questionings be able, with St. Paul, to say: "The life that I now live in the flesh, I live in faith; faith in the Son of God who loved me and gave himself up for me."¹ The keynote of true Evangelicalism has been and still is *assurance*. The act of meditation in the life of faith can and should bring with it a more blessed assurance of the reality of saving grace, and make us more fitted to receive the fulness of the Spirit, the fulness of joy in believing. This assurance, where it is manifested in the members of a household, is itself a dynamic force and radiates its influence. In a very real sense in a home-life of this kind, prayer is "caught, not taught."

¹ Gal. ii. 20,

Psychology has much to teach us on the efficacy of prayer from the point of view of its conditions, bodily and mental. If the psychology of religious experience succeeds in laying bare the laws and principles which govern the prayer-life, so far as these can be deduced from empirical study, it can teach us much as to how best to mobilise this force, both in the private life of the individual and the public worship of the Church. The power of suggestion in congregational worship is a fact with which we have been long familiar, but a scientific investigation in the light of the modern psychology of the crowd is certainly bringing home to us afresh the value and best use to which we can put our corporate worship and mobilise the power of intercession. Private prayer, family prayers, Church services, all these can be justified, and their relative value exhibited by a psychological study of the conditions, if not the forms, under which they are enacted. Psychology can teach us how best to utilise the available spiritual resources at our disposal. It can and does remind us in the name of science that we need not remain spiritual paupers when we might become spiritual millionaires.

Another discovery awaiting us when we examine the findings of modern psychological method in relation to the prayer-life will be the wisdom of the saints and mystics of old, who were psychologists before their time. For this reason the growth of a mass of new literature dealing with religious experience from the psychological standpoint will not exempt us from a study of the best the past has produced in the way of guides to the prayer-life and the practice of the Presence of God. From one point of view psychology has nothing fresh to teach the Catholic Church on the question how to pray. What it is doing is to dot the i's and cross the t's of many wise counsels given in the past history of the Church in its endeavour to fulfil its function in the world for the "cure of souls."

At the same time it must be recognised as a distinct gain if in our generation we may claim something in the nature of scientific sanction from the findings of modern psychology for many of the Church's methods in dealing both with the "once born" and the "twice born," the "healthy-minded" and the "sick" souls. If modern scientific methods applied to spiritual therapeutics condemn some and sanction others amongst the means at present employed by the Church, all the better.

The great need to-day is not so much more "saying of prayers" and attendance at church services, but more real prayer and sincerity in worship. Undoubtedly the causes for our failure here are many and varied and are not wholly due to the fault of the Church, but we are on safe ground when we admit that one cause is a failure in method in the cultivation of the prayer-life. If, as Professor Barry reminds us, "prayer misdirected is spiritual poison," we shall do well in all humility to listen to anything modern psychology can legitimately claim to teach us as to how best to fit ourselves for the reception of that Divine Grace and Spiritual Power which we believe to be all around us and pressing in upon us, and which none the less we succeed only partially in gaining, because we have not studied aright the method by which we may claim it and receive it as our own.

Now, whilst the books upon prayer are legion, we do not hesitate in this connection to recommend warmly the study by an unknown author of the subject in two works published in recent years by Messrs. Mowbray under the titles *The Splendour of God* and *The Riches of Prayer*. We do so because we are convinced that whilst these two were written without any primary reference to the findings of modern psychology on the subject, yet they are profoundly in accord with the best that the psychological analysis of religious experience can teach us. We cannot justify this

statement at length, but we can illustrate it briefly, and, in doing so, indicate at the same time a line along which a practical application of the psychology of prayer is possible. One of the chief points of emphasis in modern psychology is the power of suggestion.

Now what is one of the most frequent laments of the experients in the prayer-life? Is it not the poverty of our goodness, the faintness of our endeavours after the Christian life and the coldness of our devotion? The unknown author to whose books we have just referred would point us at once to the key, in his reminder that we must begin with God. Prayer is not one long self-commiseration and one dismal communing with ourselves over our many faults and failings. Consider what such a course of suggestion must lead to in filling our minds with utter depression and despair! The *primary* reference in all prayer is not downwards to self, but upwards to God. Hence the remedy for coldness and weariness in the saying of our prayers is not an increased time for prayers, nor the use of a more varied assortment of books of devotion, still less an increased dwelling upon our lack of faith and our need for Grace. The remedy is simple. Let us begin by a concentrated effort of mind and will to lift up our hearts to God, steadfastly waiting upon Him and deliberately recalling to our minds His Love; His Holiness; His Redemption through Christ Jesus; the commendation of that Love which was revealed in the Sacrifice of His Son; the great price He paid that we, although sinners, none the less might be reckoned other than we are and called "sons." Time enough afterwards in the light of all this to turn the attention of our minds to ourselves and the exceeding sinfulness of our sins. We are then in a right attitude to ponder afresh the meaning of the great evangelical fact that we are not forgiven because we repent in love, but that we repent in love because we are forgiven!

Consider again the *form* our petitions would take if in our prayers we had begun by filling our minds with thoughts of God and His character. If, by this method of suggestion, we have charged our souls with the thought of *Him*, are our petitions likely to aim exclusively at getting our will done in Heaven rather than that His will should be done upon earth? Is not the outstanding difficulty over and over again in the prayer-life the stumbling-block of a silent Heaven? We complain that God does not answer our prayers, and so faith grows dim and prayers die away. If, however, we begin with God, we are more likely to reach the right tone in prayer, and we shall go on, (*a*) to an increased intensity of utterance, as in the case of the Canaanitish woman, because at first He answered her never a word, putting forth a fuller strength of faith; since (*b*) we learn that "Be it unto thee as thou wilt" must wait upon His commendation, "Great is thy faith"; and finally, (*c*) an increased appreciation, in the light of this experience, first of the greatness of the gift we desire, and secondly, of the greatness of our need, over and over again results in our realisation of the fact that our prayer in its first form was really asking for a stone which we thought was bread. This knowledge enables us to change the form of our prayer, and we live to praise Him because He did not give us what we thought we wanted, but something better—viz., what we really needed. The secret of true prayer lies in a right knowledge of God's character.

Now if suggestion has such power in colouring the mind, and if our whole prayer-life in its tone is so influenced by suggestions for good or evil, does not modern psychology confirm the advice of the leaders of old in their spiritual directions when they one and all bid us begin with God and think Him aright before we go on to ask for our daily bread and all things needful both for our souls and bodies? The spiritual ascent

of the mind up to the Mount of Vision, that we may, from that altitude, survey the world and our own human needs, is psychologically justified and brings us into such close *rappor*t with Him as to enable us to see as He sees, to behold light in His Light and Truth from His standpoint. Then and then only can we rightly apply the vision to the affairs of earth and go forth from His Presence fully assured that this is a God who answereth prayer.

Psychology would teach us afresh that the real enemy of the spiritual life is despair, and the real quickening power is Hope informed by Love and issuing in a charitable spirit.

A profounder study of human life is bringing home to us afresh the moulding power of ideals, and teaching us in this sense that it is not so much the inheritance of the past as the hope of the future which can be the decisive factor in character-building. We tend to become that for which we pray. If suggestion can fashion us anew, then Christianity is justified when it bids us seek nothing less than the highest—the crowned Christ—and hope for nothing less than perfection in accordance with His promise, “Ye shall be perfect even as I am perfect.”

In all this we do not wish for a moment to be taken to mean any depreciation of the vital need and value in the prayer-life of self-examination, self-introspection, repentance and confession, as essential factors for spiritual health. What we wish to emphasise, and what we think that the psychology of suggestion justifies, is the Catholic principle which puts God first in all religious experience and deprecates a narrower religion which is primarily occupied with the states of the individual soul and forgets that our first duty is not with self, but to know God and to enjoy Him. The aim of prayer in its primary reference is to God, and it is offered to Him. Hence we commence with the *Sursum corda*.

Another issue from the same principle is the emphasis to be placed upon the cultivation of positive virtues as the best way of overcoming temptation and uprooting evil in human life. We must not rest content with a negative resistance, but must press on towards a positive drawing near to God.¹

Psychology is teaching us the relative value of the methods of resistance and counter-attraction. It is this last, what Professor Barry describes in a felicitous expression as "falling in love with Jesus," or what the author of *Ecce Homo* named long ago as the "expulsive power of a new affection," which is the true key to progress in the Christian life and the way to enter more fully into the riches of prayer.

In an age distinguished by its weariness of spirit, the superficial character of its work, and the ever-increasing strain of its feverish restlessness, we may come to present afresh the ancient Christian remedies clothed in a modern psychological garb in the hope that the scientific disguise may win for them a hearing in quarters least responsive to the direct appeal of the spiritual physician. The Divine remedy which alone can minister to a mind diseased and pluck from the memory a rooted sorrow is Supernatural Grace, mediated to the souls of men through human agencies. One pre-requisite, however, is essential—viz., prayer. Men must learn afresh the meaning and value of real prayer, be the forms it takes however many and varied. Prayer it is which can secure the repose of the soul and its issue in a spiritual mind, producing as that does upon those who come under its influence a twofold impression, that of remoteness and that of nearness and sympathy. Prayer it is which Jeremy Taylor so beautifully describes as "the stillness of our thoughts, the evenness of recollection, the seat of meditation, the rest of our souls, and the calm of our tempest; prayer is the issue of a quiet mind of un-

¹ Jas. iv. 7.

troubled thoughts; it is the daughter of charity and the sister of meekness."

Such indeed it is, and the world needs it badly. If anything we have written here concerning the "psychology of prayer and religious experience" proves helpful either in demonstrating its therapeutic value or removing intellectual difficulties, so as to enable some to employ it with a more whole-hearted assurance of its spiritual efficacy, we shall not have laboured in vain.

IV
THE PSYCHOLOGY OF PUBLIC
WORSHIP

BY
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IV

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF PUBLIC WORSHIP

ANY fruitful discussion of the subject before us in this essay must begin with some consideration of the rationale and purpose of worship; a question on which our views will be largely determined by our ideas as to the nature of the Being to whom, on any theory of its purpose, worship is addressed. There is a sense, indeed, in which worship covers the entire activities of life, and in which it may be said that all a man's thoughts, words, and actions should together express his worship. It is not, however, with worship in this wide connotation of the word that we are now concerned, but rather with that aspect of it which consists in the conscious concentration, at certain times, of the mind, the affections, and the will in aspiration, praise, and prayer. But at the outset I will ask the reader to consider a distinction which may be drawn even between worship and prayer. It would be stating it much too crudely to say that, while we pray to God as our Father, we worship Him as our Creator and our King, or that prayer is addressed to Love, and worship to Holiness. Of course, all true worship includes a prayer element; and the primitive idea of holiness has been so moralised and spiritualised in the course of man's history, and especially by Judaism and Christianity, that to us the thought of holiness is inseparable from that of righteousness and goodness. The distinction cannot be pressed. Nevertheless, I believe that it expresses a truth, and, since it is assumed by some of the arguments of later pages in

this essay, it is necessary to give some preliminary attention to it. That this should be so is a good illustration of the fact, too often forgotten, that psychology and theology are sister sciences.

I

Dr. Rudolf Otto, at the beginning of his remarkable book *The Idea of the Holy*, observes that "We have come to use the words *holy*, *sacred* (*heilig*), in an entirely derivative sense, quite different from that which they originally bore. We generally take 'holy' as meaning 'completely good'; it is the absolute moral attribute, denoting the consummation of moral goodness. . . . But this common usage of the term is inaccurate. It is true that all this moral significance is contained in the word 'holy,' but it includes in addition—as even we cannot but feel—a clear overplus of meaning. . . . Nor is this merely a later or acquired meaning; rather, 'holy,' or at least the equivalent words [*quādôsh*, *ἅγιος*, *sacer*, etc.] in Latin and Greek, in Semitic and other ancient languages, denoted first and foremost *only* this overplus; if the ethical element was present at all, at any rate it was not original, and never constituted the whole meaning of the word."¹

There can be no doubt that this is a true and accurate account of the facts. In all primitive religion—including Hebrew religion, be it specially noted for our present purpose—holiness has at first nothing whatever to do with ethics. The *mana* theory of the origin of religion seems the one most consonant with known facts.² That is to say, man's earliest intimations of the Divine consisted of a vague belief in a mysterious force or influence (the *mana* or *orenda* of some present-day savages), supposed to attach to various strange,

¹ *The Idea of the Holy*, by Rudolf Otto (English translation, by J. W. Harvey), p. 5. My obligations to this book will be obvious to all who have read it.

² See, e.g., *The Threshold of Religion*, by R. R. Marett (especially chapters i., iv., vii.).

important, powerful, or dangerous phenomena—to thunder and lightning, to sickness and disease, to a woman before or after childbirth, to children at puberty, to a dead body, to a poisoned arrow, to a successful medicine-man or a mighty warrior. It is the—to primitive mentality—odd and inexplicable aspect of these and many other things which constitutes their *holiness*; the dread “power” inherent in them makes them, as it were, infectious, so that it is dangerous to come into contact with them, and they must be hedged about with all kinds of restrictions and *tabus*. As men came to believe in personal gods—with the evolution of this belief we are not here concerned—these ideas of holiness were projected on to them, with the natural result that in course of time they came to be invested with the variously *ethical* attributes which we find attributed to their gods by various groups of mankind.

Now, the wonder and the glory of the history of Israel consists in this: that whereas God’s chosen people began with notions about His holiness hardly to be distinguished from those of their heathen neighbours, or of modern savages, they arrived at length, under the influence of successive prophets and teachers, at an entirely moral and spiritual conception of His holiness: they came at last to realise that only *sin* separates man from God, and that to the humble and the contrite heart—to the man who is trying to “separate” *himself* from sin—He is utterly open and approachable. Consider two Old Testament passages. In 2 Samuel vi. we read how Uzzah was instantly struck dead because, in stretching out his hand to steady the oxen which were drawing a cart with the sacred Ark on it, he inadvertently touched the Ark itself. The Ark, that is to say, being a holy thing—God’s thing—was a thing of potential danger: therefore God “broke forth upon Uzzah.” In Isaiah lvii. 15 the great prophet of the Return speaks of “the High and

Lofty One that inhabiteth Eternity, whose name is Holy," and saith: "I dwell in the high and holy place, with him also that is of a contrite and an humble spirit, to revive the spirit of the humble, and to revive the heart of the contrite ones." The story of the Old Testament is the story of the development between these two conceptions of the holiness of God. But for our present purpose, what is important is the common element in the two conceptions. For their common element is what our Lord Himself found in Judaism—found and accepted and taught and built upon: their common element belongs to Christianity, and is one of the foundations of Christian worship. What, then, is it? It is, surely, the idea of the Majesty, and the Glory, and the Awefulness, and the inconceivable Purity—in a word, the Holiness—of God. All truly Christian thought—and not least that which is concerned with the forms of public worship—must begin here. HOLY, HOLY, HOLY IS THE LORD OF Hosts.

Nor is it the case that this "numinous" element (as Dr. Otto calls it) is absent from the gospel picture of the teaching and person of Incarnate Love. True, it is not emphasised or made explicit: but it is recognisably there. There was in the actual bodily presence of Christ a certain undefined atmosphere of awe and "dread," of which we catch glimpses in slight hints and quite unconscious touches in the gospels. How did the demons recognise Him as "the Holy One"? Why did His own friends protest that He was "mad"? Why was one Roman official, seeking the new Healer, impelled to cry, when face to face with Him, "I am not worthy that Thou shouldst come under my roof"?—and another, who saw Him die, moved by the sight to confess that "Truly this man was a Son of God?"¹ Why did Judas and his companions, coming to seize Jesus in the garden,

¹ *Cp.* St. Luke xxiii. 48 and other passages.

“go backward and fall to the ground” at His simple reply, “I am he,” to their statement that they were looking for Jesus of Nazareth? What is the significance of that remarkable verse (St. Mark x. 32), *And they were in the way going up to Jerusalem; and Jesus was going before them; and they were amazed (ἐθαμβοῦντο); and they that followed were afraid?*

With these suggestions—they are no more, and therein lies their importance—we may compare certain features in our Lord’s recorded teaching: the opening petition of the Paternoster, the central place in His message occupied by the conception of the Kingdom of God, and occasional sayings of such terrific import as, *Fear Him who is able to cast both body and soul into hell: yea, I say unto you, fear Him!*

There is, then, in our Lord’s explicit teaching, and in casual and unconscious suggestions of the impression He made on His contemporaries, warrant enough for insisting that the idea of the Holiness, the Transcendence, the *Otherness* of God, is vital to any true Christian view of His nature and character. *Worship is man’s tribute to that transcendence.*

It has often been pointed out that we can only worship a God who is good. And that is true—for *us*. But what makes it true is that the Christian conception of God has become part of the intellectual apparatus of Western civilisation. The modern European may accept the Christian faith or reject it, but there is little likelihood of his adopting any other. It is emphatically not true, however, that *no* worship except of a good God is possible to the human mind, as the comparative study of religion shows. What is true is that, as has already been said, the idea of God’s holiness—that element in His nature which constrains man to worship Him—is in Christianity—not, indeed, emasculated of its essential and primary content, but filled through and through with the thought of His love. Holiness and love are not simply interchangeable

terms: nevertheless, God's Holiness is the holiness of Love, and His Love is a holy love. It is unnecessary to dwell here on the idea of the love of God: it is axiomatic to any form of Christianity. But the foregoing considerations may serve to remind us that there is nothing vacillating or capricious about the love of God. When we call Him "Father" we mean, truly, that that is the least we can say of Him. We mean that His love for each single soul that He has made is at least unimaginably deeper and more intense than that of the most loving human parent—father or mother—we can conceive: that the best and finest types of fatherhood and motherhood are but faint images and reflections of the love with which our heavenly Father loves, unceasingly, from moment to moment, each of His children. We do *not* mean that He spoils us. He idolises none. He has no favourites.

The idea of God, then, as a Holy Father—which in its fulness we owe to His self-revelation in and through our blessed Lord—must be the standard by which we judge all prayer and all worship. But before we pass to the discussion of particular forms of worship in the light of all this, there are still one or two other preliminary matters of which we must take account.

A "purely spiritual" form of religion, if such a thing be possible, is something less than Christian. The central fact of the Incarnation makes Christianity *sacramental* from beginning to end, and there can be no truce with the false dualism which regards spirit and matter as impermeable entities, and therefore denies the possibility of using the material world, in worship and devotion, without abusing it. *The Word became flesh*: once and for all, by that tremendous fact, is refuted the heretical notion that the material world is inherently and unalterably evil. Further, human life itself is essentially sacramental (using the word in a

broad sense): since human personality is bound up with a physical body, intercourse among ourselves is necessarily through the body. Christianity is, as it were, the consecration of these obvious and inescapable facts. And they are consecrated, not merely by the sacramental system of the Catholic Church, but by the whole philosophy of Christianity. This religion has no use for "ideas" save in so far as they are incarnated and expressed. "Anything in this world which is purely spiritual," it has been well said, "is also wholly negligible. Good intentions are purely spiritual; that is why they make up the pavement of Hell."¹ All spiritual aspiration, then, whether in worship or otherwise, while on the one hand it must be fulfilled in the ordinary activities of everyday life, may also be embodied in various forms of ritual and symbol. We shall see the importance of this later.

But this brings us to the last of these preliminary theological considerations. No part of the Christian life may legitimately be regarded as an end in itself. Just as we have insisted that the holiness of God cannot rightly be isolated, and must always be thought of in conjunction with His love; so worship, though for the purposes of our present argument it may be discussed, so to speak, *per se*, as man's tribute to the glory and transcendence of God, in actual practice must, nevertheless, be always related to the various other means of attaining to the ultimate and inclusive ends of religion. Those ends may be comprehensively stated as "the glory of God": but this must be held to include the deepening of the individual's interior life, and his more effectual co-operation in the extension of the Kingdom of God on earth. Forms of public worship which do not make—or at least do not tend to make—the worshipper grow more and more into the character of God stand self-condemned. I am put into this world *to become like Jesus Christ*: if my

¹ W. Temple.

worship does not help me towards this end, it is not Christian worship. And again: Christianity is a *corporate* way of life. God treats us as members of a family, and in Baptism we are incorporated into the Church, which is the Body of Christ, the instrument of His will. I am to be a living, active member of that Body, an agent through whom God's will may be realised, and His reign enlarged, in the lives of men. Unless my worship helps me towards this end—unless it makes me, or tends to make me, a missionary and a worker—it is not Christian worship.

We are now, perhaps, in a position to approach the more directly psychological aspects of the subject before us. With the foregoing considerations in mind I propose, in what follows, to examine from a psychological standpoint three main types of public worship with which most Englishmen are familiar. These theological preliminaries have been necessary because *no* schemes of public worship can safely leave them out of account: they are universally relevant. We shall have occasion to refer to them again in the following pages; but for the most part we shall now be occupied with the ways in which certain psychological factors—certain characteristics of the human mind—are (or are not) concerned in special types of service. It is obvious that this method of treatment involves some slight artificiality: thus, some of the factors mentioned are at work in other types of worship than that under which they are discussed. But so long as we do not forget this, I think the method I propose to follow may tend to simplicity and clearness.

2

It will be convenient to begin with the Mattins or Evensong type of service, as being that form of public worship with which the average Englishman is most familiar.

In the fact that it *is* familiar lies, largely, its psychological importance. We are so accustomed in these days to the demand for variety, adaptation to new needs and new circumstances and so on, that the influence of the "ordinary morning service" on generations of our countrymen is apt to be under-valued. But the importance of habit needs no emphasis, and we may certainly discount the suggestion, fashionable in certain quarters to-day, that the Anglican insistence on "going to church at eleven on Sundays" has on the whole militated against true religion. It is probable, however, that this conventional churchgoing exercises a greater influence on the faith than on the practice of the worshippers. Despite many evidences to the contrary, the ordinary Englishman—though he may be but loosely attached to institutional Christianity, and though the practice of his religion may involve little more than "saying his prayers" (often the identical prayers he used as a child)—still believes in "One above." He takes care to be married in church, to be buried in church, and (less universally) to have his children christened in church. All this is the result, in large measure, of centuries of conventional church-going. Its psychological effect is multiplied a thousandfold by its corporate character. I shall have more to say later about suggestion: here we need only notice the actual fact of the human being's keen sensitiveness to the opinions and dictates of his fellows, and its obvious bearing on the formation of habits. No doubt it is important that the motive of worship should be more conscious in the minds of the members of our congregations than is, perhaps, often the case. But church-going, even as a habit, should seldom be discouraged. Least of all should it be discouraged in the case of a man who is going through a period of intellectual or spiritual disturbance, and who is apt to feel that until his interior conflict has been stilled, his attendance at church service is a

mockery and a pretence. Professor J. B. Pratt rightly emphasises the importance of public worship as a means of "bringing powerfully into the worshipper's mind the sense of social confirmation."¹ It is difficult to exaggerate the influence exerted on a mind in any degree open and suggestible, by the mere sight of other people at prayer.

"A process once perceived *and attended to* tends to be set up or imitated in the muscles of the percipient. . . . And so close is the relation between reaction and feeling, between bodily expression and inner state, that he who imitates another's act, posture, or expression, is likely to share, at least incipiently, in the mental attitude thus expressed."²

Psychological considerations lend support to the value of outward acts of reverence. We hear a great deal of the influence of the mind on the body. But the converse is also true, that bodily conditions and bodily movements may powerfully affect the mind. The tendency to which Pratt refers, for actions or behaviour simulating a certain emotion to set up the emotion or mental condition normally expressed by that behaviour, is of great interest and value, as is unconsciously recognised, not merely by the man who "works himself up" by simulating an anger which, at the outset, he does not fully feel, but by the savage who, on the eve of battle, *dances* the fury which he desires to wreak on his enemies when once the combat is joined. The importance of the psychological law involved is not to be dismissed by calling its expression—what it is, of course, in the case of the savage—"sympathetic magic." And its relevance to the subject before us is obvious. The principle concerned may rightly be urged in defence of such things as the use of the sign of the cross—considered as an outward expression of our faith (which may be or may not be actually present in consciousness

¹ *The Religious Consciousness*, p. 282.

² *Ibid.*, p. 95.

at a particular moment) that to the death of Christ on Calvary we owe our redemption and our hope of heaven; bowing the head at the name of Jesus, bowing or genuflecting at the *Incarnatus* in the creed, or before the Blessed Sacrament, and so on. These things are sometimes criticised as being mere formalism, and no doubt they are liable to abuse.¹ But beyond question they may be defended on unassailable psychological grounds. Nor is it necessary, as I have already hinted, to argue that (for example) a momentary reverence to the altar, as one goes into one's seat, is only justifiable if the idea, the interior disposition which it is intended to express, is actually and invariably present to one's conscious attention while the action is being performed. No one would deny that outward acts of reverence are means, not ends: but they may be very valuable means. It is not to the point in this connexion, I think, to say that certain devout Christian people dispense with these things without, apparently, any spiritual loss. We need not, perhaps, accept without argument the implied suggestion that this type of spirituality represents the ideal. Nor does there seem much justification in fact for the commonly accepted view that a Quaker, for example, is necessarily and invariably sweeter tempered and more loving, a more devoted servant of God and man, than his fellow-Christians. On *a priori* grounds one would not expect the fulness of Christian character to be displayed by a body which deliberately isolates itself from the rest: such an attitude must surely tend towards uncharitableness and spiritual pride. But even if these faults were wholly absent from those Christian communities which discourage, or even forbid, outward acts of devotion, this would be no argument against such acts. It is not a valid objection to any aid, help, or method, that some people

¹ Their most serious danger lies in their *potential* capacity for developing a form of religious "fantasy" in which a thoughtless and easy emotionalism is substituted for active love of God and man. Of course "spikery" is a perversion of Christianity, but *abusus non tollit usum*.

reach (if they do reach) the same goal by other methods, or even without help.

From a slightly different angle, outward acts of devotion may be advocated for reasons similar to those adduced in favour of expression-work in the teaching of little children. The value of expression-work lies partly in the fact that the doing of it involves more of the child's personality—including the use of his limbs—than is required in the mere verbal reproduction of what he has been taught.

Language is one of the chief means of self-expression: and this, in conjunction with the principle of ideo-motor action just discussed, and the facts of suggestion to be mentioned immediately, makes the words used by the congregation of great importance. Public worship is, inevitably, less the expression of the congregation's actual emotions than the prophetic expression of their ideal emotions—of the feelings they *ought* to have, the love and adoration which they wish were theirs, and which they would fain achieve. The hymns, psalms, etc., used, therefore, should be chosen with the possibility in mind of raising to their own spiritual level the feelings of those who sing them. It is well not to be too much afraid of hymns, for example, which obviously outstrip the devotional capacity of the congregation. What is more important is that the ideas and emotions the hymns express should be such as an entirely Christian congregation would rightly and spontaneously wish to express.¹ It is good for a crowd of half-converted people to sing:

“Jesu, the very thought of Thee
With sweetness fills the breast.”

It is not good for them to sing:

*If you can't get in at the Golden Gate
Get over the garden wall.*

¹ It will be noted how perfectly the *Te Deum*, Creed, and Canticles satisfy this test.

In all services of the type we are discussing, the conduct of the minister is all-important. His profession, his position, and his prestige make it inevitable that he should teach more by his actions and behaviour and manner of conducting the service than by any number of sermons. Imagine the case of a man with great rhetorical gifts, but little personal religion. He delivers, let us suppose, powerful and moving discourses on prayer—prayer as the greatest spiritual force in the universe, the soul's communion with its Maker, and so forth. But Sunday by Sunday his people *see him actually engaged* in what, in his sermons, he assures them is the supreme activity of the human spirit. If we ask whether they are likely, so far as his influence goes, to get their ideas of the nature, the object, and the importance of prayer from his sermons or from the sight of him praying, there can be little doubt as to the answer. Most people would agree, I suppose, that the most valuable lessons they have learnt in life have been those given unconsciously rather than consciously, implicitly rather than explicitly, by example rather than by precept, given when the teacher had little thought of teaching. He who has to lead the public worship of God does well to remember this. His sermons—his conscious and deliberate teaching—may or may not be heeded. But there are moments when he *cannot help* teaching, and the spiritual truth or untruth expressed in his own outward behaviour in church is what he inevitably, though unconsciously, passes on to a large proportion of those who see and hear him. It is not children only who learn more from an *acted* lesson than from many spoken ones. The minister who gabbles the service, or leads the Lord's Prayer at such a pace that few of the congregation can follow it, or makes the Litany unintelligible, may be doing more harm than he suspects. It need hardly be added that the danger is greater in proportion as the congregation is simple and uneducated.

We would not be thought, however, to undervalue the importance of the sermon, or of direct instruction generally. The importance attached to preaching, and to the whole prophetic aspect of the ministry, is part of the genius of Protestantism, and may remind us that Christianity is the consecration of the intellect as well as of the affections and the will. I am thinking now mainly of the "instruction" type of sermon; the more direct appeal to the emotions we shall consider in the next section. It is obvious that the importance of the sermon of this predominantly didactic type will vary with the authority ascribed to the clergyman by his hearers. There may still, perhaps, exist a few congregations to whom the words they hear from the pulpit are all but infallible utterances which it would be blasphemous to question. But there are very few. What is too often forgotten is that the decline of respect for authority *qua* authority makes the work of preaching not less, but more important. The man in the pew will no longer accept what his parson says from the pulpit simply because the parson says it, and says it from the pulpit; but the influence of the few outstanding preachers of to-day is sufficient refutation of the too often accepted view that "preaching doesn't count nowadays." Will anyone suggest that a sermon preached, say, by Dr. Gore, or the Bishop of Manchester, or Dr. W. E. Orchard, is not a vitally important feature of the service in which it occurs? I choose these three because, while they are all men in whose theology the conception of Authority occupies a central place, they are also conspicuous examples of the importance attaching to the truth that the modern man demands a reason for the hope that we wish him to make his own. The common complaint of the fatuous ineptness of a great many sermons is only too true. Not every parish priest can be a Temple or a Gore; but every parish priest can see to it that he does not use methods and argu-

ments in the pulpit which he would be ashamed to use in private discussion with the most intelligent members of his congregation. The derisive way in which preaching is sometimes spoken of by a section of the clergy themselves is occasionally the rationalisation of men who will not read and are too indolent to think. The pulpit is still an immense influence, but it is an influence which tells against religion, and not for it, unless it is used *either* by an obviously inspired prophet, a torch whose flame is God, a man burning to deliver a message which he has himself received from the lips of his Maker, *or* by a man without, it may be, the recognisably prophetic gift in any pronounced degree, but with a coherent philosophy which makes life intelligible and purposeful to himself and which, with his whole soul, he desires to commend to his fellows, and the truth of which he has tasted in his own spiritual experience.

The opportunities and responsibility of the minister are not confined, however, to his own outward behaviour and his sermons. In nearly every service of the type we are discussing there are introduced nowadays various additions and modifications "at the discretion of the minister." It will be convenient here to consider these from one point of view only—from the point of view of helping to put the congregation into the frame of mind in which they may be the more disposed to offer to God the worship for which they are gathered together. The clergyman who has this end in view is considering, in psychological language, how to increase the suggestibility of his people.

Suggestion is defined by Dr. Thouless as "a process of communication resulting in the acceptance and realisation of a communicated idea in the absence of adequate grounds for its acceptance."¹ M. Baudouin, expressing in systematised form the experience gained at M. Coué's psychotherapeutic clinic at Nancy,

¹ *Introduction to the Psychology of Religion*, p. 18.

clothes in scientific language facts which have long been familiar to doctors and others.¹ The first kind of suggestion to be studied scientifically was that which operates in the phenomena of hypnotism. But in ordinary life we find things which differ from these only in degree. We know, for example, that an idea presented to us in a certain way, or a statement made with confidence and assurance—more especially if it is made by a person for whom we have feelings of trust and respect—tends to affect our own behaviour and opinions. Other important facts about suggestion, which recent psychology has to tell us, may be shortly stated: the relevancy of some of them will not appear till a later stage of our discussion. There appear to be, then, different degrees of suggestibility: on the whole, children are more suggestible than adults, and women more suggestible than men. Secondly, a mental condition in which the potency of suggestion is very high—whether hetero-suggestion, or the auto-suggestion of which M. Coué is the arch-prophet—is that of semi-hypnosis, a state which occurs naturally in the moments just before sleep and just after waking, but which can be induced at other times by various means, such as fixing the eyes on a bright point or listening to a continuous or rhythmically varying sound; this condition grows through practice and can be developed almost indefinitely. Finally, we may notice the immense suggestive force of symbols.

For our present purpose, the conditions under which suggestion works most effectively must be noticed. They have been summarised by Miss Evelyn Underhill, following Baudouin and others, under three heads: Quiescence, Attention, and Emotional Interest.² That congregation, then, will be most suggestible—to the general moral, emotional, and intellectual appeal of the whole service—in which these conditions are

¹ *Suggestion and Auto-Suggestion* (English translation by Eden and Cedar Paul).

² *The Life of the Spirit and the Life of To-day*, pp. 109 ff.

most successfully attained. It would be possible to discuss the various features of the Mattins or Evensong type from this point of view at great length: I will suggest only one or two points.

The value of occasional periods of *silence* would seem evident, as helping towards both quiescence and attention. Yet it is widely ignored. Most people find that if their private devotions are not to become mechanical and unreal, they must begin with a short pause for recollection and the attempt to realise the presence of God and the nature and object of prayer. The same considerations would seem to apply to corporate prayer and public worship. It would be a good thing if in all churches those parts of the service in which the people either are led by or join with the minister in common intercession or supplication were occasionally prefaced by absolute silence. Sometimes, perhaps, the minister might say, before the pause, some such words as: *Let us prepare ourselves in silence to speak to God. Let us consider what we are about to do, and to whom we are about to speak. . . . Thou, O Lord, art in the midst of us, and we are called by Thy name: leave us not, O Lord our God.* Such a formula, of course, must never be allowed to become stereotyped, nor should it be an invariable practice to have any "bidding" at all: by becoming mechanical its value would be lost. But it seems hardly possible to doubt that even such a simple thing as this might tend to make our common prayer more real. Again, it would seem possible, without being theatrical or pandering to a bad desire for novelty and sensation, to take more care than is sometimes done to keep the attention and interest of the congregation throughout the service. Some of the Lessons, for example—from the New as well as from the Old Testament—are almost unintelligible apart from their context and without some elementary exegesis: why should they not be occasionally prefaced by a very brief explanatory

comment? It would presumably be necessary, in the Church of England, to ask episcopal sanction for the *occasional* substitution of a modern version of the New Testament for the Authorised or Revised: but no one who has ever lent, as I have, Professor Moffatt's *New Testament: A New Translation* to a man in whom familiarity with A.V. had somehow bred an inability to read it with full attention, and seen the result, can doubt that it would be a good thing to do. Other means of ensuring that the minds of the congregation are as alert as possible will occur to the reader. If space permitted, it would be worth while to consider such a subject as the ideal type of pew or chair, and to ask whether the atmosphere of contrition is or is not most effectively achieved by the use of the note G.

It is a shallow view which minimises the potentialities of Mattins and Evensong. On the other hand, their serious defects, considered as services designed to put the congregation into the frame of mind (and heart) in which they may most effectively and worthily worship God, must be recognised. They are recognised by all the suggestions—Green, Yellow, Grey and “Official”—put forward for the revision of the Prayer Book. The most serious limitation lies in the small scope for variety afforded by these services; and they are not very adaptable to topical needs and current interests; both these faults are likely to be remedied by the new Book when it comes. In the meantime, the Revised Lectionary and Psalter are a great improvement on the old, as tending to greater reality; while the permission, now generally accorded to the clergy, to use prayers from external sources in the place of those provided after the Third Collect, gives considerable freedom and opportunity. It is also possible to devise “occasional” services free from the less valuable features of Mattins and Evensong. There is now a fair number of books, easily obtainable, which are

likely to be of assistance in drawing up such services. Of these, *Divine Service*, the book in regular use at the King's Weigh House, is perhaps the most useful, compiled as it is on sound theological and psychological principles after ransacking the liturgical and devotional literature of Christendom for material. Psychologically, one of the most valuable features of this book is the *variety* of morning and evening services provided. These are alike in general structure, but each of them is built up round *one main idea*—Unity, Social Needs, Missions, etc. This is an excellent plan.

At this point we may make some reference to auto-suggestion. The important fact to notice for our present purpose is that the strength of an auto-suggestion is immensely increased by its articulate (not necessarily audible) utterance repeated several times over: we are all familiar with the famous *Day by day in every respect I get better and better*. From the psychological point of view, there are obviously very close affinities between auto-suggestion and prayer, and the value of "acts" of faith, hope, love, penitence, etc., cannot be questioned, and may be supposed to be increased by being used corporately. The psychological law underlying such acts and auto-suggestions is also at work in the use of the rosary. Baudouin distinguishes between *contention* and *concentration*. The former is the condition, already referred to as being common just before or after sleep, in which conscious and deliberate thought is at a minimum, and which can be artificially achieved by fixing the attention on some external sight or sound. Concentration, as distinguished from contention, is the same semi-hypnotic condition, reached, however, by fixing the attention, not on any external object, but on the idea or suggestion which it is desired to implant in the mind. Dr. Thouless points out that "if, in the rosary, the formula repeated were expressive of the mystery itself, this would be an example of what Baudouin

calls concentration.”¹ In the ordinary use of the rosary, the state of contention is reached by the reiterated repetitions of Hail Marys, Paternosters, and Glorias, while the mind is occupied throughout (or ought to be occupied) with the Joyful, Sorrowful, or Glorious Mysteries of our Lord’s life. But there is clearly a great deal to be said in favour of a devotion in which, while the psychological value of the rosary is retained, the distinction between what is said and what is thought of is abolished. Such a devotion is to be found in the *Chaplet of Prayer*² devised and made popular in recent years by Fr. Conran, S.S.J.E.; it is much to be commended.

Such devices as I have mentioned, if used with discretion, hardly lay themselves open to the charge of increasing the suggestibility of individuals to such an extent that the strength of their own personality is impaired. It is in the services of the type to be considered in the next section that this danger becomes a real one, and we will consider it in its proper place. But at this point it is possible that a reader who accepted my original suggestions as to the nature and purpose of worship may object that in these last pages we have been mainly concerned with ways and means which appear to suggest that the main function of a service is its effect upon the human soul, and *not* the worship of God. Let us briefly consider this.

Professor Pratt draws a distinction between what he calls “objective” and “subjective” worship, the aim of the former being to “make some kind of effect on the Deity, or in some way to communicate with him,” while the latter “seeks *only* to induce some desired mood or belief or attitude in the mind of the worshipper.” The distinction is, I think, a real one, in the sense that some types of Christianity *tend* to emphasise the “glory of God,” and some the “uplift” of the con-

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 175.

² Various editions and forms are published by S.P.C.K.

gregation as the chief end in view: but the word which I have italicised in the sentence quoted from Pratt shows clearly that the distinction cannot be pressed. There is no form—there has never been any form—of Christian service of which it could be said that its *sole* object was the edification of the worshippers, and that adoration or supplication addressed to God was wholly ruled out. Nor, on the other hand, is the most objective type of worship ever offered to God without some thought, even though it is implicit or barely conscious, of its effect upon the minds and hearts of the worshippers. But if we accept, with these provisos, Pratt's distinction between the two types, then clearly it is the objective type which most evidently fulfils the requirements of worship in the sense in which worship was defined at the beginning of this essay. And it must be pointed out that the obvious *tendency* of the kind of service we have been considering is to stress its potential effect on the congregation rather than its "effect upon the Deity." Its primary note, that is to say, is apt to be subjective rather than objective. The "objective" idea is certainly not lacking; but it is liable to be, so to speak, ultimate rather than proximate, and subconscious rather than conscious.¹ We may perhaps summarise our conclusions so far by saying that, if services of this type were the only ones of which we had any experience, we should feel the need of some forms of public worship in which, while the subjective element would be no less prominent, the objective idea might be more evident and explicit.

3

We must now give some attention to the various types of service of which the chief and avowed object

¹ This is less true of these services when said privately by the clergy, etc. The primary *intention*, at any rate, of the recitation of the Divine Office is the "glory of God."

is to produce an effect on the congregation; if objective worship is in view here at all, it is as an ultimate end to be served or achieved as the result of subjective work. Under this head may be included Mission services of every kind, in which the conductor definitely sets himself either to convert the unconverted, or to deepen the spiritual life of those who are already living, in greater or less degree, in communion with God.

The factors of suggestion and suggestibility are concerned here to an even greater extent than in services of the type already considered. This is not the place in which to discuss the place of the emotions in religion generally, but since it is the emotions which are mainly concerned in Mission services, we may briefly consider how and why it is that a congregation assembled (as the type of congregation I have in mind is assembled) for subjective rather than objective worship is so pliable in the emotional direction.

The element of expectation may be mentioned first. In a full-dress Mission, which has been prepared for by several months of careful spade-work by workers who themselves anticipate "conversions" as the fruit of the Mission when it comes, this element may be very powerful. Even at a mid-week service in Lent, if the preacher be a man of any considerable repute, it is there.

Pratt, quoting Le Bon's *The Crowd*, points out that "the members of a crowd tend to be more suggestible, more *primitive* in their reactions, than they would be by themselves. The higher and more complex faculties are temporarily weakened by the influence of large numbers of like-minded fellows, and the more fundamental and simple reactions, no longer inhibited, have things their own way. Men differ from each other most in intellect, morality, ideas, and least in animal impulses and emotions; hence the greater the power of the crowd the more do its members come to resemble

each other, the things in which they differ being laid aside. Emotion and imagination become very prominent, while the critical judgment becomes weak."¹

These remarks apply to relatively small collections of people as well as to *mobs*, and it is hardly necessary to point out that a great power is put into the hands of a man who has the handling of such a group.² It is a power to be used. But it can also be abused, and since the dangers of its abuse are so incalculably great, we may refer to them here. Since an appeal to the feelings is likely, under these conditions, to provoke an immediate response and to produce quick and visible results, a temptation is offered to the preacher to stress the emotional element in his sermon and in the hymns and prayers. The dangers of succumbing to this temptation depend on the fact that every soul includes a *mind*, and that no religious appeal which deliberately ignores the mind can be adequate or lasting. It is easy to create a pleasant, comfortable, religious-warm-bath atmosphere by a service of emotional and rather meaningless hymns, a few rhythmically monotonous prayers and a vaguely emotional appeal from the pulpit, and then to persuade ourselves that the general sense of well-being and satisfaction thereby produced is a proof of the presence of the Spirit—the Spirit of Wisdom, Understanding, Counsel, Knowledge. It is significant that our Lord seems deliberately to have avoided any reliance on the emotional suggestibility of groups, in spite of opportunities offered to Him by the multitudes which hung on His words, the peculiarly imaginative character of the Eastern mind, and the prospect of a general acknowledgment of His Messiahship. There was one occasion, it will be remembered, when the crowds, apparently swept off their feet by a wave of feeling not

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 173.

² In this and the following paragraph I have ventured to draw on my *Recent Psychology and the Christian Religion*, pp. 81 ff.

really based on any stable interior conviction, wanted to make Him their king on the spot. *Jesus, therefore, perceiving that they were about to come and take Him by force to make Him king, withdrew again into the mountain Himself alone.*

Religious "revivals" are fortunately out of fashion. Anyone who regrets this may be advised to study the literature of the subject, particularly that dealing with the physical phenomena which too often accompany revivalism. "Great excitement of any kind, but especially joy or fear," writes Pratt, "has to overflow into the muscles," sometimes with regrettable and even revolting results. The rector of a country parish in a district where revivals are frequent and popular among Nonconformists told me recently that because of their after-effects, and particularly for their invariably loosening effect upon sexual morality, he always dreads a revival within fifty miles of his village. In this connexion we may also recall Starbuck's informing statistics as to the comparative permanence of "conversions" brought about during, and apart from, a revival of the more sensational kind.¹

But the recognition of the dangers inherent in the emotional suggestibility of a group of people assembled with the conscious—or more than half-conscious—desire to be impressed need not blind us to the valuable possibilities of the right kind of suggestion. We have seen that the essential characteristic of suggestion is that it works independently of adequate rational grounds.² The fact that this is so, and that suggestion is a powerful method of instilling ideas into a suggestible congregation, does not diminish

¹ *Psychology of Religion*, p. 170. Of a particular congregation, a pastor told Starbuck that out of ninety-two converts "received" during a revival, sixty-two lapsed within six weeks, while of the remaining thirty only twelve stuck to religion for any length of time. Of sixty-eight converts received in the regular course of Church work, only sixteen lapsed within six weeks, while of the remaining fifty-two there were still forty-one "in good standing" long afterwards.

² It is important to recognise that the greater part of most people's religion is based on *authority* of one kind or another, which operates largely through suggestion.

the minister's responsibility; on the contrary, it increases it, since he is charged with the duty of choosing what those ideas shall be, and of guarding against the danger of passing on false or only half-true suggestions. He must see to it, in his preaching and in the conduct of the service, that the congregation's suggestibility is provided with right suggestions to work upon, and not wrong ones; that the suggestions offered to it are *true*; that, at any rate in his mind, they are the result of right thinking, and are capable of rational justification.

4

We come now to the service which most evidently fulfils the function of worship in the sense suggested at the beginning of this essay, and distinguished as "objective" by Pratt and others—I mean the Eucharist. That one purpose of the Eucharist is to "make some kind of an effect upon the Deity" needs no argument. From the psychological point of view the question we have to consider is, What are the characteristic features of the Eucharist which make it the expression *par excellence* of that human tribute to God's transcendent holiness and love which constitutes the vital element in worship? In discussing this question we shall avail ourselves, in addition to psychology, of the assistance to be derived from the sister science of anthropology.

The Eucharist, from one point of view, clearly belongs to that class of institution known by the generic name of cult, under which title may be included all religiously prescribed *modes of action*. We need hardly concern ourselves with the vexed question whether, in the religion of primitive man, ritual or belief came first; it seems, as a matter of fact, to be pretty generally agreed that the former is the older of the two. But we must notice that ritual or cult is essentially a social product. Among primitive peoples it seems likely

that some social activity—a dance, a meal, a ceremony of almost any kind—comes to be (*how*, anthropologists are not unanimously agreed) associated with or affected by current ideas about the spirit world; this association having once been made, the religious significance of the ceremony persists. The cult in this final form fulfils three purposes. It helps to foster the corporate spirit, herd instinct ensuring that every member of the group complies with the cult's demands on him: it satisfies, in a religious direction, the instinct of self-expression, and thus has a great subjective value: and it helps to keep religion before the individual's mind and attention by associating him with it in a direct and personal way.

Now it is clear that these three ends are all served by the Eucharist. They are all subjective ends. But because the Eucharist possesses these characteristics common to all forms of cult, it lends itself, also, to the ends of objective worship. That is to say, objective and subjective are here fused and made one. The form of Christian worship which most definitely and explicitly aims at offering homage, adoration, and supplication to Almighty God is that which at the same time produces the most direct and explicit consciousness of Him—or at least of the reality of the unseen world—in the mind of the worshipper.

"The Mass is the very centre of Catholic worship and the heart of Catholic belief . . . it has no rival in the whole round of religious ceremonial for impressiveness, and for the production of deep but controlled religious emotion."¹

An important factor concerned both in the origin and continuance of cult is the power of symbols. The reader who has any acquaintance with modern psy-

¹ Pratt, *op. cit.*, p. 298. It is noticeable that the Eucharist possesses such immense subjective value precisely because of its essentially objective purpose; in this respect it has the advantage over every type of service of which the purpose is predominantly subjective. An analogy to this may be found in the paradox of hedonism: happiness does *not* come most surely when sought most consciously.

chology will not need to be reminded that the number of people whose thinking and conduct are to any great extent based upon logical and rational processes of the mind is comparatively small. The power of "directed thinking" is a relatively late product of evolution, and it ought not to surprise us that the powers of many in this direction are limited, and that even the higher intellectual types show marked traces of the alogical and undirected thinking which reveals itself most clearly in dreams and other manifestations of the unconscious. It is its non-rational character which makes the unconscious, as we have seen, so responsive to suggestion. The same quality accounts for the enormous influence of symbols. They appeal to the primitive tendency to think in objects and things rather than in ideas. It is clear that a strong case for idolatry could be made out along these lines. It is certain that it has a profound psychological basis. The need of the ordinary man for some visible, tangible object associated with his faith is evidenced by the whole history of religion. It may be demonstrated most strikingly by the case of Buddhism. When this faith is mentioned, the picture of temples containing images of the Buddha comes instantly to our mind; and quite rightly, since they are an indispensable adjunct of modern Buddhism. But primitive Buddhism was entirely atheistic, and Gotama deliberately guarded against the possibility that he should himself become an object of worship to his followers. For some centuries the Four Noble Truths constituted the whole of Buddhism. The time came, however, when the psychological need for symbols asserted itself: images of Buddha were introduced, and have been an integral part of Buddhist worship ever since.

Do we detract from the dignity and spiritual value of the Eucharist by admitting that part of its universal appeal lies in the satisfaction it affords to the deep-rooted mental characteristic which accounts also for

idolatrous worship? Only, I think, if we make the cardinal error of confusing the question of *origin* with the question of *truth*: and if we fall into a fallacy parallel to that which argues that to demonstrate the sources of man's belief in God is the same thing as to prove that there is no God to believe in. Our Lord's saying, that He came not to destroy but to fulfil, is relevant here. The Christian Eucharist is not a bolt from the blue, but the completion, correction, and consecration of ideas and desires concerning man's approach to God which have always existed in the human heart. "If we are so made," says Mr. G. K. Chesterton somewhere, "that only the Son of God can redeem us, is it strange that Patagonians (and others) should dream of a son of God?" We may well ask, similarly, If symbolism is a universal adjunct of worship, would it not be strange if it had no place in the central act of Christian worship?

It is important, however, to insist that the central symbolism of the Eucharist is—to use a distinction which recent discussions among Anglicans have made familiar—*effectual*, and not merely declaratory or didactic. It may be doubted whether any worshipper, prostrating himself before an idol, believes that in any ultimate sense his god is actually *identified* with it; *association* would be the more correct word to describe the connexion conceived to exist between them. The symbol, that is to say, is declaratory. But in the Eucharist Christ and the consecrated elements are—if we consider only the least advanced types of sacramental doctrine—at least so far identified that he who in faith receives them receives grace and life from Him. The symbolism here is *effectual*: through the operation of the Divine will, and not simply in virtue of the significance which men attach to it, the symbol *does* something. Or—if we could think of the effect of consecration apart from the ultimate end of communion—the Eucharistic symbols *are* what they

are because God, and not man, wills it so. In other words, the final justification for these symbols is theological; to a Christian they are more than concessions to a profound psychological need—though from God's point of view they may be so described: they are *true*.

But even apart from its central and supreme symbolism, the Eucharist, enriched as it has been in Catholicism by the wealth of ritual, art, and music which, in the course of ages, has come to be associated with it, has no rivals among forms of worship designed to express and to foster the numinous sense. Quite as much from the psychological as from the theological point of view, it stands unique and supreme. It would be easy to discuss the Eucharist in this light at infinite length. I can only suggest one or two further ideas as to the subjective value of this essentially and supremely objective form of public worship. It must suffice merely to mention—not because they are unimportant, but for reasons of space—such things as the subconscious influence of a building in which the Christian mysteries have been celebrated for centuries; the sense, fostered by the unvarying character of the liturgy and the prescribed manual acts of the priest, that one is taking part in a Drama being enacted in the same way, at the same moment, at countless other altars all over the world; the associations created by such things as vestments, altar lights, the sacred vessels, and the smell of incense. This last point is interesting. The use of incense is confined, it may be said without fear of contradiction, to churches in which the objective nature of Eucharistic worship is most evident: and its characteristic odour tends therefore to become directly and intimately associated with the numinous sense. There must be cases, one imagines, of lapsed Catholics who have been recalled to a sense of the reality of God, and of the duty and joy of worship—it may be, after years spent in

forgetfulness of Him—by entering a church and encountering that strange but unmistakable scent once more.

On a previous page I referred to the psychological value of silence. Its power is at a maximum in the Eucharist, where it tends to enhance all the features of the service which suggest awe, mystery, and wonder. It is, perhaps, a matter for regret that in the Anglican liturgy the intervals of silence are not longer and more frequent, which accounts for the growing number of churches in which the Eucharist is said inaudibly. I would not be thought to advocate "the blessed mutter of the Mass": the normal way of assisting at the Holy Mysteries should surely be that of following the service as it proceeds. On the other hand, the Roman method of celebrating Low Mass, in which the congregation are not expected to follow the service themselves—which, of course, many of them cannot do if it is in Latin—but to occupy themselves with their own devotions, may be theologically justified by remembering that the Eucharist is essentially something done, an Action, an Offering, a Drama. When the Eucharist is celebrated thus, the devotional opportunities of silence are greater than when the whole service is conducted by the priest in an audible and sonorous voice. As an Anglican, one wishes sometimes that *three* methods of celebrating could be recognised as permissible; they might be used at different times and on particular occasions: (1) the ordinary method, audible: (2) inaudible: (3) a celebration—akin in this respect, I suppose, to the Orthodox liturgy—which would take a considerable time, in which the service would be broken by a fairly long period of absolute silence at certain points.

A further point to be borne in mind in connexion with the Eucharist is the following. While it manifestly serves certain subjective ends, as we have seen, and appeals to the emotional and imaginative side of

man's nature, regarded from a slightly different angle it provides a *check* to emotionalism, and regulates the emotional vagaries of individuals. This is one of the great virtues of all sacramental religion, which emphasises the importance of motive and will expressed in action, not in mere feeling. Christianity is a religion for the "wayfaring man, yea the fool." He is not a mystic, or at any rate his moments of vision and the consciousness of God's presence are rare. But his spiritual needs are met in the sacraments, and above all in the sacrament of Christ's Body and Blood. He may not be able at will to lift up his soul to God, but he knows where and how his Saviour has promised His Presence to those who seek Him. He may not, perhaps, *feel* very much when he takes the Bread and drinks the Cup, but he knows that at the altar he is where earth and heaven meet.

In this short discussion of the Eucharist, psychology and theology have been almost equally in evidence. This is not merely inevitable: it is right. Christian worship must be based on sound theology; no purely psychological considerations can, in the final resort, compensate for that. The relevance of this to a subject which is at present exercising the minds of a good many Anglicans may perhaps be pointed out. There is a marked tendency in some quarters to build the case for the extra-liturgical cultus of the Blessed Sacrament solely upon the subjective effect of such devotions. This is not the place to discuss the questions at issue. But fundamentally they are theological questions: they cannot be decided on purely psychological grounds.

On a previous page it has been admitted that the possibility of materialistic and magical notions is inherent in the very nature of the Eucharist—as in all sacramental religion. It follows that in all our thought and teaching about the Eucharist we must be careful to prevent this potential danger from becoming actual.

Corruptio optimi pessima. "Magic begins," as von Hügel remarks, "only when and where things physical are taken to effect spiritual results apart altogether from minds transmitting or receiving."¹

The danger referred to is most real when Eucharistic worship is urged upon groups of people whose spiritual and intellectual grasp of religion is at a comparatively undeveloped stage. Two illustrations will suffice. It is surely desirable that children should be brought up to regard the Eucharist as the normal (because the highest) act of corporate Christian worship. And this can only be done effectively by accustoming them to attendance at the Eucharist. But I am sure that where children are present there should always be some grown-up person among them, who will very briefly and simply explain the various stages of the service as it proceeds, and lead them in appropriate devotions.² Again, congregations of simple and uneducated folk are not unknown in which any *intelligent* appreciation of their Eucharistic worship is almost non-existent. This is on every ground to be regretted, and it is not unavoidable. A parish in which the Eucharist is urged as the proper Sunday service to attend, but in which there is no *constant and careful instruction*, is liable to two dangers. The worship of the faithful inner circle falls far short, inevitably, of what Eucharistic worship may and ought to be; and precisely the best type of parishioner is alienated by a form of service which he does not understand.

The fact that the psychological merits of the Eucharist are supported (as I should maintain) by sound theology is of great importance, and may remind us that in this central act of Christian worship the whole personality of the worshipper—intellect as well as affections and will—is (or may be) involved. The

¹ *Essays and Addresses on the Philosophy of Religion*, p. 251.

² Hence the value of a Children's Eucharist rather than one which the children attend together with adults.

representation of Christ's Passion is an appeal to the mind as well as to the emotions. It is true that some modern psychologists have a simple and ready explanation of Eucharistic theology. It is, they tell us, a rationalisation—that is to say, it is a theory invented by the collective Christian mind for conduct which is, in fact, based upon the appeal of symbolism and cult to primitive mentality, in much the same way as civilised man invents reasons for the conventions, racial prejudices, and opinions which are in reality the result of his instinctive and primitive sensitiveness to the suggestions of his fellows. But this superficially attractive analogy breaks down on examination. The whole point about a rationalisation is *that it can be recognised as false* by the critical intellect. Few people would venture to say as much of the Catholic doctrine of the Eucharist—unless, indeed, with Mr. A. G. Tansley,¹ they are prepared to regard the whole of Christian doctrine as the supreme example of rationalisation. We rightly emphasise, then, the intellectual appeal of the Eucharist. Its supreme attraction for the scholar, as well as for the sinner and the saint, is sufficient refutation of the shallow view which regards its influence throughout Christian history as wholly due to the suggestive power of symbolism. “Why should Baron von Hügel or the Dean of St. Paul’s chase the same phantom as the Basuto or the Korean, and never see that it is a phantom?”²

I have not disguised my personal conviction that the Catholic form of the Eucharist provides, whether regarded from a theological or psychological standpoint, the supreme means and opportunity for offering to God the worship which creatures owe to their Creator, children to their Father in Heaven, the redeemed to their Redeemer. I cannot conclude more fitly than by quoting a tribute to this form of public

¹ *The New Psychology and its Relation to Life.*

² H. Balmforth, *Is Christian Experience an Illusion?* p. 109.

worship, as it is offered day by day at thousands of altars in the Anglican Communion, by a critical but sympathetic Free Churchman.¹

"I know no mode of worship in which I am now less obstructed by the media than the Anglican celebration of the Eucharist. The different elements in the service so tone in with one another that each produces its effect without calling attention to itself, whereas in the simpler symbolism of a Congregational communion service each item stands out stark and insistent because of its singularity. Moreover, the ministrant, in the Catholic modes of worship, because he does nothing unexpected, is less apt to intrude his own individual idiosyncrasies between my soul and God. There is no service in which I can so count upon being brought face to face with Christ Himself, with no distraction to break the intensity of my communion. There is none in which Christ is at once so great and so near, so much the universal Saviour of all men and the Saviour of my own individual soul."

¹ Malcolm Spencer, *Impasse or Opportunity: The Situation after Lambeth*, p. 53.

V

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF RELIGIOUS
EDUCATION

BY

G. H. DIX, M.A., D.LIT.

V

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF RELIGIOUS EDUCATION

THE teaching of religious knowledge to children and adolescents has for its purpose to help them to fashion their lives upon the examples set before them, and particularly upon the pattern of the life of Christ, who perfectly fulfilled the will of God. The end of religious training is therefore conformity of human character with the character of God. The attainment of this end constitutes the Christian idea of the purpose of life. We believe that the human mind, emotions, and will have been created in order that they may act together in perfect harmony, and make human personality reflect the likeness of the Divine. Consequently, all the material and the methods of religious instruction are at once brought to the test, whether they help the person taught towards achieving the Christian ideal of life's purpose. By the application of psychological principles both to the proper grading of material and to the methods of teaching this material, when it is rightly graded, we are warned beforehand against mistakes and failures such as must come when these principles are violated.

Psychology investigates the kinds of response which the mind makes to the world in which it is placed. The world includes the body which encloses the mind, and other persons and things outside. The whole of what is called "the environment" of a person elicits mental responses from him. But when we analyse these terms "environment" and "mental responses," we find that they bear very complex meanings. "En-

vironment " includes not only material things, but all that is meant by civilisation and culture, thought and religion. Mental and spiritual as well as material elements go to its composition. Again, "mental responses" may be intellectual, emotional, or volitional in character, or a blend of two or more of these in varying proportions; and the kind of response made to an object will vary from person to person, and from mood to mood in the same person. All these characteristics belong to the province which psychology investigates with a view to finding upon what principles the mind acts when it responds to the world in which it is placed. The teacher therefore wisely makes use of the conclusions of psychology in testing both the kind of material which he ought to bring to the minds of pupils of different ages, and the methods by which he would secure the mental response he desires to that material.

Certain general principles are laid down as maxims for teachers, such as: (1) Teach from the well-known to the less known and so to the unknown; (2) Teach from the concrete to the abstract; (3) Teach from the particular to the general. The first two are based upon psychology; the third is based upon the logical method of induction, and is good where it can be applied, but is by no means universally applicable to all lessons. The deductive method has to be used in many cases. But the first maxim enunciates the psychological truth that we learn by relating a new fact to an old one; and the second similarly states that the mind thinks pictorially and symbolically of objects much better than it learns to think of their qualities. It is easier for a child to think of "an orange" than of "yellowness" or "smoothness"; it is easier to understand the phrase "The Lord is my Shepherd" than to grasp the meaning of the term "Providence"; it is easier to learn "God loves me" than to learn "God is love." We are forthwith brought face to face with

the problem of "doctrinal teaching." If the principles we have laid down are true, it is better to give such teaching through concrete examples which illustrate the doctrines to be taught, than to proceed from definitions to illustrations which throw light upon their meaning. Teaching is not the less doctrinal because it starts from illustration and ends with definition, rather than *vice versa*; and such a method has the advantage of being based upon a psychological principle which not only individuals, but the Church as a whole, has made use of in learning to formulate her Christologies, Creeds, and Catechisms. From this point of view it is impossible to teach the Bible unless it be taught doctrinally, for children learn readily enough to draw general conclusions from particular examples. The teacher's business is to select the right materials, and to employ such psychological methods as will lead the child to form correct conclusions, and to formulate adequate definitions of the conclusions which it has reached. This is doctrinal teaching at its best. Moses learnt the lesson that "God is everywhere" from his vision of the burning bush. God was there, but He was no less in Egypt with Israel to preserve it, and would be no less with Israel in its journey to Canaan. The new doctrine, for it was new to him, was a new discovery about God which Moses made from concrete examples which set it forth; and the same mode of discovery is rightly employed in teaching religious doctrine to children and adolescents.

What psychological principles, then, should we adopt in teaching children at different ages and stages in their development? To answer this question we must consider the stages through which children pass. These may be roughly classified as follows: (1) The stage of infancy; (2) The kindergarten stage (about five to eight); (3) Boyhood and girlhood (about eight to thirteen); (4) Adolescence (thirteen onwards to the twenties).

I

The characteristics of infancy make it the seed-plot of all religious teaching and training. It is the period of life when the mind is most plastic to receive and retain impressions; correspondingly, it is the period of greatest sensitiveness to impressions and imitative self-activity in response to impressions. The mother's knee is the place for teaching infants, and the material of instruction is the love of God for a little child. During these years the child learns the loving care of mother and the protective strength of father; and both ideas find their place in the mother's teaching about God. "Prayerfulness" is the method of instruction, —*i.e.*, the child is taught to put hands together, close eyes, and speak to God just as mother does when she listens to evening prayers. Here is the principle of imitative self-activity in operation in teaching reverence and holy love for God, and in training the child to religious habits. Flowers, the sky, sunshine, animals, are good things for a mother to talk about, because they can be made to manifest the love of God who made them and protects them. Home-life properly lived gives a religious atmosphere in which the little child learns to know God as One Factor, the chief loving Person, in his environment. It is in this atmosphere of religion that the earliest and most permanently abiding lessons for after-life are taught. The training given in the home is of paramount importance in the right development of a spiritual character because it "sets" that development going in the right direction.

2

The child's religious education and training continues in the home, but receives added force from school, where it finds itself a member of a larger society than the family, and learns by degrees the

meaning of fellowship through association with persons like itself in character, desires, and interests. In school the child is placed in an environment which has been "selected" as the best for teaching and training; and the child's education is a process whereby it learns under the guidance of teachers to adapt itself to this environment. In school the teacher's main concern is to guide the child how to respond to this environment in the best way it can; that is, the work of the day-school is largely instruction, though as there can be no instruction without training, the latter necessarily has an important place in the teacher's mind.

Class teaching in school takes the place of individual instruction in the home, but no teacher can be satisfied with teaching "a class"; he must teach individuals in the class, and to do this demands an intimate knowledge of each child's personality and its needs. No doubt children of the same age bear a general resemblance to each other; but the differences between them are no less striking. Thus, while the generality of children of kindergarten age are fond of activities, some will be found who are simply imitative, others who show marked individuality and inventiveness, and others again who blend these two characteristics. Thus, when the psychologist generalises, and says that the teacher in a kindergarten must appeal to the principle of self-activity, it is still the teacher's business to find how far and in what ways this generalisation is applicable to individuals in the class. Or again, when the psychologist notes that a child's memory is as wax to receive and retain impressions, the teacher has still to discover what impressions ought to be given for retention, and how they should be presented. Or again, it is a psychological fact that imagination is very active at this stage of life, but this does not mean that imagery of all types is fashioned equally well by all children; the majority can picture visual images better than those of

sound; a few use the latter rather than the former in recalling impressions, so that the teacher must learn to discriminate between individuals.

It is true to say that the bodily senses are avenues through which the mind is reached, and that the mind is the informant of the spirit. It follows, therefore, that sound thinking upon any subject, including religion, is the result of correct sense-impressions; and that the child is guided to right spiritual activities by sound knowledge of what is required of him.

The kindergarten places the child in an environment where he can receive good sense-impressions and begin to learn to think correctly about them. Since our immediate purpose is to discuss the bearing of psychology upon teaching and training children at this stage, we may perhaps indicate the chief ways in which a good kindergarten makes use of psychological principles. In the first place, it appeals strongly to the sense of sight, sound and touch, by objects, pictures, diagrams, colours, good music, and all with orderliness and neatness. Thus religious lessons take their form from the most interesting lessons in other subjects: religion is made interesting by having things in it which appeal to the natural interests of the child, and giving these things a symbolic value. Flowers, children, animals, teach lessons about God's love, God's wisdom, God's creative power, God's protecting care, and so forth. After all, the Hebrews began to learn about God from these concrete objects: we can do no better than follow the Divine method of instruction as revealed in Scripture.

In the second place, the kindergarten makes use of the story to teach religious truth. This again follows the guidance of Scripture, and satisfies the demands of child-nature for knowledge which is interesting in its appeal. Stories both appeal to the intellect and imagination and sway the emotions. A "moving" story has power to reach the inner life of children and

adults. The stories of the Old Testament, the stories of the Lord Jesus and His Saints, are rich treasures of religious knowledge from which the kindergarten teacher will make wise selection. The test of value, which all teaching stories must satisfy, is that they should teach what is True, and set forth that truth in Beauty and in Joy. These three qualities are necessary to a child's religion, because they are the things which every child seeks in life: and religion must be as large as life at all stages. If the teacher will seek stories which contain these three elements—wheresoever the stories may be found, in the works of non-scriptural poets and prose-writers as well as in the Bible—the child will respond to their appeal and learn to love the religion which they teach.

Again, the kindergarten finds employment for the child's memory, by giving it texts, hymns, and maxims of conduct to learn. But here again the appeal must be to the child's nature. Mere mechanical memorising by repetition satisfies children only for a short time. Music and action take away from the monotony by giving sustained interest to the passages to be memorised. Even so, variation of posture and variety of occupation with frequent return to the repetition will secure better work and longer and more accurate retention in the memory.

Similarly, the manifold activities of children are made use of in the Kindergarten, by means of the missionary march, the lighting of birthday candles, references to the Baptismal Roll, expression work at the close of the lesson, and so forth. We have learnt that children teach themselves through the exercise of their functions, and it is the application of this truth to teaching and training in religion which a good kindergarten manifests. The religious exercises, hymns, and prayers provide for the proper exercise of the activities of the child just as much as do other parts of the curriculum: in point of fact, they bring religious instruction to its

focus in training the child's will to respond to the will of God through His grace given in answer to prayer, so that the child's grace-endowed will may find ways of expressing itself in action. Here is the first great extension of the religion of the home, an extension which is given by additional knowledge about God and His love, and the response which this knowledge demands.

A word is necessary concerning teaching about sin and punishment at this stage. Young children have very little idea of sin, though they understand "naughtiness" and its result to themselves. Our Lord's method was to emphasise goodness, and not evil, in the life of children. He considered them the ideal members of His Kingdom, and taught adults to manifest the virtues of childhood. It is well to remember this, because it will affect both the kind of lessons we shall give and the attitude we adopt in teaching young children. Stories that deal with goodness and its effects rather than with evil and its results; incidents and lives that are filled with the joy of holiness rather than with the sadness of wickedness; events that issue in the triumph of righteousness and the praise of them that do good, rather than in the defeat of evil and the punishment of them that do wickedly—such stories follow the guidance thus given by the Great Teacher, and satisfy the demands of the modern psychologist. Again, the teacher's attitude to young children will be affected by this consideration, for teaching will be a ministry to enhance the goodness they exemplify rather than a method of eradicating evil from their souls. It follows, therefore, that the joy of this ministry will impart itself to the teacher's work and find its reflection in the child's desire to share the secret of the teacher's enthusiastic gladness.

3

When the kindergarten child passes onwards into the upper school, it becomes conscious of its powers as a person who counts in school life. Intellect sharpens as it ranges over a larger world; emotions become more complex with the complexity of objects that provoke mixed feelings; and the will hardens in resolve as it fashions a character out of actions that tend to become habitual.

In the early years of girlhood and boyhood there is little need to distinguish between the mental activities of the two sexes. Both think, and feel, and will, in much the same way. But a transition has been made from the kindergarten attitude of receptiveness because developing personality needs scope for its own new powers. The story still interests, but it must have greater complexity, or keener "point," or be cast in more emotional mould, to retain attention at this stage. In general, stories which exemplify the conquest of dangers and difficulties by a hero or heroine of surpassing strength, goodness, courage, or cleverness, win their way to favour because they illustrate the qualities which girls and boys desire to possess for themselves. The life of action always appeals because it illustrates and provides example for the exercise of personality—*i.e.*, the very element which girlhood and boyhood set store by. The desire to "shine" is characteristic in children of this age: they admire personalities which stand out from the rest of the world.

But the teacher's stock of such stories is limited, though it will be constantly receiving additions from the study of the later books of the Bible, the records of Church History, the Mission field, and other places in literature and life. The child is anxious to know the world to its full extent, and the work of religious teaching is to show that religion is co-extensive with the best and highest activities of people in the world—

i.e., that religion is as large and as interesting as life itself. Consequently, as the years pass, the story becomes less and less the vehicle of instruction, and serves more and more the purpose of illustration. The child demands fact and reality, because it lives in a factual and real world which has to be known. Therefore, the discoveries which knowledge has made in the fields of science, archæology, history, geography, become of interest, because they give explanations of the real world. Maps showing the world as known (*a*) to the Babylonians, (*b*) to the Hebrews, (*c*) to the Greeks, (*d*) to the Romans, (*e*) to Europe before Columbus, and (*f*) to people of to-day, will help boys and girls to realise among other things the meaning of history as the gradual unfolding of God's purpose for men, the place of the great nations at different times in history, the contribution of Israel to the religious life of mankind, and the missionary efforts which must be made by Christian people to-day. Again, since the study of life itself is the supreme interest of unfolding personalities, biography becomes of great importance in teaching. There is no need to confine attention to the lives of the patriarchs of Israel: outlines of the lives of the prophets of the Old Testament, and the apostles and evangelists of the New, together with their successors, the missionary saints of the Church, will provide new and interesting material for lessons. But since we are dealing with the exemplification of Christian character in action, reference at all times to the Life of lives is essential.

But while this new material is provided for the teacher, it must be remembered that the child's apprehension and use of it in his own life is the purpose of teaching and training in religion. The child's intellect will need exercise not only in the way of memory, but also in the way of reason. Whether the teacher wishes it or not, the challenge of new knowledge will be taken up by the child's reasoning powers. Is it true? Is it

real? Does it apply to my life? These are the questions, often unuttered, which the child wants answered. Therefore, the teacher will be ready with such material as will challenge developing reason to find satisfaction in exercise. Lessons upon the Creed, when they employ illustrations such as we have mentioned; lessons upon the Sacraments, when they show that the sacramental principle is illustrated by such themes as the story of the Burning Bush, Elijah's mantle, the miracle at Cana of Galilee, the feeding of the five thousand, and so forth; lessons upon the Church Catechism, when they are furnished with illustrations taken from the Bible and from Church History; these challenge a child's reason to find its rightful exercise in the sphere of Christian doctrine.

Again, the child's emotional life must find satisfaction in religion. It is impossible that any child should remain unmoved by the heroism of St. Paul, or the work of St. Francis of Assisi, or the story of the conversion of the English, or the dramatic witness of Elijah and St. Stephen to God and Christ, or the story of the call of Amos or Isaiah to struggle on God's behalf—provided that the teacher has felt the glow of emotional fire which these stories give out, and can express it in words. Here we come to the necessity that the teacher should be able to describe what he knows and feels. Guidance as to the proper way of doing this is supplied by the child. Watch him as he narrates an incident interesting to himself—the brightening eye, the tense muscles of the face, the moving hands and arms, and finally the whole body taking part in the dramatic description. The teacher takes his lesson from the child in these things; otherwise, religion becomes the one subject of knowledge which, because of its lack of emotional appeal, fails to arrest and retain the child's interest.

Moreover, in preparing such lessons as necessitate good descriptive powers, the teacher must learn to

arrange his thoughts after the child's fashion. How does a child think? We have seen that the kind of imagery employed by the majority of young children is visual; and this does not alter in the higher school. The mind is apt to make pictures of people, scenes, and events. The teacher will therefore think out an arrangement of such mental pictures to form a lesson in description. As teachers, we analyse documents, and chapters of documents, not into paragraphs and verses, but into a series of visual images which give us a concrete edition of the story; then we can move backward and forward along the series as we will, in order to find the proper emotional colouring to be given to each image so as to make it "live" in the minds of our pupils.

It is essential that emotion should have its right place in religious teaching, not only because without it lessons lack appeal, but because through emotion the will is stirred to action; and as the practice of religion ultimately belongs to the region of the will, right emotional prompting must furnish the basis for all the rightful activity of the will. The cruder emotions of fear, anger, jealousy, rivalry, hatred, are easily enough stirred into life by emotional appeals; the finer emotions of awe, reverence, gratitude, sympathy, benevolence, are much more difficult to foster and to train during the years of boyhood and girlhood. Yet it is essentially the task of the teacher of religion to do this, for these are the emotions which make the religious life of the individual a life of fellowship with God and man. The "atmosphere" of the school and church, the teacher's own attitude to sacred things, the demand made of the pupils for care in the externals of religious teaching, orderliness and quietness of demeanour when assembling, or at lessons, or in worship, all count for much in cultivating the rightful employment of emotion in connection with religion.

Not that emotional teaching is to be pushed to an

extreme with pupils of this age. Most teachers have had experience on the one hand of a seeming lack of right feeling in some boys and girls, and on the other hand of excessively emotional types whose wills are as wayward as their moods. The former class are more difficult to teach than the latter; but often the resulting effect of the lessons given is more permanent in building up a strong religious character. The fact is that the less emotional type of child is generally slower to find religion a very personal thing; he is learning to know rather than to feel. The more emotional type develops earlier, is very self-centred, and is easily swayed by rapidly coloured imaginings and fancies. The teacher must distinguish between individuals here. It is easy to cultivate hot-house plants which cannot stand the cold winds of the real world; it is hard to wait for flowers from stocks which bloom slowly. Nature is wise in preventing too early a display of emotion in children, who have to learn how to think and act rightly in a world that calls for fulness of knowledge and power of will to overcome circumstances and temptations which would thwart balanced development of the whole personality. It is best not to anticipate too much the emotional development that more rightly belongs to adolescence.

The religion of boyhood and girlhood, then, is such as suits this particular stage of human development. It is not the religion of the adult cut down to smaller proportions; nor is it the religion of the kindergarten upon a higher scale. It consists of learning the *ideas* of the Christian faith, and the ways in which these ideas may be worked out in life—*i.e.*, in the life of boys and girls. Each has to be guided to find his own way of practical religion, for each boy and girl differs from all others; there is no general mould in which all can be fitted, no mere "average girl" or "average boy." At this stage particularly the teacher's business is to teach and train individuals, not simply a class.

We pass on to consider the most difficult stage which the human being passes through, the period of adolescence intervening between the boyhood and girlhood that are now being left behind, and the manhood and womanhood in which religion becomes the accepted centre of an ordered and well-balanced life lived in love for God and in fellowship with mankind.

Adolescence is the age of criticism. The things of childhood are being abandoned because the interests of larger life are many and varied. The world is full of romantic attractions, and it offers rewards to those who strive to attain. Consequently, adolescence is the time when life's ideals are fashioned, either to be fulfilled, or to be abandoned later in disillusionment. It is also the age when one's own personality counts for much, when to be accounted great, or good, or even worthy of greatness or goodness, is a dominant desire. Hence it is the age of hero-worship, because heroes are the embodiments of ideals achieved. Furthermore, it is the period in life when the emotions develop most rapidly under the influence of bodily changes which bring strong instincts into play. The desire to attract notice is displayed in choice of dress, attention to personal looks, the cultivation of good manners, general respect for conventions of conduct, and the manifest wish to stand well with persons of older years and of the opposite sex. In the sphere of thought the adolescent wishes to have knowledge which marks him out from others: in literature he reads and quotes poetry, in science he takes wide surveys, in art he begins to appreciate painting and architecture, and in religion he finds other ideas, besides those which he has learnt, of which he must take account. In all ways he finds himself the inhabitant of a larger and more wonderful world than he has ever dreamt of—a world that presents problems to thought, and difficulties to life, problems

which he must solve and difficulties which he must conquer for himself if he is to think and live rightly.

So far we have considered the adolescent as an individual; he is also a member of society, in which he finds scope for the exercise of his developing functions. He begins to learn that there are inequalities in human life, unequal gifts and graces, unequal rewards for similar tasks performed, social wrongs and injustices, pains as well as pleasures, suffering and sorrow as well as joy. These things present problems to which he finds answers, and call forth emotions which must lead him to action in some attempt to alleviate the evils which he knows of. Clubs, scouts, guides, girls' brigades, and such organisations ought to be training grounds for right thinking, right feeling, and right action to this end. They cannot continue to exist unless they make the adolescent "other-regarding" rather than "self-regarding," for they must be spheres in which the adolescent finds scope for the exercise of his social gifts and graces on a small scale, in order that he may employ them usefully in larger societies later on.

The social life of the adolescent, therefore, is important for the teacher of religion to consider. Every association has its "spirit," and imparts something of this spirit to its members. What kind of spirit does the teacher of religion desire that the adolescent associations should form and impart? Certainly one that produces the rich harvest of the Spirit of Christ, whose fruit is love, joy, peace, longsuffering, kindness, goodness, faithfulness, meekness, and self-control. Nothing less than this will give satisfaction either to teacher or taught. Here is the life of disciplined ministry, not the cultivation of mere social qualities which help to success in life, but the cultivation of Christian virtues at all costs to self. Therefore, associations of adolescents will provide opportunities for self-sacrificing service to others after the example of Christ.

Now in adolescence religion becomes a very personal matter: it has to find its place in a full life of thought, emotion, and willed activity. We shall not be surprised, therefore, if many experiments are tried before final settlement is found. Larger knowledge of systems of religious, scientific, and philosophical thought outside the Christian faith, as so far taught, has to be incorporated into the Christian synthesis. This involves mental struggle upon the fundamentals of Christian doctrine. The rapid development of instincts, such as those of sex and parenthood, brings new emotions into play in life, increases the range and power of temptation, changes earlier points of view concerning many things, forces facts of life upon attention, and gives a new colouring to the adolescent's world. This means emotional struggle, often intense, sometimes prolonged—a conflict between the self's desires, and the claims of society upon the best of which the self is capable. It is not too much to say that the emotional life of the adolescent is the most important factor for the teacher's study. It determines the course of adolescent thought; it determines the trend of adolescent habits—those habits which are formed by the will's activities in response to emotional promptings.

How can the teacher help the adolescent? In the first place, he will remember that this time of human nature's storm and stress is one that calls for sympathetic understanding on his part. The individual personality claims his study more now than at any other time in life, if he would know its difficulties and exercise his ministry to them. The Bible Class, in its several varieties, will give instruction, and specialists in particular subjects of religious knowledge may well be called in to address it; but the training of adolescents goes on outside the Bible Class, and is taken up in the discussions which follow instruction, in listening to the theories which individuals put forward, and in suggest-

ing other points of view, other ideas, other factors, which must be taken account of if ultimate truth is to be found. The difficult thing for the teacher is to get the adolescent to express his own ideas in public; he is afraid of public opinion, though often he is sure that his own solution of problems is the only one. He needs counsel, not in the way of contradiction, but in the way of helpful suggestion; and this demands of the teacher much patience in listening, and great gentleness as to the manner in which he offers suggestions. A sympathetic friend who can lead him is the adolescent's chief requirement.

Yet the Bible Class must have a syllabus upon which to work. To frame this syllabus the class must be taken into the teacher's confidence. The demand which it will make of the teacher is that he will show religion in its application to a full life, individual and social. This is the teacher's opportunity to take his illustrations from all parts of the Bible, from the lives of the saints, from Church History, and from the Mission field, with pointed reference to the example and grace of Christ. The Church as it is to-day, with its problems and perplexities, its life of fellowship, its worship, its faith and its practice of religion, will be the great exemplar for the work of the association or guild of which the class is representative. The many-sided witness of the Church to its faith will provide illustrations of the social value of creed and sacrament; and the necessity that every member of the Church should be a working member will be impressed by the rules which govern, and by the Spirit which animates the class. In such ways as these the subject of "religion in life" can be worked out for the instruction and guidance of adolescents who want to know what the Christian faith implies, and how it can be made practical. The teacher who studies the ways of thought of adolescents will learn that its hero-worship can be stimulated to copying the best lives, and above

all the life of Christ; that its search for new emotions can be directed into channels which will lead it to find the romance of religion; and that its desires for activities which will be of use to the world can be fulfilled in a life of helpful ministries in the society of the Church. Two dangers the teacher will avoid: the first, that of leading the adolescent to think that the Christian faith is something which can be easily learnt from small manuals which give but its outlines; and the second, that of training him to depend entirely upon a human person. The first danger is obviated by giving as wide and large knowledge as possible; the second is avoided by training him to a life of fellowship in worship and sacraments, through which he will find the Grace of Christ to strengthen him in his own doubts, and temptations, and in his ministries to others. Leadership is the great qualification which the teacher of adolescents must possess.

We have now passed in review the stages through which the child advances to adult life; and we have tried to indicate both the kind of material and the methods of instruction which psychology suggests as suitable for each stage. We are far from claiming that psychology has said its last word upon the subject of religious teaching and training. Thus far we have found only certain rough principles easily deducible from a general study of child-nature, which is possible for all teachers. But the science of psychology has much more exact work to do in the way of investigation, and particularly in the field of "educational measurement"—*i.e.*, for the more accurate determination of results obtained from specified subjects, and by special methods of instruction in religious knowledge. The proper classification of pupils, the organisation of syllabuses, the best methods of teaching can only be arrived at after prolonged and carefully methodised observation. This type of investigation is being pursued in the "secular" subjects of instruction; it

is needful that trained psychologists should take it up in the subject of religion.

Meanwhile, we may notice that our Lord's teaching methods are worth the most careful study. The New Testament is the best handbook ever written upon the teaching of religion; psychology only makes explicit the principles which are there followed out. As Christians we believe that the central Fact of Christianity is Christ; as teachers we know that all teaching must show Him to be the Way, the Truth, and the Life.

VI

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF PREACHING,
EVANGELISM, AND EDIFICATION

BY

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VI

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF PREACHING, EVANGELISM, AND EDIFICATION

PREACHING is the accepted method of Christian propaganda. It is assumed that the Church is primarily Evangelical—primarily, that is, in purpose; that it is her function first and last to evangelise others, as of necessity it had to be the first step when the world had to be conquered for Christ; and preaching, it is also taken for granted, is what builds her up. At the same time, and in the same popular judgment, sermonising is considered as synonymous with platitudinous moralising. Endless, if feeble, jokes are made about going to sleep in church, and the fact remains that sermons play practically no part in the history of great literature.

There is something wrong. Even if it is true, as many would argue, that there is another side of Christianity, that the continued insistence on the duty of proselytising is repellent, that the continual direction of our attention in religion to ourselves and our fellow-men, when it should be directed primarily to God, is in part the cause why preaching has failed to reach its aim, still it does remain one side, and that an important one. A study of the psychology of Evangelism calls, therefore, for a serious reconsideration of our present methods to see whether those generally accepted are really sound, as judged by their effectiveness, whether this exclusive attention to words is right; whether, after all, the priest does not play a much greater part both in conserving and in furthering religious life, than

does the prophet; and whether the cause of his greater effectiveness may not appear on consideration of how, as a matter of fact, religion does grow and spread.

I

No one will deny that the preacher has much to learn from a study of psychology. His problems are much the same as those of the teacher considered in the previous chapter, for, after all, the sermon only carries school methods on to adult life. Indeed, for many it provides almost the only attempt at considered and systematic education after they have been set free from school. Success in preaching largely depends on the same facts. It follows from recognition of the same laws of attention and interest, of activity and fatigue, of the necessity of variety and of the use of illustration. The natural structure of a lesson with its stages of preparation and presentation, of association and generalisation, of application and expression, the Herbartian "five steps," reappears in the sermon with its beginning, middle, and end. The commonplace of pedagogy that the great advance in education was made when, having elaborated the syllabus and trained the teacher, it at last discovered the child, has its parallel in Homiletics. After repeating for years the answer to the inquiring student, "Some men prepare their sermons" (pause); "others prepare themselves!" we are realising that it is, after all, a knowledge of the human nature of those to whom we preach that is needed, that sermon and preacher, like teacher and time-table, exist in the end for the man who must enter into the Kingdom of Heaven, as into the Kingdom of Science, as a little child.

So, apart from the greater interest a sound psychology can be made to contribute to the subject-matter of our sermons, it has a special bearing on the principles, as of education, so of oratory. The former

is no unimportant matter. Young unmarried men are warned against preaching on the right bringing up of children, but facts of the development of life in the young, or of the working of the parental instinct, established by others and written down in books, could be used by the neophyte without offence. The nature of habit could be explained to give a reasoned ground for religious practices. An analysis of such sentiments as reverence, awe, or joy, a consideration of the nature of conscience, an examination of the interplay of the self-regarding and altruistic sentiments, as Bishop Butler examined them in the light of the knowledge of his day, would add considerably to the interest of the ordinary sermon, and would stimulate religious thought in the congregation; nor would this be beyond the powers of any intelligent student who could assimilate the work of our writers of to-day. But we are considering now rather the effect on our sermons of a more scientific examination of the conditions under which the preacher works and the nature of the men to whom he speaks.

A few points may be noted as examples. First, as to the length of the sermon. The continual complaints that are made show that there is something wrong, though the complainers may not be good enough psychologists to say why it is that Army chaplains are warned not to preach too long sermons. Indeed, it is most amusing to a civilian priest, when asked to take a military service, to see how one after another, in different ways, the chaplain whose place he is taking, the sergeant who comes with the details, the vestry orderly, the organist, and the Colonel who comes in to shake hands before the service, and anyone else who can get a word in, tells him to be short. The men can only cough when they have had enough. The service is reduced to a form and the sermon to a ten minutes' "few words," in which nothing of any interest can be said. The real factor is left out of count, which is

that for some two hours before the men have been hard at work at an absurd and irrelevant preparation in the form of getting ready for parade, and are already exasperated and tired out. For attention works rhythmically, and the unit in adults appears to last about an hour. The laws have been worked out with some certainty in the case of children, and the length of lessons in school has been adapted to their natures. It is probable that it was not by chance that the day has been divided into twenty-four hours. The number appears arbitrarily chosen, but the length of the unit of measurement seems to be based on a fundamental factor in human nature. Lectures last about an hour. They seem shorter to the active lecturer and longer to the receptive hearers, but for the one it is found to be just the time he wants to round off his subject, and to the other just as much as they can attend to. So concerts lasting for two hours have an interval. Plays are divided into acts of about an hour each. Soldiers march for an hour and then rest for ten minutes. If the action during the hour is more varied, the period can be extended; if more uniform, the strain is greater and rest is required sooner. The "akademische Viertelstunde" between the lectures is found necessary in German Universities.

So a service or a sermon naturally lasts about an hour. The Roman Mass and the English Eucharist last about thirty or forty minutes; worshippers extend them to fifty by private devotions before and after. A service, as having variety in its composition, can be expanded to the length of an hour and a quarter without fatigue; a sermon by itself can last, like a lecture, from forty to fifty minutes. What is needed, therefore, is either sermons by themselves such as are preached in our University churches, where a subject can be adequately treated, or a quite short sermon where it is only one element in the whole. Either the sermon or the worship must be in the first place. It is fatal

to both if psychological laws are disregarded. The Puritans naturally petitioned that the "longsomeness of the service might be abridged," when, to the liturgy which united two separate services each really requiring an hour, an hour-long sermon was added. No wonder that "the gentry and Nobility" of the "Countrey Parson's" parish, as George Herbert anticipated, made it "a piece of state not to come at the beginning of service with their poor neighbours, but at mid-prayers."¹

If the sermon is only one element of the whole act of worship, what should be its length? Not more than a quarter of an hour or twenty minutes—not more, that is, than one-quarter or one-third of the whole—or it will not balance with the rest. For the general impression of a whole is closely connected with our power of visualising, and depends on limitations which affect not only services and sermons, but vast ranges of human life and art.

Not more than three or four things can be associated directly and at once by our sight. Beyond this number a process of grouping and addition, often very rapid, is necessary. For this reason many savages are unable to count beyond three or four. They have no names for numerals beyond. A cashier counting money will group the coins by threes, or perhaps fours, as he adds them up. A knitter will count her stitches by threes or fours, never by fives, though our decimal system of notation would make it easier. We can extend our powers by conventional arrangement of objects. A card player can recognise higher numbers at once, but on reaching ten he has to fall back on pictures, since a higher number would involve groups of fives not directly recognisable.

Regard for this limitation is a necessity for all art. The composition of a painting depends on a balance of three or four principal objects or light values. In

¹ Chapter vi., "The Parson Praying."

music, four-part harmony and triple or common time are all that the ordinary man can take in. The lyric is normally of three or four verses; if prolonged, it loses its unity and approximates to the continuous ballad. The Welsh, hymn singers by nature, rarely sing more than three verses of a hymn. So in poetry the verse is of three or four lines, or is made up of combinations of threes and fours. The sonnet elaborates the scheme, but maintains the same principle of structure. In prose the period is governed by the same laws. Had our conscious powers been greater (I say "conscious" because it is possible that the rhythm of the week may depend on similar subconscious powers of association), it may be that the whole range of our art and literature would have been enormously increased.

The same laws apply to oratory. If our sermons are to be lucid and not confused in their final effect, this connexion of our grasp of ideas with our power of vision must be reckoned with. They need a structural outline. There must be economy in use of matter which must be arranged in threes and fours. There must be logical sequence and balance of structure if people are to take in what is said, and have a clear conception of the whole. Disregard of this psychological law is a cause of much ineffectiveness of preaching.

Turning from the preacher to the congregation, we see that many other little points of oratory depend on a knowledge of human nature. The use of the tones and inflexions of speech, on which actual varieties of meaning, and still more of emotional tone, depend, for angry men can often be quieted down by a gentle manner, and indifferent men attracted by a persuasive tone; the hindrance to attention by strain if a voice is indistinct, the distraction if it is peculiar or speaks with a provincial twang; the impressiveness of clothes and place, for "a receptive attitude and an impulse of sub-

missiveness is induced not merely by superiority of physical strength, of social standing, and of intellectual reputation, but even of tailoring,"¹ and as Pascal saw, a preacher badly shaved will not be attended to, however great the truths he declares;² all the empirically discovered precepts of speech-making, that anger should be met by laughter and laughter by anger (a good saying, according to Aristotle),³ that sustained eloquence bores us, that "the great secret is to say the same thing over and over again in different words if you can, in the same if you can't", that the order should be *ut probet, ut delectat, ut flectat*—all these depend ultimately on a knowledge of human nature.

Among these we may consider one or two more fully. Most of us, whether studying it in history, or in the present day in the public Press or parks, must have been impressed, not only with the ugliness of religious controversy, but with its extraordinary futility. The case of Dionysius of Alexandria, who held a three days' public discussion with men whom another bishop would have denounced as heretics, with a result which Dr. Salmon says he "never heard of as the result of any other public discussion—that he talked his opponents round and brought them all to a complete agreement with himself,"⁴ though not so unparalleled as to deserve to be called "one of the greatest and most authentic miracles of ecclesiastical history," was still unusual. This is largely because controversialists ignore what psychology teaches us of human nature, especially as to the force of contra-suggestion in emotional and moral judgment.

For a direct attack inevitably arouses the fighting instinct in an opponent, and it is fatal to begin by antagonising the man you want to convert. Not only does his opposition increase with the force of your attack,

¹ W. McDougall, *Social Psychology*, p. 99.

² *Pensées*, Ed. Brunschvicg., No. 82.

³ *Rhetoric* iii., 187.

⁴ *A Historical Introduction to the Study of the Books of the New Testament* (Murray, third edition, 1888), p. 230.

but the bystander argues of his contention that "there must be something in it if it needs such a lot of refutation." Besides, it is seldom that the real points of difference are those which come to the fore. They are, at best, symbols or test instances of much greater principles lying behind, as when the Puritans argued against the use of the surplice, while really their objections were to the hierarchy and the whole idea of a Church, objections necessitated by their belief in predestination and their wholly different conception of God; or else they are rationalisations of decisions made on quite other emotional or moral grounds and having little or no connexion with the real causes of disagreement. This is a commonplace that would seem too obvious to be worth repeating were it not that so many of our best writers and most religious thinkers spoil so much of their work and defeat their own ends by forgetting it. Surely what is needed is to establish the underlying principles, with concrete illustrations to make men think, and then to leave these to work themselves out continuously and largely subconsciously. Our great example in such controversy is Richard Hooker, who, as Dean Church says, "was one of those rare controversialists who are more intent on showing why their opponents are wrong than even the fact that they are so,"¹ or, as he himself said, "followed that method which searcheth the truth by the causes of truth."²

Again, in controversy, appreciation and praise of your opponents is always more effective than abuse, besides being more Christian, for, apart from the fact that, if you begin by emphasising points of agreement, paths are opened along which points of difference can be brought together, it is obvious that, if you can appreciate their position, you must think your own

¹ Hooker, *Of the Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity*, Book I. (Oxford, 1896), Introduction, p. xvi.

² *Ecclesiastical Polity*, Book V., Epistle Dedicatorie, § 3.

still better. Moreover, to praise assumes a superiority. We regard praise from inferiors as an impertinence. Since the acceptance of praise, writes Dr. McDougall, "involves the recognition of superiority in him who praises, praise evokes our negative self-feeling, but since it is an acknowledgment by our superior of our merit, it also elates us."¹ This combination of elation and submissiveness is an excellent condition for conversion, but, of course, mere praise of your opponent as an oratorical trick is useless. Unless you really have the better case, it will be mere patronage, and arouse even greater opposition than attack.

Another fact that missionaries in controversy are slow to recognise is the strength of understatement, which at once gives a sense of force—that is, of course, if it is really the fact that much more might be said. Bishop Butler is a model for us in this matter. The continual recurrence in his works of such phrases as "It is not so clear a case that there is nothing in it"; "The divine goodness with which, if I mistake not, we make very free in our speculations"; "There is nothing incredible in it"; "I take upon me to assure all persons who think they have received indignities and injurious treatment, that they may depend upon it as in a manner certain that the offence is not so great as they imagine," show how, as Dean Church again says, "he is a writer who, if there is any reason for it, always *understates* his case; and he is a writer, too, from whom we learn the power and force, in an argument, of understatement, the suggestion which it carries with it both of truthfulness and care, of strength in reserve."² Till we have learned in controversy to avoid personalities and to discuss principles, to look out for grounds of agreement rather than for points of difference, to be generous and good-tempered rather than insistent to score, we shall not much further the cause of Christ, for it is the

¹ *Social Psychology*, p. 198.

² *Pascal and other Sermons* (Macmillan, 1896), Sermon II. *Bishop Butler*, p. 30.

men that matter, and it is by the tone and temper of the man that argues that they judge.

Or again, there is much empiric knowledge on effective missionary methods. Mr. Spurgeon lectured on them to his students. Mr. Torrey wrote a book on how to conduct a revival. Lookers-on have described the tactics adopted by Mr. "Billy" Sunday. Novelists have depicted the practices of "debt-raisers."¹ There is a fairly large volume of description of the phenomena accompanying such movements as have occurred in Wales under the influence of Mr. Evan Roberts and others. Students of psychology have traced their force to the strength of the herd instinct, and to the greater suggestibility of men in crowds. The influence of the law of rhythm in life has been pointed out to explain the periodic recurrence of such revivals. While the study of such laws undoubtedly does much to make preaching effective, as the study of child psychology has re-created class teaching, it also shows the extraordinary danger of such methods in the hands of ignorant men, and the serious limitations to their effectiveness and lasting power. The law of rhythm which helps on the revival accounts for the continual complaint of backsliding; and the fact that the preaching largely consists in an appeal to fear, which, while it fixes the attention, inhibits action, explains why such missionary effort has so little permanence or moral result. The classic example of such misdirected evangelism may be read of in the pages of Bunyan's *Grace Abounding*, in which we see that Bunyan's struggle was "devoid of moral significance."²

So psychology throws light on many minor points in homiletics, explaining, for instance, how shy men often make the most effective preachers, in part because of the effort demanded by public speech, and also from

¹ See Harold Frederick's *Illumination*.

² Pratt, *The Religious Consciousness*, (New York), 1920, pp. 140-5.

the feeling of exhilaration in overcoming an obsessing hindrance to action; but the real thing to be realised is that preaching is but one method of evangelisation, and one limited at the best.

2

It is limited in its effects, as may be seen by the extreme indifference of many choirmen, who are compelled to hear two sermons every Sunday, which seem to have practically no effect on them. But even where there is the right receptive attitude, and the sermons are well constructed, two short half-hours (and half an hour we saw was too long) are, as every preacher knows, quite insufficient for any systematic teaching or edification. Moreover, at any rate in the Church of England, the appeal is mainly to the intellect, just where the masses of people have fewest points of contact with the preacher, and do not understand the exact meaning of half the words (especially those of Latin or Greek origin) that he uses. This necessitates in parish churches a low, or rather a very simple, intellectual standard; but were there more opportunities for preaching of a more academic order for men of greater intellectual calibre, the effect would still be very limited. Men are not converted by argument; at most their minds are enlightened. Their beliefs are justified and established by reason, but the grounds of their belief and action are quite other. "Le cœur a ses raisons que la raison ne connaît point."¹

On the other hand, emotional appeals soon begin to bore people. "L'éloquence continue ennue."² The force of the appeal grows less each time, and the harm of such repetition is that it demoralises the man who feels it, unless he translates it into action and habit. This was seen by Newman, when in his sermon on *The Religious Use of Excited Feelings* he so penetratingly

¹ Pascal, *Pensées*, Ed. Brunschvicg., No. 277.

² *Ibid.*, No. 355.

analysed the dangers of the Evangelicalism of his day. For, as Bishop Butler said, "going over the theory of virtue in one's thoughts, talking well, and drawing fine pictures of it; this is so far from necessarily or certainly conducing to form a habit of it in him who thus employs himself, that it may harden the mind in a contrary course, and render it gradually more insensible—*i.e.*, form a habit of insensibility to all moral considerations."¹

Therefore, it is usually felt that the work of preaching must be backed up by other forces, and the chief force is said to be that of personal influence. This is asserted without fear of contradiction in most books on homiletics, and is generally accepted as an axiom of Pastoral Theology. It is not, perhaps, too much to say that in the majority of cases to "get hold of their people" is put before candidates for Holy Orders as the ideal of their life and work.

But the danger of all such personal influence, especially to adolescents who are most susceptible to it, is well recognised in education. "When a teacher," writes Mr. Findlay, "has so trained her class that they 'will do anything for her,' it is often a sign that her control is mischievous."² The aim of discipline in the army is to get rid of the personal factor. Where no one is ashamed of enthusiasm for a cause, devotion to a person easily becomes a little ridiculous. The reason for this is analysed by psychologists. Conduct based on a "reciprocal sentiment of affection between the parties concerned . . . has its own peculiar charm, and it tends to the development of a very delicate and sympathetic character, though a narrow one; it cannot lead on to the stronger forms of character and to conduct based on broad moral principles."³ Do we not recognise the type in the boy who has been "got hold of," and then often unfairly criticised?

¹ *Analogy*, part i., chapter v.

² *Principles of Class Teaching* (Macmillan, 1911), p. 391.

³ W. McDougall, *Social Psychology*, p. 203.

Moreover, as in the more emphasised influence of the hypnotiser, there is always the danger of the transference of the emotion from the undesirable object to the operator instead of to the ideal, and that the person so influenced will put the parson in the place of God, to say nothing of the frequent danger of reaction, especially in the case of adolescents, when they grow to be resentful of what they consider was an advantage taken of their susceptibility and ignorance. It is, of course, true that admiration for the exponent of an idea makes the idea acceptable, but this power is destroyed at once if the exponent becomes conscious of it and exploits it by giving people doses of himself instead of his ideas. Here comes in the value of large-scaled impersonal action, that speaks in the name of an order or society, and vests itself in the uniform, as in the case of a nurse or an army officer.

The necessity of associating action with an emotional or intellectual appeal has been too often overlooked. In teaching children, it is now recognised that the lesson is rarely learned till it has been used in "expression work." Neglect of this was a mistake made at the Reformation. Stirring preaching, with all the force of the personalities behind it, naturally at first, as to-day, attracted larger crowds than were led by habits of worship to the altar. Moral action, as a consequence, was no doubt demanded by the Puritans, and their strength lay in this fact; but as far as specific religious observance went, they were contented with the passive attitude of the listener, with the natural result that the English ceased to be a church-going people.

So it is generally felt that preaching by itself is not enough; but the subsequent action taken to drive its effects home is generally attempted by the preacher himself, and takes the form of an extension of his preaching by Sunday Schools and classes for the young, and men's services, mothers' meetings, and Retreats for

the grown up. With a better knowledge of child psychology we have introduced certain reforms into the first of these, but they still contrast strongly with the day schools, which, though far from perfect, have been continually improving by the experience of nearly two generations, and are really grappling with the problem of the education of the masses of the people. But our "Bible Classes" have no analogy in the normal lives of the people; it is not by classes and lectures that they get such ideas as they have. Our men's classes and Brotherhoods, though often showing a striking success as far as numbers go, do not, it is the universal complaint, "bring the men to church"—that is, establish permanent habits. In fact, we have built up our work with great energy, but with little study of the mental or social customs of those we are trying to evangelise, and, naturally, the result is not commensurate with the effort made.

Much the same criticism might be applied to the other popular panacea for all our defects—namely, that of "house to house" visiting; not, of course, to the necessary visiting that inevitably arises when any real work is going on, but of visiting as a means by itself. It ignores the social habits of those visited, for it begins precisely at that social level at which visiting ceases to be a custom; the "poor" are visited, but it is only among the leisured that visiting is a recognised social function. Moreover, all the conventions of social visiting are disregarded, for the rule of them is that men call on men, and women on women, and the older resident on the newcomer. It is based on the assumption that class distinctions are rigid and permanent. Moreover, its advocates have never put themselves in the place of the visited and asked themselves, "Should I like it myself, or should I regard it as an impertinence?" "Can I imagine myself deriving any spiritual benefit from a visit in the middle of the afternoon from a man like myself coming for no particular

reason and without being invited?" There is, of course, no offence in a visit arising out of some connexion already established, a boy at the school, a child for whom sponsorship has been assumed, a reference given by a common acquaintance, a commendation from the clergy of a parish just left. Rather such visits are as welcome as necessary; but the ordinary "house to house" visit stands by itself, and having no relation to the "apperception mass" of the visited, it is not surprising that it is totally ineffective. There is a certain analogy in the calling of the doctor, but he is summoned by the patient. There is a parallel in the lowest branch of trading, for certain insurance agents and the tally-man—that curse of the improvident—call from door to door. In politics the canvasser goes all down the street, but this is for a definite purpose, to solicit a vote; he only goes on the infrequent occasion of an election; and the machinery of such visiting is but a small part of, and strictly subservient to, a large and varied organisation of propaganda. The effect on character of doing continually, under the pressure of conventional public opinion, what is felt to be psychologically unnatural is very serious. Mr. Graham Wallas speaks in his *The Great Society* of the sense of degradation he experienced when visiting from house to house in political work. The men and women, he writes, whose public spirit compels them to obey the order to canvass from house to house shrink from it "from the sense that they are somehow offending against good manners." "The last time I went canvassing," he continues, "I felt I was outraging every possible code." The political canvasser sees himself as in a glass in the commercial canvasser of books or milk. "The creature . . . seems to have lost some of the dignity of man."¹ If the clergy are feeling anything of this sort, it must seriously harm their self-respect.

¹ P. 817.

3

The real defect in all our efforts to extend the work of preaching is that it is based on no adequate study of human nature generally. We have not set ourselves seriously to consider the psychology of religion to observe how, as a matter of fact, religious life grows. We have been slow to apply the sort of knowledge that is being applied to political propaganda, to medicine, and to education.

To take a few examples. We are ready to acknowledge that religious life is a growth and not a manufacture, but we have hardly translated the acknowledgment into action. We do not see what it involves. In education it is seen that the growing life must be surrounded by a rich provision of objects from which experience can be built up, and round which varied associations can gather. This is called creating the right atmosphere. So the child should not so much be taught religion as be brought into contact with the sights and sounds of living worship, with the language of prayer and the verse of hymns, from which it can build up a rich content of religious experience, in which it can develop, as it assimilates with its growing religious life, whatever best feeds and interprets it. We shall bring children to church much more, taking care not to bore them by keeping them there too long.

If adult religious life is a growth, it will be by imitation and by the stimulus of suggestion that it will grow. We may be certain that any good, thorough, conscientious work done anywhere will tell. But directly such work is done priggishly—that is, with a conscious desire to edify others—it defeats its own object. Good work will create the right atmosphere; if we have that we can often afford to let people alone. The priest does at least as much as the prophet to evangelise the world. The rôle of the prophet may easily degenerate

into that of mere denunciation. "It is a cheap line to denounce," wrote Bishop Creighton. "It satisfies the sense that something ought to be done."¹ The priest, on the other hand, with faithful administration, is the great conservator of the good of the past, the unifier of forces, the maintainer of the conditions of healthy, spontaneous, spiritual growth and life. It is action we want, not words; but action, of course, with science and understanding behind.

So what can be done for the spread of Christianity is largely negative. If hindrances are removed, it will spread by its own growth. The elimination of little tricks of voice and manner in public worship; the right use of the voice as to pace, distinctness, absence of dialectical or professional peculiarities; the right ordering of music so that it does not exclude participation in common prayer or offend by false taste; the furnishing of churches so that they are obviously seen to be houses of God, the provision of space to kneel in, the securing of freedom of movement and easiness of entry, the art of letting people alone in church and not "fussing" them; all the little points that will make the man as ready to come in from the street as he is to enter a shop or a picture house—all these constitute the weeding and draining for the harvest in which God gives the increase.

And, positively, we need to enlist the services of art in the work of propaganda, for art has a wider and more democratic appeal than the best oratory. "If the eastern people," writes a Japanese professor of the Philosophy of Religion, "were shown the artistic side of Christianity . . . they would be far more ready to appreciate Christianity than the experience of missionaries would have led them to expect."² A Gothic cathedral, properly used, is a perpetual call to the thought of God. A picture will wait and speak to us

¹ *Life and Letters* (Longmans, 1907), vol. i., p. 325.

² M. Anesaki, in the *Hibbert Journal*, vol. iv., October, 1909.

till we are in the mood to listen. A melody will haunt us, and come up with its associations from our subconsciousness again and again. Indian missionaries are beginning to realise the possible powers of Christian song. Books will go where the voice of the preacher is not heard, but they must invite reading. The problem of style is, as Pascal saw, the first, in time at least, in apologetics. We need authors, novelists, dramatists, and poets, as well as theologians who have that power over words that will draw men to read their works and to read them with pleasure.

Above all, men are influenced by social tradition. It takes time for things to grow. "Every civilised society," writes Dr. McDougall, "has a more or less highly developed moral tradition. . . . This moral tradition has been slowly formed and improved by the influence of the great and good men, the moral leaders of the race, through many generations; it has been handed on from generation to generation in a living form in the sentiments of the *élite*, the superior individuals of each generation, and has been embodied in literature and, in a partial fashion, in a variety of institutions, such as the Church."¹

The result we require will not be brought about in a hurry; there is, therefore, all the more need to set about it at once, to work with a steady aim at influencing the springs of popular thought, to organise our efforts so that they may converge to the one end of directing popular action.

"The moral tradition of any society lives," says the same writer, "in its fullest and completest form only in the strong moral sentiments of a comparatively few individuals who are expressly called 'the salt of the earth.'"² Therefore, it is always worth while doing your best and concentrating your efforts on the best. A sound social psychology will warn us of the danger of ignoring class differences. They are there, and it

¹ *Social Psychology*, p. 219.

² *Ibid.*, p. 220.

is a serious mistake to ignore them. In language, in habits of life, in understanding, in refinement, if not in morals, in taste in jokes, there are differences between different social grades which prevent the free interplay of ideas and check sympathy and mutual understanding. But it is even more fatal to acquiesce in them and to stereotype them by having one method for the "rich" and another for the "poor," as permanent customs and not mere temporary expedients. In England the Church is strongest in the cultivated and educated classes, and our great problem is how to preach the Gospel to the poor. So, no doubt, successful work has been done by attacking the extreme, and the results of missions in the poorest districts of our great cities are proof of this; but the fact remains that we have more points of contact with those nearest us in the social scale, and that ideas are more readily accepted from those just a little older or better educated than yourself, that the rapid spread of customs by imitation, in dress, language, manners, beliefs, is from above down, and the slighter the gradations between class and class the more rapidly do they filter through, and the more do the poorest benefit. Russia has failed largely because she had practically no middle class to mediate the civilisation of her aristocracy to the masses.

Therefore, the wiser policy in the evangelisation of England would have been always to go for the best. We should, while not neglecting the East End, have sent our best men to the West. We should have concentrated on our Universities, and our schools, whence the leaders of thought in the next generation are to come. As Dr. Arnold worked through his sixth form, we should have got into touch with the heads of departments, with the employers and organisers of labour, with men prominent in political, municipal, scientific, and philanthropic life, because it is through them, presenting conspicuous models,

that the masses of men are influenced. The one condition of such success being that each man in his place should have his sense of duty directed to those nearest, and just a little less fortunate or endowed than himself.

Closely connected with this principle of effective spread of influence is that of manning institutions already existing rather than starting new ones. No doubt, organisations run under directly Church influence gain a spirit and enthusiasm which a common spiritual life alone can inspire, and for the purpose of fostering *that* they may be necessary; but for the purpose of evangelisation, far more will be done by churchmen throwing themselves into the normal life of their neighbourhood, by joining clubs and institutes and trying to make them a success, by seeking opportunities for the Christian point of view to find its place in lectures and debates got up by philosophic and literary societies, by taking part in public service as Guardians or Borough Councillors, members of Care and Health Committees, by joining Friendly Societies. If the best members of these bodies prove to be those who have come up from their connexion with the Church, the Church will grow in popularity, and not only in popularity, for, without any preaching, men will be well disposed to Christian ideals and will be almost insensibly led to adopt them. This will be because the ideas are travelling along natural lines of connexion indicated by a sound social psychology.

Again, there are few things in common life that recent psychology has made us understand better than the laws of advertisement. The part played by repetition, by suggestion, by subconscious working of ideas, had been made obvious when attention was called to it. We have realised the harm it may do in political and commercial life, when knowledge of human nature is used to delude men into accepting wrong views or buying bad articles. But there is

also a perfectly legitimate use of it, if you are convinced that your ideas are true; and it can only be to public advantage to let men know of them if the goods are what they need. So in all propaganda men have recognised the value of meetings for keeping conviction alive, of processions to impress the popular imagination—we can remember the important part they played in securing the franchise for women—of dinners and dress occasions to heighten the prestige of an institution, of fine buildings to uphold the dignity of municipal or University life.

So in religion we remember the impression made on our soldiers by the crucifixes of France. We recall, it may be, how much at a loss we felt to make our men from overseas understand what the Church of England was, as there was nothing, after they had seen St. Paul's and Westminster Abbey, that we could point them to. The duty of common worship is emphasised, and it also has a value to ourselves in encouraging group feeling, in giving us confidence in our creed accepted on intellectual grounds, but felt as we unite to its opening words, "I believe in one God." Moreover, the regular habit of common prayer supplies a right background for our daily life. "If a religious man," points out Dr. Thouless, "desires to develop a devotional habit of mind, it is certain that he can only do this by carrying out the same form of prayer, whatever his feelings may be."¹ Pascal was right when, for the men of his day and country, he advised the taking of holy water and having masses said as a way of making yourself believe.

But it is not so generally recognised that such things have a missionary and apologetic value, and that their maintenance is an evangelical duty. St. Paul spoke of Christ being openly set forth or placed before the eyes of the Galatians,² and there is need of advertise-

¹ *Introduction to the Psychology of Religion*, p. 175.

² Gal. iii. 2.

ment to let people know of the spiritual goods they need. We should build fine churches and place them where men cannot help seeing them, as witnesses to the glory of God. Sir Thomas Browne said he used to "take occasion of praying upon the sight of any church which he saw as he passed by or rode about."¹ Bishop Butler, who did so much by argument to defend Christianity, knew what other factors there were in belief, and charged the clergy of Durham "to endeavour to beget a practical sense of [religion] upon [men's] hearts as what they acknowledge their belief of, and profess they ought to conform to . . . by keeping up as we are able the form and face of religion with decency and reverence." "Whereas," says the decree of the Council of Trent, "such is the nature of man, that, without external helps, he cannot easily be upraised to the meditation of divine things, on this account has holy Mother Church instituted certain rites."² This is sound psychology, though that of the sixteenth century; but the same is said by a man and a woman of the twentieth:

"Attempts to support religion on an intellectual assent to dogma alone are doomed to failure. They ignore the essential psychological basis of the religious instinct. . . . An effective church must be able to enshrine the glamour of the past in continuity of rite and tradition, to meet by continual routine of prayer and praise man's psychological need of association in the development of the religious sense, and to satisfy the artistic and emotional sides of man's nature in dignified ritual, while maintaining its hold on the best spirits of the age by an open-minded receptivity to intellectual progress. A nation that forsakes its church or suffers its church to forget traditions on the one side or fall into obscurantism on the other, a nation that ignores the survival value of religion, will perish

¹ *Commonplace Book* (Pickering, 1845), p. 374.

² Session xxii., chapter v.

from off the face of the earth,"¹ It is by such means, as Hooker said, that "they which cannot be drawn to hearken to that we teach, may only by looking upon that we do, in a manner read whatever we believe."²

One word more. It is often asked, Has not the Church failed because she has done nothing for the working classes? The charge implied is an error in fact. A vast amount has been done by the Church for the working classes; indeed, it would be hardly too much to say that till within recent years practically all that was done for them was done by the Church or by other Christian organisations. And of recent years, apart from what through trade unions and Friendly Societies they have done for themselves, what has been done has been done, not voluntarily, but by State agency, at the cost of the tax-payer. Though there is, no doubt, much public unpaid service and much service that cannot be paid for which is not directly traceable to a Christian motive, there is much that undoubtedly *is*, and it may, at least, be argued that in the former the inspiration may be traced of earlier Christian teaching, which continues to work though the faith on which it was based has been rejected, or to the influence of a Christian environment and example. Much, no doubt, of the Church's work has been misdirected, much patronising, much unwise and even calculated to increase the evil it was meant to cure; but it is hardly too much to say that the mass of what has been done *for* the working classes is due to Christianity.

But the point which concerns us now is that the charge is based on an unsound psychology. We do not care so much for people who do things for us as for those for whom we do things. When you do things for people they feel under an obligation to you, and are inclined to dislike you. When you make

¹ W. C. D. and C. D. Whetham, *Science and the Human Mind* (Longmans, 1912), p. 266.

² *Ecclesiastical Polity*, Book V., chapter lxxi., § 11.

demands on them they respond. A mother's love for her child is far stronger than the affection of the child for its mother. If there is someone whom you do not like, to serve him is a sure way to incline you to think better of him. Marriage regarded as a contract for mutual advantage is bound to fail; regarded as giving scope for mutual service it grows in the strength of its bond.

And if we look at the facts round us, we shall see that it is so too in religion. The Church has been untiring in her attempts to help the working classes, and they are, on the whole, supremely indifferent to her. There are exceptions and notable exceptions. They are found in the great industrial centres where men have had to take responsibility on themselves. They are to be found in Nonconforming bodies who are too poor to "do things for people," or among Roman Catholics, whose Church makes definite and irksome demands on its members, and in our own Church, where often amid a mass of passive indifference on the part of people who expect something to be done for them, there is a little body of enthusiastic workers, giving out of their small wages, sacrificing their scanty leisure, and consequently enthusiastic and keen.

If this is so, much of our policy is entirely wrong. Apart from avoiding the demoralisation of religious bribery, we should reverse our methods. We should make demands on people, material demands in expecting them to contribute to the support of the Church, moral demands in insisting on a high standard of life, and religious demands in emphasising the active duties of religious worship as against the mere passive attitude of "coming to church to get good."

VII

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF MORAL
DEVELOPMENT

BY

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VII

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF MORAL DEVELOPMENT

FROM the point of view of one who seeks to learn what help modern psychology has to offer in the making of Christian character, its exponents fall into three groups. The first is comparatively small, and its numbers are rapidly shrinking. It insists on the interpretation of spirit in terms of matter, and therefore it finds life to be a physically determined, mechanistic process, and man "a plausible mechanical dummy," to quote some words of Dr. McDougall. The second school is large, vociferous, and immensely popular. Boldly appropriating for its own teaching the title of "The New Psychology," it explores the recesses of man's psychical nature, reveals the alarming modes of operation of the instinctive forces hidden there, and proclaims the error and moral inutility of rational processes and the illusory nature of volitional choice. The third school is of uncertain size, probably larger than its literary output suggests by comparison with that of the second school. Distinguishing between psychology and physical science, it yet recognises the proper limitations of its subject as a department of scientific study, it is not wholly obsessed by the Unconscious, and in its investigations of man's conscious activities it approaches with respect, and even reverence, the mystery attaching to the conscience and will of the human personality.

While it is difficult, in view of its subject-matter, to understand how psychology can be content to be

strictly confined within the limits of science, as generally understood, it is evident that, where it is so confined, there is nothing really hostile to religion in a mechanistic interpretation of mental process and of human conduct. For then, as Professor E. J. Price puts it,¹ "Psychology is concerned solely with what goes on *within* the conscious process. On this purely scientific view it is inevitable that the mind should be treated on mechanistic lines. Science wins its way by excluding from its sphere of operations all non-natural causes. Such causes may be all-important for a final and all-comprehensive view, as worked out by a philosopher. Science, however, must limit itself to secondary causes operating mechanically. So far, then, its view, though justified by utility, is partial and incomplete. It enables us to win command over the phenomena by restricting the range of inquiry. Obviously, therefore, psychology, so far as it is scientific, must proceed in the same way. It will exclude from its purview all causes which lie outside the conscious process, and will invite us, at least provisionally, to regard mental phenomena as finding their complete expression within the mental series." There is no doubt that the terms "science" and "scientific method" are already undergoing modification as a result of the development of the new sciences of sociology and the comparative study of ethics and of religion, and of psychology itself; but if the accepted meanings are to be retained without change, then this position is sound, and psychology is limited accordingly. For all who thus regard it there is, strictly speaking, no conduct properly so called to be discovered in human beings, but only reflex action. When an object suddenly approaches the eye, when pepper gets into the nostrils, when the sole of the foot is tickled, there follow inevitably certain fixed responses to these external stimuli. In exactly the same way, from this

¹ *Hibbert Journal*, July, 1924, p. 664.

particular standpoint, a human being is apparently compelled, by the physical constitution of his body with its own peculiar nervous system modified by all its former activities, to make response to a situation in which, for example, he has the opportunity to steal or to tell a lie at a time of need. He supposes himself to be deciding between stealing and not stealing, between lying and speaking the truth; but in reality, so far as the psychologist can report, he is moved by the inescapable compulsion of his physical organism to take the course which he imagines himself to choose. Thus, in individual lives, and in human society as a whole, results are produced infallibly by preceding causes, and themselves become in turn the causes of further fixed results, so that the whole order moves forward ceaselessly and helplessly on a path which is strictly determined at every step of the self-deceiving psychical process.

The New Psychologists constitute a separate group, not because they are agreed in rejecting the determinist views of the first school, for that is certainly not the case, but because their chief interest lies in another battle, that of Instinct *versus* Intelligence. By far the greater number of them are undoubtedly on the side of the determinists, but it is their main task to demonstrate the full force of the instinctive powers in the determination of man's conduct rather than to relate the psychical process to the physical. For the most part they show an unconcealed hostility to Christianity, representing the New Psychology as nothing less than the science which has, at length, arrived to disabuse men's minds of fallacies proclaimed by the Church as truths fundamental and assured, to set them free from the power of sin by revealing its true nature as consisting of hitherto unrecognised forms of mental disease, and to point the way to the peace and happiness of self-realisation by a curative discipline which is simplicity itself.

The third group, again, are not to be regarded as wholly opposed to the theory of determinism, for there are varieties and degrees of opposition to the belief in human freedom; but they are impressed by the evidence of a constitutive, organising, directive power contained within the life-energy, and they are convinced that life is purposive. For them conduct is distinguishable from reflex action long before the human level of life is reached. "The difference is that instinctive conduct does and reflex action does not presuppose the co-operation of intelligent consciousness, including under this head interest, attention, variation of behaviour according as its results are satisfactory or unsatisfactory, and the power of learning by experience."¹ Further, this power of intelligent co-operation in the individual is regarded as no arbitrary and irresponsible possession, but as a power which is in some way cognate and definitely associated with the corresponding power in others, and tending towards the same end, whether unwittingly or in varying degrees of conscious appreciation of that fact. "In all the root impulses," says Dr. L. T. Hobhouse,² "if we except the bodily appetites, there is something that points beyond the self. This is true, not only of the social impulses that connect us with our fellows, and of the cognitive and constructive impulses that relate us to the entire external order, but also of the self-regarding impulses of pride and self-respect which imply a sense of our function in a larger whole. Thus, the tie to a wider whole is common to all the specifically human interests, the point in which they all unite, or more probably from which they take their origin. For, in the last analysis we are in presence of one ultimate impulse taking manifold forms in various directions."

In his presidential address to the Psychological Section of the meeting of the British Association held

¹ G. F. Stout, *A Manual of Psychology*, p. 343.

² *Social Development*, p. 169.

at Toronto in August, 1924, Dr. McDougall recommended the adoption of this conception of purposive striving as a fundamental category of psychology, and urged that psychologists should dare to abandon the abstract conceptions of physical science and be boldly anthropomorphic in describing man. "Let us frankly acknowledge," he said, "that man is that thing in all the world with which we have the most intimate acquaintance. Let us begin by accepting him for what he seems to be, a thinking being that strives to attain the goal he desires, to realise his ideals, sometimes succeeding, often failing, but always striving so long as he lives. Let us try to understand the history of these tendencies to strive, as they are revealed in the individual and the species; to understand more nearly our knowing, our imagining, our recollecting, our judging and reasoning, as they serve us in our strivings for the attainment of our goals." Dr. McDougall suggested that in the progress of science it might come to be seen that of these two apparently different processes, the mechanistic and the purposive, one is merely an appearance of the other, an appearance due to the present limitations and imperfections of our understanding; and he expressed the opinion that in that case it would be the purposive type that would be found to be the more real of the two. Whatever the future may hold in that respect, there can be no doubt that for the present Christian students of psychology will attend with a much greater degree of expectation to those who are of Dr. McDougall's way of thinking than to the others. But even then they will remember that psychologists, as such, are never free to claim for themselves the unfettered liberty with which philosophers and theologians explore the 'other side' of those powers which are at work in man; and, while they may expect to find psychological truth dovetailing with theological truth, they will not complain because the former does not include the latter.

I

The contrast between the two is very strikingly revealed on a first rapid survey of the psychological report of the moral struggle that has its place in the development of every mature human life, by the side of the Church's long-established and clear-cut statement of the same thing. On the one side we have a familiar and readily intelligible picture of a war waged by the human soul against the world, the flesh, and the devil, the soul being enlightened in its conscience and strengthened in its will by the secret operation of the Holy Spirit of God. On the other side there is a forbidding array of instincts, impulses, emotions, and sentiments, variously defined and grouped according to the opinions of the individual psychologist, with much strange talk concerning the evil results of repressions and complexes, the delusions of fantasy, projection, and rationalisation, and the all-availing efficacy of sublimation. Instead of impatiently dismissing "the weird terms of a new-fangled science," let us dispose ourselves to learn from those who expound it.

The psychological study of human conduct and character is defined as an endeavour to discover the original elements out of which character is organised, and the stages of the process in which these elements are systematically combined by the formation of habits and by the mental activities of the higher thought-centres. It is clear at the outset that a considerable degree of uncertainty yet prevails as to the precise nature and number of the primary elements and also as to the early stages of their association. This will be brought home to any student who takes up the works of, say, Shand, McDougall, Hobhouse, and Hadfield, and seeks to gain from them exact ideas of instincts, impulses, and emotions. Dr. Hadfield

apparently finds emotion and instinct so nearly identical, or at least so intimately associated, that he does not stay to distinguish between them in his recent work on *Psychology and Morals*, but is content to use the phrase "the instinctive emotions" without explanation. His view of the impulses is that "they are the expression or activity of the complexes and instincts."¹ "When the instincts and complexes function we call them Impulses."² "An impulse may spring from an instinct, as when we have an 'impulse' to steal, to be morbidly curious, or to take vengeance; or from repressed complexes, as when we have an 'impulse' to twitch the face, to throw ourselves in front of a moving train, to be cruel to our friends."³ Dr. McDougall, on the contrary, makes a clear distinction between instinct and emotion, closely associated as he finds them to be, understanding by the latter "the affective aspect of the operation of any one of the principal instincts."⁴ Mr. Shand, while agreeing as to the distinction to be made, joins issue with Dr. McDougall, as to the manner of their association, pointing out that the position taken seems to obscure three important points: "(1) That an instinct may be excited, and even evolve the behaviour which is characteristic of it, without exciting an emotion; (2) that in the system of an emotion there may be not only one but several instincts; (3) that sometimes the same instinct may be found organised in the systems of different emotions."⁵ Dr. McDougall in turn criticises Mr. Shand's use of the word "instinct," arguing that "if he would turn his attention to the birds and insects, he would see that his position is untenable."⁶ As to the word "impulse," Mr. Shand would use it to name the most rudimentary of the emotional systems. He says, "Impulses, with their connected instincts and

¹ P. 71.² P. 70.³ P. 71.⁴ *Social Psychology*, p. 47.⁵ *The Foundations of Character*, second edition, p. 188.⁶ *An Outline of Psychology*, p. 116; cf. p. 142.

acquired tendencies, are constituents of our primary emotional systems; but the latter are not constituents of the former; they are more comprehensive systems. Impulses, in fact, function in emotions, and are subordinated to their general ends."¹ For Dr. Hobhouse, yet again, an instinct is "an innate interest guiding impulses, one or many, to an end which is not foreseen";² and he asserts that "in the simplest forms of action which are not mechanical, we trace two elements, impulse and feeling, very closely allied, yet not identical."³

These differences are not a little confusing. They are partly due to the want of an agreed terminology, but they also show that much remains to be done in the investigation of that groundwork of instinctive behaviour on which human character is built. Two truths of great importance may be regarded as established, however. The first, which is now generally recognised, is that that groundwork is still the essential support of the wonderful rational structure which man has reared upon it—is, indeed, more truly conceived as the roots of a mighty tree, vitally related to its topmost branch and leaf, and the hidden source of all its life-energy. It is no longer admissible to assert boldly that man is distinguished from the lower animals by the fact that he governs himself by reason, whereas they are governed by instinct. For again—and this is the second truth, not so generally recognised—psychology is no more able completely to deny reason to the animals than it is to assert man's emancipation from instinct. As Dr. Hobhouse says,⁴ "It would be a mistake to regard animal behaviour as limited to reflex and instinctive responses whether modified or unmodified by experience. Quite low down in the animal scale we find evidence of power to deal with

¹ *An Outline of Psychology*, p. 459 f.

² *Op. cit.*, p. 136.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 135.

⁴ *Op. cit.*, p. 137; cf. W. H. R. Rivers, *Instinct and the Unconscious*, pp. 40-43.

the situation, not merely by some established method, but in accordance with the requirements of the root interest in the individual case." Thus the barriers between instinct and intelligence are broken down, and modern psychology is not yet able to resolve with certainty the difficulties created by their combined operation.

Experience and increasing rationality, these are the two factors at work in that modification of the original instinctive responses of the creature which is to issue in the formation of human character. Directed at first to the preservation of the individual (by nutrition, flight, concealment, and aggression) and to the preservation of the species (by the production and care of offspring), these instincts are extended in the case of some creatures to serve the interests of a group or herd; and a nice question is raised as to whether this is effected by the transference or redirection of instincts already existing, or whether this extension points to the fact that those existing instincts were only particular applications of more generalised powers possessed from the first. It will be seen that this has an important bearing on the question of the sublimation of instinct, to be referred to later.

The possibility of the formation of human character lies, at any rate, in this permanent association of the individual creature not only with its mate and offspring, but with other members of the same species. For in this common life individual experiences are multiplied, and valuable lessons are learned by imitation, a widened range of stimuli is brought to bear upon all the members of the group, and requirements other than those of individual and family need are imposed upon them; and out of these things occasions of choice and of conflict continually arise, and there is discovered within the individual the beginning of that "conscience" which, according to Dr. W. Trotter,¹

¹ *Instincts of the Herd in Peace and War*, p. 41.

is but "an indirect result of the gregarious instinct."

The inner aspect of this process of development has so far received its most convincing treatment at the hands of Mr. A. F. Shand, whose theory as to the formation of the sentiments has been widely approved. He considers that there are broadly three stages in the organisation of the instinctive powers, or, as he phrases it, "in the evolution of the emotional systems." First come "the lesser systems of the impulses and emotions"; in the third stage are found "the greater systems of the sentiments"; and between the two there is an intermediate stage when the emotions are "dangerous and independent systems." "It is with them," he says,¹ "as so often with children, who, at first, have to obey a rule imposed on them which they cannot understand, and afterwards, when they grow up, break from its control, but only to fall under their own unregulated impulses, until at length their disasters teach them to make a new law to replace the old one they derided." That is to say, in the first stage there is a minimum of choice and a maximum of necessity. Certain stimuli representing root interests effect in the creature the excitation of primary impulses or rudimentary emotional systems, and the organism, strictly limited in its choosing, yet not altogether without choice, calls into play some of its instinctive powers of action and makes its response. These lesser mental systems include the appetites of hunger and sex, the impulses for repose and sleep, for self-display and self-abasement, and the primary emotions of fear, anger, joy, sorrow, curiosity, repugnance, and disgust. Each of these constitutes "a single system innately determined to the pursuit of a particular end."²

Development from this earliest stage proceeds according to the fundamental law of organisation

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 196.

² Shand, *op. cit.*, p. 457 f.

found in the psychic life. "Every primary emotion tends to organise in its system all instincts that are serviceable to its innately determined end, and to acquire many serviceable tendencies which modify such instincts."¹ Having thus associated with itself a considerable range of instincts, an emotion may become "an independent system, unrelated to the welfare of the organism," and may work grievous harm. Herein lies the danger of the second stage, a persisting danger, moreover, which presently challenges the inferior stability of the third stage and threatens to effect debasement of character. But this danger is fortunately countered to some extent by the fact that there is an innate bond between the emotions, making readily possible their own intimate association. "Every primary impulse, whether it is independent or belongs to a primary emotion, is innately connected with the systems of fear, anger, joy and sorrow, in such a way that, when opposed, it tends to arouse anger; when satisfied, joy; when frustrated, sorrow; and when it anticipates frustration, fear; these systems being similarly connected together. This law must also be understood to imply that there is in the very structure of the nervous system an innate base for the organisation of the dispositions of these primary emotions with one another and with the disposition of any other primary impulse."² Thus it comes about that the sentiments of love and hate, respect and contempt, are developed, in manifold variety of form and degree, and the emotions are subordinated to the particular ends of the individual sentiments. Just as the emotions gather up the instinctive powers, and make them serve their ends, so the sentiments purposefully gather up the emotions, rejecting from their systems those which are antagonistic or useless to them, but appropriating all those which are serviceable. And, in order to

¹ Shand, *op. cit.*, p. 192.

² *Ibid.*, p. 38.

conserve its particular interest and to pursue its end with success, each sentiment devises for itself what may be termed a relative code of ethics, setting up ideals of conduct, such as loyalty, courage, and perseverance, creating special emotions of aspiration, enthusiasm, self-reproach, self-approval, to assist it in striving to carry out those ideals, and recognising for itself the obligation of certain duties suited to its proper manifestation and calculated to promote its development.

Over against these sentiments, some of which are formed in every human being, certain other mental structures known as complexes are frequently, but by no means invariably, found. Like the sentiment the complex is a psychological system¹ embracing various emotions and instinctive powers, known generally by its dominant emotion or interest as a fear-complex, sex-complex, and so on; but it has been thrust out of the sphere of consciousness by deliberate repression, because of its shameful or distasteful character, by unconscious suppression through mere refusal to face something unpleasant and painful, or simply by unconscious automatic suppression. The complex, being thus formed, proves a lively and persistent source of trouble. It produces nervous disorders, it finds expression in troublesome dreams, and it not infrequently leads to conduct which, apart from the explanation afforded by the psycho-analyst, would be accounted sinful, and therefore reprehensible.

There is a strong tendency to claim that the area hitherto covered by the term *sin* shall now be very considerably restricted, and that the psycho-analyst shall be employed to do scientifically and satisfactorily work that was formerly ill done by the priest through lack of knowledge. The claim must be allowed in part. There is a distinction, often by no means

¹ But simple by comparison with the sentiment. As Dr. Rivers points out, "they differ first in complexity, the sentiment being far more complex in its nature than the process which has been denoted according to this feature" (*Instinct and the Unconscious*, p. 88).

sufficiently clear, however, between moral disease and actual sin; psycho-analysis has established the right to be regarded as the proper method of treatment for some of those who suffer from moral disorder and inertia; and, further, the priest is himself under no small obligation to those who have thrown new light on the causes of certain types of mental and moral disturbance. But there is a grave danger lest actual sinners shall be encouraged to confound the psychological with the ethical, and to excuse themselves lightly for sin which is really sinful. It cannot be too strongly emphasised that in the formation of complexes there is often an original element of shirking which is the cause of all the trouble; and it is to the credit of some of those physicians who most fully appreciate the value of psycho-analysis, both as a theory and as a method, that they also realise and declare the truth that it stands for the recognition of a wider individual responsibility, rather than for any tendency to limit the power of the personality. As Dr. H. Crichton Miller says,¹ "Both in the individual and in the social sphere, the outlook of analytical psychology is tending to enlarge the field of consciousness and of responsibility. The neurotic patient feels himself the victim of circumstances. His obsessions, phobiæ, compulsions, inertia, or physical symptoms: his neurosis, whatever form it takes, means to him a loss of freedom and of happiness; and this, in itself, proves to him that it is something that has come upon him against his will. It is only as he is brought to recognise the parts of his experience and the dynamics of his life with which he has lost contact, that he comes to realise that his problem lies within his own personality. Until he is thus reassociated, he makes no secure adjustment to the demands of life." Dr. Hadfield equally maintains that moral responsibility attaches to such cases to seek the right means of cure, and also to exercise such self-control as is found possible

¹ *The New Psychology and the Teacher*, p. 136 f.

even while they are still suffering. "Whilst the pervert cannot control his psychological impulses, he can frequently control the expression of these impulses in outward conduct. There are hundreds of homosexuals or exhibitionists who have never given way to their impulses in perverted acts. To that extent, therefore, the pervert may be held responsible. Nevertheless, even in these cases, there may come a point where the mind, constantly obsessed by an impulse, can stand the strain no longer and falls."¹

The nemesis attendant upon the mind's refusal to face the issues of life is but the obverse side of the truth that where choice is boldly and honestly made between competing sentiments, the personality develops into a close-knit unity having a definite type of character and a will to be reckoned with. By deciding in favour of a particular sentiment on any occasion of conflict, the self modifies its own constitution accordingly. It now possesses a will strengthened in favour of the accepted sentiment, and correspondingly weakened for the rejected sentiment; for the will is the whole of the organised life-impulse, and expresses what may be regarded as the purpose or direction of the life. So too, since each sentiment is dynamically related to the whole character and strives to extend its influence over it, the more frequently the biddings of a particular sentiment are performed the greater is its power of spreading itself, and the character of the personality becomes increasingly coloured by the sentiment.

It might naturally be supposed that conflict would arise chiefly between the self-regarding sentiment and the sentiments which are attached to others; but, as Shand and Hobhouse recognise, this is not the case. The sentiment of self-love is admittedly found to be "generally pre-eminent" in men, but "joined to this self-love in subtle and intimate ways . . . are a variety of disinterested sentiments: as conjugal and parental

¹ *Psychology and Morals*, p. 50.

love, filial affection, friendship, the sentiment for some game or sport, and in the higher characters one or other of the great impersonal sentiments, patriotism and the love for some science or art.”¹ As Dr. Hobhouse says, “We have to distinguish between the self as an exclusive centre, and the self as pervading everything within the reach of its activity, and even of its thought.”² Hence, in the conflicts which arise between the sentiments it is not mainly a question of the self-regarding sentiment opposing the others, but, as a rule, of a struggle for supremacy between those which are of social utility and those which are anti-social. “These conflicts of the first sociological importance arise out of the conditions of the evolutionary process which begins with a chaos of unorganised relations and develops through partial unities, self, family, class, group, nationality. Each of these unities has its own self-assertiveness and potential antagonism to others. We may even say that it has its own self-regard—*i.e.*, that its members feel about it the same pride, and for it the same ambitions and fears, that each may feel for self. With these the wider social feeling has to do repeated battle, and so develops an idea of self-negation—a necessary corrective, but one that must be seen in due relation. Mind fulfils itself, not by destroying its deepest impulses, but by finding for them their function in a harmonious whole. Similarly the social union, if truly organic, does not destroy the elements on which the deepest emotions are concentrated, but gives them the form in which their vigour redounds to the strength of the whole.”³

Temptation at any given time, then, lies in the appeal of that particular impulse, or of those associated impulses, which will prove injurious, or of inferior service to the whole life of the individual, regarded not

¹ Shand, *op. cit.*, p. 57.

² *Op. cit.*, p. 159.

³ P. 161.

as an isolated unit, but as a member of a community. Each organised emotional system makes its separate claim repeatedly, and all are judged by a mysterious Self or ego, which sits, not apart from them as an independent arbiter, but in close association with each of them, weighing them all in connection with the whole Self, the ideal Self, which is greater than the sum total of all the separate or departmental selves represented by these separate systems. This central personality is frankly recognised as an inscrutable mystery. Mr. Shand says of it, "Our personality does not seem to be the sum of the dispositions of our emotions and sentiments. These are our many selves; but there is also our one self. This enigmatical self which reflects on their systems estimates them, and, however loath to do it, sometimes chooses between their ends, seems to be the central fact of our personality. If this be the fact, it is not the kind of fact which we can take into account. The science of character will be the science of our sentiments and emotions—of these many selves, not of this one self. It will try to understand those forces with which our personality has to reckon, to trace the laws of their organisation, of their growth and decline, of their action and interaction; but it will leave out of account the mystery which lies behind them."¹

2

At this point we may presume to introduce the question of religion, expressing mild astonishment at the readiness with which many psychologists relegate this department of their subject to the specialist. Mr. Shand's study of the foundations of character cries aloud for a full recognition of the religious sentiment;

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 66 f. A passage in Joseph Conrad's *The Arrow of Gold* is interesting in this connection: "The observer, more or less alert, whom each of us carries in his own consciousness, failed me altogether, had turned away his face in sheer horror, or else had fainted from the strain. And thus I had to live alone, unobserved even by myself."

yet, after describing the sentiment of "respect for conscience" as "a system of unique importance," in most men "combined with the religious sentiment," he dismisses both of them in a brief paragraph.¹

No one can dispute the great importance of the religious or God-sentiment as a factor in the development both of individual character and of the social organism; and it must be obvious that that importance would not be in any way diminished for the psychologist and the sociologist, even if psychology completely satisfied itself that there is no objective reality corresponding to man's persistent faith. The eternal God is, however, still a part of the scheme of things for many psychologists. If the God-sentiment is explained as merely the result of a "projection" from man's mind, there would seem to be no need to dispute the explanation, as a purely psychological explanation of a mental process. As Dr. G. F. Stout says at the conclusion of his *Manual of Psychology*, "Truth and freedom are ultimately topics for the metaphysician. As psychologists, we deal not with the ultimate possibility of will and thought, but only with their mode of occurrence as time-processes taking place in the individual mind." In terms of religious thought this "projection" is the return of the immanent Spirit of God upon Himself. It is the work of mind-spirits created, equipped, urged from within and stimulated from without, by the God whose being and nature are thus "projected"; and the degree of error in the mental picture is recognised as proportionate to the immaturity of the projecting mind-spirits. The conscience of the individual is without doubt largely the result of the social influences that are brought to bear upon him; but it is not to be wholly explained without the acceptance of the religious hypothesis. For, when psychology has disposed of God by assuming that the knowledge of a mental process invalidates its results,

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 57.

and has satisfied itself as to the origin and growth of conscience by unduly magnifying the influence of the social group, it is faced with the problem of the moral genius; and it can offer no word in explanation of the specially enlightened consciences of the individuals by whom the corporate or group-conscience is advanced. Dr. Hobhouse, whose testimony as a sociologist is particularly valuable, fairly recognises the importance and the problem of these moral leaders: "The higher scientific, philosophic, religious, and ethical interests have no doubt survival value to the community in which they are sufficiently strong. But in their progressive advance they are generally disadvantageous and often fatal to their individual possessors. . . . However advantageous an ethical standard, once firmly established, may be to a community, we are left without explanation of its growth in individual minds."¹

The religious man is free, therefore, to trace out for himself the undoubted connexion between the religious sentiment and that ideal Self which plays so large a part in the process of voluntary decision; and, further, to find the inspiration and strength of the Conscience, as distinct from those inferior consciences which attach to the other sentiments, in the special nature and direction of this sentiment with its characteristic complex-emotion of reverence. The Conscience is for him the self-consciousness of the human life-impulse in its contact, mediated (through the community) and direct, with the Spirit of God, ever seeking to organise the whole life in the interests of super-biological—that is, moral and spiritual—ends; and the Will, which is the whole of the life-impulse so far as it is organised, is the more or less imperfectly equipped servant of that Conscience.

The special form taken by the religious sentiment in the life of one whose moral standards are, in some

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 309 f.

sense, Christian, is determined by the inclusion of a more or less strongly developed Christ-sentiment. This may be a sentiment for the Person of Jesus Christ as God, or as the supreme ethical teacher, commonly but not invariably in association with what may be called a Church-sentiment; or, again, it may have no conscious attachment to the Person of Christ or to any Church, but may be a sentiment for a partly Christian code of morals adopted, with individual modifications, from the general community, and, within that, from a particular group connected with school and business or professional life. In so-called Christian countries in the modern world, that is to say, the conscience of one who is really entitled to be known as a Christian draws on three separate sources. In its early growth it is mainly dependent upon the moral standard of the racial and national group, and of the particular class or section of the community in which it is produced and fostered, and upon that of the particular Christian organisation and system to which it is attached by family tradition, the two overlapping to a greater or less degree. When, gradually or suddenly, as a result of spiritual development, there is added to these a direct sentiment for the Person of Christ, the conscience of the individual will comprise elements derived, in varying proportions, from all three sources. The peasant child born in an Italian mountain-village, the heir of a wealthy American manufacturer, the infant son of a Kikuyu convert, and the child of an English country vicarage, may all, in the end, come to be morally dominated by the Christ-sentiment, and be found in general agreement on all moral issues. But they breathe at first the moral atmospheres into which they are born, and these are clearly by no means identical. Again, not to go so far afield, and avoiding all differences of race, nationality, and social class, it is possible to imagine four children born in a day in some English town, one in

an Anglican home, a second in a Baptist family, a third in a Wesleyan, and a fourth in a Roman Catholic, and to feel assured that the moral standards of the four children will vary, in respect of the ideals of sainthood which are held by them, in respect of their codes of ecclesiastical duties and offences, and more generally in respect of certain departments of conduct in worldly affairs. And such differences are, as a rule, never entirely eliminated. Frequently, on the contrary, they become fixed and hardened, where there is a growth of Church-sentiment in perverse distinction from Christ-sentiment.

Psychologists have devoted much attention to the religious experience known as conversion, with the general result that the apparent differences between conversions of the sudden or explosive type and those of gradual growth have been considerably reduced. Both types are found to be characterised by a process of development, though in the one case it is conscious, while in the other it is largely unconscious until its apparently sudden consummation. In either case the result is seen in the possession of a strong Christ-sentiment by the converted person. "The problem of the growth of a given sentiment," as Mr. Shand points out,¹ "is, first, to understand how this innate system at the base of love" (that is, the organisation of emotional dispositions in which the primary systems of joy, repugnance, sorrow, fear, and anger are included) "comes to be attached to a particular object. In a great many cases," he says, "the emotion of joy is instrumental in effecting this connexion in the first instance, because joy directs or holds attention to the object." Certainly it is so in the case of the formation of the Christ-sentiment. Whether the convert is one who has become painfully aware of his own sinfulness and of his inability to deliver himself from it, or whether, apart from any tormenting stings of

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 158.

conscience, he has been led to seek a truly satisfying love-object, the object of his new-born sentiment is One who, by His message of love in the Incarnation and His promise of life through the Cross and Resurrection, has wrought in the believer a conviction of redemption from all ills and great gladness of heart. And the sentiment thus formed is strengthened by every subsequent emotion of joy arising out of the sense of forgiveness of sin confessed and out of the sense of a realised fellowship of love.

"But joy alone can never form a durable bond, so as to render us 'attached' to this person rather than to another. For this the opposite emotions of sorrow and repugnance are essential, which ensue, if at all, when the object of joy is absent, or destroyed, or injured."¹ Thus is it that the contemplation of the Cross in ever-growing appreciation of the quality and significance of the sorrows of Christ, together with the sorrowful and sinful experiences of individual and social life, issuing in a deepened spirit of penitence, co-operates with the abiding sense of joy in the Beloved to promote devotion to Him who was dead for man's sins, and, for their salvation, is alive for evermore.

The means by which this combined development of joy and sorrow is sustained in the life of the Christian are found in the Church's sacramental system and corporate worship, in the intellectual and devotional use of its sacred scriptures, and in the private exercise of the spiritual powers in meditation and prayer. In all these things there is a "beyond" which psychology cannot reach, and an operative force from the other side which psychology can measure only by the effects produced on the human side. Thinking, however humbly, in terms of the philosophy and theology of his religion, the Christian interprets his experiences as the direct result of fellowship with the Eternal God, Father, Son, and Holy Spirit; and his own inner life

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 158.

gives him an assurance, which goes beyond intellectual demonstration, of the validity of the interpretation. Approaching experiences of the same quality, whether by introspection or by examination of the written and spoken records of others, the psychologist is restricted to the observation of the working of what his science terms "suggestion"—auto-suggestion, or direct self-suggestion, and hetero-suggestion, or suggestion made by others, which must be consciously or unconsciously adopted and so become auto-suggestion before it begins to operate. In the baptismal washing away of the defilement of sin, in the solemn partaking of the consecrated Elements in the memorial of the Passion, in the various acts of benediction and enabling by the laying on of hands, as in all other of the Church's sacramental usages, the psychologist sees precisely the same sort of suggestion being powerfully made to the individual Christian by the corporate society to which he belongs as the individual makes to himself when, after hearing or reading the messages of the Gospel, he disposes himself to pray for divine assistance in his striving away from evil towards the good. And he recognises the great value of all such suggestion, especially of that which is made corporately by the group, in the building up of the Christ-sentiment, which may thus be so strengthened as to become the predominant factor in the ordering of the moral life.

Here it may be noticed incidentally that, while psychology is, strictly speaking, incapable of either denying or affirming the truth of the Christian's belief as to the reality of the Power with whom he is in contact, there is none the less what may almost be called a psychological argument for the existence of God, in the fact that the sacramental system and the life of prayer "work" only so long as they are used in faith. When faith is wanting, it is of no avail to use the sacramental system as mere magic or the activity

of prayer as a piece of conscious deception devised to lend added strength to auto-suggestion. But in proportion to the strength of the faith that is exerted the moral power of the Christ-sentiment increases, and avails for the discharge of the duties attaching to the sentiment and for growing conformation to the ideals associated with it.

It is claimed by the Church that Christianity is distinguished from all other religions and from all other moral systems by its possession of a unique moral dynamic. The direct and irrefutable answer made by it to those who would dispute that claim lies in its steady and persevering success in the work of weaning men from lives of gross sin and in its production of saints. Psychology may, however, help to give an intelligible explanation of the mode of operation of the Christ-sentiment in this work, and, at the same time, to deliver Christians from the mental confusion which sometimes troubles them when they observe that there are many people in their midst professing no allegiance to Jesus Christ who yet live lives morally indistinguishable from those of the best of their Christian neighbours. To take the latter point first, it should be clear that the Church has no interest in asserting, in the face of facts, the impotence of a high moral ideal, least of all when that ideal is derived in large measure from its own. The morality of the English gentleman, for example, reaches a high standard, and affords valuable testimony to the power of an ideal maintained by a fellowship and also to the pervasive quality of the morality of the saints. But at its best it is by no means above criticism; and it would appear to be the case that such moral dynamic as its ideal possesses depends for its operation on the existence of congenial social conditions, to say nothing of a persisting background of vital Christianity. The Church, however, is able to transform character, in the face of highly adverse social conditions, by implant-

ing and developing the Christ-sentiment in lives of low moral standard. This transformation it attributes to the operation of Divine Grace, an explanation which suggests to many people a belief in the magical transmutation of moral energy. The true psychological explanation is, no doubt, not that the superior moral power of the Christ-sentiment is due simply to the fact that the individual is thereby brought, according to the Christian belief, under the influence of a larger and more exalted social group than that which influences the merely moral man: for God and the saints must not be denied their part in the making of a gentleman who is no professing Christian. But the superiority lies, first, in the awakened *consciousness* of the Christian that he is under the personal influence of Christ, who, to speak psychologically, is thus enabled to make powerful suggestions to him, directly and through his communion with those in whom the same personal power has already achieved notable results. For the developed Christian consciousness is not a passive awareness, but an active apprehension possessing a strong emotional content; and God's outpouring of the Holy Spirit is ever conditioned as to measure by human capacity to receive. Secondly, this superiority lies in the vividness of the ideal self, seen by the Christian not merely as a possibility, but as something already existing in the sight of God. Conviction of justification by faith exercises an incalculable power in the moral reformation of a life.

So, in the case of infant baptism, granted the Christian premiss of a wider society, psychology would accept the claim that there is an admission of an unwitting child into a corporate society in which the personal power of Christ has established a greater degree of freedom to operate than is to be found elsewhere; and the child would accordingly be regarded as living "in a state of grace" from that time forward, it being clearly understood that the operation of the

divine power, which is both mediated and direct, would be mediated rather than direct through the early years of the child's life. As its powers mature, so the Christ-sentiment may be progressively formed, with its ideals and duties, and with its strong personal suggestions from beyond, looked for, recognised, and accepted.

When the Christ-sentiment, in this sense of direct attachment to the Person of Christ, is strongly established, its moral pull is felt in the direction of idealistic and other-worldly aims, and it inevitably finds itself in some degree of conflict with the less direct Christ-sentiments, social sentiments rather, derived from the moral life of the community, ecclesiastical and civil. For these latter are bound to some extent to represent codifications of an ideal which can never be codified without loss. They are essentially practical and compromising, and they necessarily include in their systems some degree of convention: whereas the pure Christ-sentiment urges those in whom it is strongly formed to work out in their lives the principle of the atonement, to undertake such an unshrinking war with evil as must often appear quixotic to onlookers, and to pursue such a fervent quest of God's Kingdom and His righteousness as cannot fail to be derided by many as childishly utopian. This is most strikingly seen in the lives of the saints, who are wholly governed by the Christ-sentiment, whatever the way of life which is accepted by them as their special vocation. In a man like St. Francis of Assisi, that which is normally only a relative system of ethics in the life of the Christian who is citizen, father of a family, and a man of business, has become an exclusive system, completely dominating the life, by the extension of the Christ-sentiment, until it embraces and controls the whole of the saint's emotional and instinctive powers. The world's standards and the Church's standards, so far as these are practically expressed at the time, are observed by such a one

just so long as they coincide with the moral standard of the individual Christ-sentiment; but in any situation in which conflict arises, all goes down before the absolute demands of the ruling system.

Two important questions arise in the consideration of such lives. The first is that of the authority of the individual conscience in conflict with the corporate conscience; and the second is that of the adequacy of the moral resultant of the pure Christ-sentiment. Psychology is not of itself competent to answer either of these closely related questions, but it has its contribution to make to their solution.

To the individual whose conscience leads him to challenge his group, psychology presents balancing considerations; on the one side, the grave dangers of subjectivism, on the other the necessity of self-realisation. Instancing fantasy and rationalisation as typical of the self-delusions and aberrations of the individual mind uncorrected by submission to the testing and guidance of others, psychology would thereby promote the safety of some who were in peril of mere eccentricity; but it might succeed equally in silencing the moral inspiration of the saint, and so rob society of its chief means of real progress, unless, indeed, the saint preferred to follow the psychologist's exhortation to achieve self-realisation, judging that the way to that satisfaction lies in the acceptance of the ultimate authority of the individual conscience for its possessor.

The adequacy of the moral resultant of the Christ-sentiment has for the psychologist a very different meaning from that which it has for the sociologist. The latter regards it as a subject for investigation by the comparative study of ethics; but for the former it is a question of the degree of satisfaction afforded to the individual by the progressive unification of his personality; and, while the satisfaction resulting from the acceptance of the Christ-sentiment may not be

more intense at any given time than that derived from certain other sentiments, there can be no doubt that it is more stable and more enduring, and that it alone is capable of unlimited increase. Psychology will, perhaps, be disposed to find an indication of marked superiority in respect of adequacy in the possibility of the complete identification of the Christ-sentiment with the religious or God-sentiment, since that leads to the identification of the conscience of the Christ-sentiment with the Conscience of the central personality, according to the Christian conviction, "I live, yet not I, but Christ liveth in me." The pursuit of Art, Science, and Morality, the quest of Beauty, Truth, and Goodness, may carry a man far and hold him steadfast over a long course of years, as may the love of another human being; but there will always be an element of incompleteness in such cases, because the sentiment that is formed is incapable of complete identification with the God-sentiment, and will always be subject to disturbance by the contrary directions of the supreme voice of Conscience.

3

As a result of the apparently sudden formation of the Christ-sentiment in adolescence or later, by the process known as conversion, there is frequently found not only a remarkable interior sense of newness of life, but also a real access of moral power sufficient to express that inner sense in terms of conduct. The convert has literally fallen in love with Jesus Christ, and in the joy of this new experience his former way of life is abandoned without difficulty, in so far as it is found to be in conflict with the requirements of the new relationship. In psychological language, a new-born sentiment has come to life with such a fulness of power that it entirely dominates all other co-existing emotional systems and makes it impossible for them to

operate in any way that is opposed to its own continuance.

To the grave loss and injury of many Christians this fact has been misunderstood to prove that Christian character is altogether a gift conveyed from without, and in no sense an achievement from within. It has somehow been supposed that the grace of God changes a man's character by superseding his power of self-determination and relieving him of all effort; and the irony of the situation lies in the fact that this error has been held chiefly by those who have offered the keenest criticism of others who appeared to them to put their trust in the magical operation of sacramental grace. In season and out of season, they have dwelt on St. Paul's teaching concerning the necessity and the power of the abounding grace of God, and have forgotten that the same apostle repeatedly represented the Christian life as a persistent striving, and that, not counting himself to have apprehended, he died daily, keeping his body under strict control and so bringing it into subjection.

The truth is that the Christian sentiment is not peculiar in that, when its first enthusiasm has been enjoyed and wonderfully expressed through a striking moral transformation, it changes its mode of activity in view of the necessity of providing for its continued operation in the great variety of situations which life inevitably brings. As Shand states it, "While in the first freshness of a sentiment its virtues often develop in this spontaneous way—as, for instance, the qualities of generosity, gentleness, kindness, and sincerity, in love and friendship, and in the sentiments for truth and art, the qualities of industry and perseverance—yet a little later these qualities are often checked, and effort and reflection succeed to the first stage of spontaneous growth."¹ It is a heavy disappointment to the Christ-lover when he finds the moral energy of

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 111.

his love weakening in the face of the old perils. In some cases he is content to behave as a disillusioned man, and gradually to resume all his former manner of life, with evil additions. "Then goeth he, and taketh to him seven other spirits more evil than himself; and they enter in and dwell there: and the last state of that man becometh worse than the first." But others accept the new situation in a right spirit, and set to work to maintain and strengthen their sentiment for Christ by proposing to themselves associated ideals, and by acknowledging the obligation of a certain range of duties. In this they are both prompted from within and directed and encouraged from without. The whole life of the Church, on its Catholic side, is organised with a view to the assistance of the soul in this task of achieving Christian character through fellowship. It is a society of men, women, and children, who are called to be saints; and, with the example of the saints prominently before it, it counsels and insists upon a rule of life in all its members, and provides through the ministerial priesthood for spiritual direction, and for the healing and strengthening of the soul by the ministry of absolution, and by the administration of penitential discipline. The duties of prayer, fasting, and almsgiving are imposed upon all who would seriously apply themselves to the achievement, by the power of God that is in them, of that perfection to which they are called. There is no question of substituting human power for divine, but of receiving with understanding and gratitude, and of using with a full sense of responsibility, that power of the Holy Spirit which enlightens the eyes and quickens the will.

The New Psychology pronounces the Christian system completely mistaken in that it represents sin as a positive evil and sets out to defeat and kill it by strengthening the power of the will. In place of this it teaches that the mind should be turned away from

all consideration of evil to dwell only on the good that it desires. Positive quest of good rather than any negative uprooting of evil is said to be the true way of progress. To this Christianity can make answer that the element of truth that lies in the criticism is no new thing, and that, in spite of the aberrations of some of those who profess the Christian faith, it has never failed to produce moral athletes who have valued, practised, and recommended that truth. Understanding Christians in every age have fully recognised the wisdom of St. Paul's injunction: "Whatsoever things are true, whatsoever things are honourable, whatsoever things are just, whatsoever things are pure, whatsoever things are lovely, whatsoever things are of good report; if there be any virtue, and if there be any praise, think on these things." To-day there can be no doubt about the necessity of countering the evil suggestion that thrusts itself indiscriminately upon all, through the agency of papers, magazines, and books, theatres and picture-palaces, and through the exhibition of vice parading in a thousand forms as an inevitable factor in the modern social system. To enable the human organism to absorb without injury the poison of these things an antidote must be found in the observance of set times of retirement for meditation and prayer, and for the enjoyment of literature, art, and music, possessing the quality of inspiration.

As a result the instinctive powers will be marshalled in the cause of the dominant sentiment so securely that the formation of revolutionary emotional systems will not easily be found possible, and there will be a steady redirection of instinctive desire, in the sense that powers which are incited to make direct response in the most obvious line of their activity are exercised instead in some less obvious but associated path. Here again Christianity has long known and practised that which the New Psychology has rediscovered for itself and emphasised under the name of *sublimation*. In a rich

ministry of love the Church has provided a way of issue, in particular, for the instinctive desire of those who, by reason of the need of their generation, and by their own vocation, have been cut off from the life of the family; and in its general guidance of seekers after moral well-being, it has shown a fertile invention in the diversion of desire from injurious and forbidden ways into paths of usefulness, honour, and true satisfaction.

But this knowledge and a long practical experience in these matters have by no means disposed the Church to a ready acceptance of the far-reaching claims of the New Psychologists in respect of sublimation. It is clear to all who have experience of this process that sublimation is always a second best from the point of view of the instincts themselves, and that it can never carry with it a guarantee of complete safety. This is seen most evidently in the attempts that are made to provide an alternative outlet for the sexual and parental instincts. From time to time these instincts will assert themselves in a demand for natural or direct satisfaction and break rudely in upon the peace and satisfaction which have been won by a long-continued practice of sublimation. Then there is nothing for it but self-control, a self-control which is not to be discovered by a stroke of luck in a moment of crisis, but which must have been slowly built up by patient and systematic discipline. If there is to be success in meeting the sudden impulse to evil, or again in slowly weaning the self of some bad habit, there must be watchfulness and the hardness of training. Filling the mind with good thoughts and desires, avoiding danger as far as may be by the sublimation of the instinctive powers, the Christian will yet count it his wisdom and his duty to mark his life with the sign of the Cross, not only in the sense of self-sacrifice for others, but also in the sense of self-regimen on behalf of the soul he has to save.

"A charge to keep I have,
 A God to glorify,
 A never-dying soul to save,
 And fit it for the sky;
 To serve the present age,
 My calling to fulfil:
 Oh may it all my powers engage
 To do my Master's will!"

Well aware that the progress to sainthood is over a rough and forbidding way, he will not suffer himself to be turned aside from the rigours of a Christian asceticism to the pleasant delusions of those who put their trust in sublimation, any more than, in seeking to guard the health of his body, he will be persuaded of the truth and sufficiency of the teaching of Christian Science. The will must learn to say "No!" and it must gain its power by practice.

Here the New Psychology immediately states the Law of Reversed Effort and points, at length, to Christianity's crowning error in the sphere of morals. Whenever it is a question of conflict between the Will and the Imagination, it says, the Will always goes down; and again, in these circumstances, the failure of the Will is in direct proportion to the effort which it puts forth. Let the Will therefore be lulled to sleep; trust only to the Imagination. Do not try to bring your desire to pass, but in a relaxed, half-dreaming state of mind assure yourself that it has already come to pass.

But, if the will is to be lulled to sleep, what is it that decides so and takes control? It looks rather like another will, a will with imagination on its side. Then the first will is only the will of a partial system. It is not the whole Will of the personality, though that is the meaning that is conveyed when the phrase Will *versus* Imagination is used. It seems, then, that the Law represents, after all, nothing more than a glimmering apprehension of the mode of activity known to Christians by the name of Faith. When a man tries

to do the right and to accomplish his desire, having already persuaded himself that he is certain to fail, he fails. When a man tries to do the right, having already persuaded himself that he can do it if he will, he may or may not succeed. When a man tries to do the right, and has faith that God will enable him to achieve it, succeed he must. But so far is his faith from supplanting his will that it strengthens and directs it for its own increase, and, apart from it, languishes unto death. Christians can never cease to pray, therefore, "*Excita, quaesumus Domine, Tuorum fidelium voluntates: ut divini operis fructum propensius exsequentes, pietatis Tuae remedia majora percipiant. Per Dominum nostrum.*"

For the direction and assistance of the individual in his work of moral self-development the Church provides, through the priesthood, a ministry both general and particular. As to the former, counsel and systematic instruction are imparted to general congregations and meetings, and to assemblies representing special groups, by means of sermons and addresses. At the conclusion of the form of service prescribed in the Book of Common Prayer for the Ministration of Publick Baptism of Infants, godparents are instructed to remember that it is their "parts and duties" to see that the newly baptised child be taught, "so soon as he shall be able to learn, what a solemn vow, promise, and profession" has been made in his name, two-thirds of it relating to the moral life. "And that he may know these things the better," it continues, "ye shall call upon him to hear Sermons." These, then, are to be concerned in large measure with the moral standards of the Christian life, not only by way of exhortation, but also by way of counsel and instruction directly relevant to the needs and circumstances of the people to whom it is addressed. But, while the general moral teaching of a wise and instructed preacher will be of great service to some, at least, of his hearers,

there remains for most people a need of individual teaching, direction, and exhortation, not only during the vitally important time of preparation for Confirmation, but throughout life. It is a matter of grave doubt whether, apart from such private counsel, any soul can be assured of clear vision at all times as to its own condition and progress. The revelation made by recent psychology concerning the general tendency to rationalisation and self-deception fully justifies the wisdom of the many Christians who, though possessed of more than common moral and spiritual power, have, nevertheless, seen fit to put themselves under direction. Pride, false independence, and blind self-satisfaction, make it harder for the very imperfect Christians in whom they are found to accept the help of which they stand in greater need.

It is evident that the responsibilities and opportunities of the director demand special qualifications and special training. There must be spirituality and moral uprightness in a man who would usefully discharge such an office, sound common-sense and practical wisdom, a good knowledge of psychology and of ethics, much earnestness, zeal, and patience, unbounded faith and a supernatural gift of intuition and analysis, sustained and strengthened by an intensive prayer-life. For this reason systematic spiritual direction is normally to be undertaken by a priest rather than by a layman, seeing that by training, by appointment, and by way of life he is more likely to develop the necessary power in these matters, and to be free to give his attention to them; and, further, the work of direction is commonly associated with the ministry of absolution, which is committed to his office. But, while every priest is required to be in some sort a director, it is not to be supposed that every priest will show a special aptitude for this work, or that aptitude without training will suffice. There is great need in the Church of England for a general

training in spiritual direction for all the younger clergy, and for the recognition and encouragement of those in whom special gifts are discovered. The higher degrees of spiritual progress are probably missed by some devout Christians through lack of that competent direction which is an important factor in the making of a saint; and even in the lower ranges much evil may result, does undoubtedly result, from the dull perception, unwisdom, and want of knowledge of earnest but ill-equipped directors.

The present stress laid by psychologists upon the duty of self-realisation is in no way contradicted by the office of the director, whose aim is direction as opposed to domination. He will constantly seek to strengthen and develop the individual whom he assists by promoting his dependence upon God by means of prayer, and will ever guard against the error of making himself an indispensable support. The only exception to this will be in the case of the scrupulous penitent. When people are found to display a morbid anxiety about comparatively petty failings and to be incapable of attaining to peace of mind through distorted vision and unjustifiable fears, they may require to be controlled for a time by the spiritual director just as completely as patients sometimes need to be controlled by the psycho-analyst; but when the phase of scrupulosity has passed, the domination of the director must also be withdrawn. The growth of moral personality is by the very nature of the resultant product an achievement from within.

Just as in the work of education the experienced schoolmaster is prepared to recognise a number of types among the pupils who come under his care, so the practised spiritual director finds himself dealing for the most part with a certain limited range of typical cases; and in both spheres the benefit of psychology is that it gives scientific interpretation to experience and assists materially in the equipment of those who

have not yet had time to acquire experience. There is a danger, perhaps, that the stubborn fact of individuality may be forgotten in the attempt to classify all comers under a few heads; but there is none the less a considerable gain to be looked for from the psychology of temperament when that particular study has been carried further. At present there is need for experienced directors themselves to make their contribution to the better understanding of the subject. It may be remarked that, in addition to the scrupulous type already referred to, there is an all too common class of people who seek mainly to secure for themselves attention and sympathy, claiming much time and care, and producing nothing in themselves to justify such expenditure, but rather growing worse as their craving is ministered to. A very different but equally large class is that of the recidivists, who are much in earnest, and for a time make good headway, only to fall back again repeatedly, and to need encouraging and spurring to fresh effort.

It is in the case of these people especially that the question of confession and the problems attendant upon it come to the front. Apart from the possibility of full reconciliation, of complete readjustment of relationship after the commission of sin, there is no hope for such people; and the method of sacramental confession has the strongest psychological support in their case. The opportunity of telling the precise nature of an offence in a solemn way in the presence of an official representative of the Church, the sense of receiving an authoritative declaration of forgiveness, and the knowledge of the binding nature of the seal of confession, all possess considerable psychological value, and conspire to create a sense of restoration to fellowship in a manner that permits of, requires even, the making of a fresh start. There is a something truly purgative in vocally and definitely naming one's sin and in declaring, "I am heartily sorry": there is

something profoundly assuring in the judicial pronouncement of absolution: and in the seal of silence imposed by the Church there is a powerful suggestion that the sin confessed is no more remembered in the sight of God, but is utterly done away.

As to frequency of confession and the much debated question as to whether it is to be regarded as food or medicine, psychology suggests that it is needed immediately after any serious lapse in order to prevent the evils of unchecked remorse and to institute recovery without delay, and that, apart from these special occasions, it should be used, where it is used at all, with such frequency as to promote continuity in the development of the spiritual life. There may be lives in which a single act of confession bears a close analogy to submission to treatment at the hands of an expert psycho-analyst, when the cure is effectual and permanent. But far more commonly, as in the case of the recidivists so generally, confession will be associated with the receiving of direction, and it will be found necessary to repeat it at intervals of not more than three months. Greater frequency than this will usually be found to involve the danger of formalism, or of scrupulosity, or of lack of a proper degree of self-confidence and self-determination. Over-direction and an unwise advocacy of frequent confession are undoubtedly responsible for most of the failures of this system where it is honestly and zealously followed.

In the imposition of penances constant care is needed to guard against any suggestion of earning forgiveness or of balancing accounts with God. Acts of reparation made to persons against whom offences have been committed, and discipline imposed for its corrective and remedial value, are in grave danger of being misconceived as compensation in a purely commercial sense. The best corrective to this would seem to be the prescription, in addition to any necessary

reparation and discipline, of small acts of gratitude for forgiveness, offered in love as a pledge of the soul's intention, suggested and accepted by the penitent rather than imposed by the confessor. At all costs the central truth of the adequacy of the merits of the death of Christ is to be guarded from perversion.

In any case of sin committed against the body, it is a fatal mistake to impose penance or discipline having the nature of bodily chastisement. This will assuredly strengthen the evil which it is designed to overcome.

In conclusion, psychology has something to teach in explanation of the growing self-depreciation of the Christian who is advancing towards sainthood. Psychologically he is being conformed to an ideal which arises out of the dominant sentiment of the life. As that sentiment—the Christ-sentiment—is strengthened, so the ideal grows in clearness and in content, and since the moral achievement of the saint proceeds at a slower rate than the growth of the ideal, there is developed in him an increasing appreciation of his own imperfection, to which in all humility and honesty he gives occasional expression. Yet he advances, and he is aware that he is advancing; and he has within him the hope and the assurance of the ultimate perfection of character which belongs to those who are in Christ.

VIII
THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SPIRITUAL
HEALING

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VIII

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SPIRITUAL HEALING

THE term "spiritual healing" may have two meanings: it may mean the cure of spiritual conditions, or it may signify the cure by spiritual means of morbid conditions whether of body or mind. Generally speaking, this distinction is not of great importance, for bodily diseases are usually treated by physical agencies, and spiritual by spiritual. But this is only generally true, for there are diseases of the soul, such as a morbid sense of sin, which may be due to diseases of the brain, and the cure of which should be along physical lines. At the same time, there are many "physical" ailments, such as hysterical paralysis, which are due to mental and emotional causes, and which may therefore be treated by "spiritual" or mental means. On the whole, it is perhaps better to use the term "spiritual healing," not merely of the treatment of spiritual conditions, in which sense the term becomes practically synonymous with the cure of souls, but to use it (as we use the term "psychotherapy") to mean the treatment by spiritual means of morbid conditions whether of body or mind. It is in this sense that the term "spiritual healing" or "faith healing" has been most commonly used; for such healing is directed not only to spiritual and moral disorders, but to bodily ills, as in our Lord's miracles, the ministry of the Early Church, the cures at Lourdes, and amongst Christian Scientists.

There is a sense, of course, in which all healing is

spiritual, and some would extend the use of the term to surgical and medical as well as psychical healing, on the ground that we have no right to exclude the work of the physician or surgeon from the sphere of the spiritual, for all healing is of God. This interpretation seems to have been favoured by the Lambeth Committee on Spiritual Healing recently appointed by the Archbishop of Canterbury. In principle no exception can be taken to this view; in the same sense the work of the tailor and of the lawyer is spiritual—or perhaps it is truer to say that it *may be* spiritual. But it is obvious that if we are to use the term “spiritual” of all forms of healing, or even if we limit it to such work as is done with a spiritual aim, we shall rob it of its special significance, and we shall be compelled to find some other term to connote what we now know as “spiritual healing.”

Spiritual healing is distinguished from ordinary physical treatment; but it also differs from faith healing and from mental healing or psychotherapy. The terms “faith healing” and “spiritual healing” are often used synonymously, and it would be pedantic to distinguish between them too sharply in ordinary language. Yet faith healing may be entirely non-spiritual, as when we are cured of a headache by a bread pill; and, on the other hand, faith is only one factor employed in spiritual healing, which may take the form of investigating the hidden causes of the morbid state with a view to readjusting the personality in conformity with spiritual ends; in which form of treatment faith plays an unimportant rôle. We should further distinguish spiritual healing from mental healing. Mental healing includes all forms of healing by mental means, and embraces faith healing and spiritual healing on the one hand, and scientific psychotherapy on the other. Psychotherapy, as now commonly used by medical men, proceeds along purely scientific lines in the investigation of the causes and

cure of mental abnormalities, whether these give rise to mental or to bodily symptoms. By spiritual healing let us mean, then, the treatment or healing of diseased conditions whether of body, mind, or spirit—by spiritual means, that is to say—by bringing the personality into relation with God.

I

A brief survey of the history of spiritual healing will help to give some impression of the main factors concerned in the process, and of the extent to which the Church has carried it out. Dr. Percy Dearmer, in *Body and Soul*, gives an excellent account of the development of spiritual healing. It may perhaps be well to mention in passing that some kind of spiritual healing was practised in the Temples of Æsculapius, Mithra, Isis and Osiris, long before the Christian era. Patients used to visit the temple and make a lengthened stay, during which they actually slept in the sacred building. What part was played by the priests themselves it is difficult to say; but the atmosphere of awe and worship would no doubt stimulate the hopes of the sick. Cures must have been effected, as the practice continued in the Temple of Æsculapius for over seven hundred years. It was imitated by the Christian Church and the practice of "incubation," as it is called, is carried on in some Eastern Orthodox Churches to-day. In heathen countries witch-doctors and medicine-men have a great influence over their patients. They work by magic charms, and doubtless certain sicknesses are influenced by them. But the advent of the medical missionary invariably puts the medicine-man in the shade, and the sick flock to the exponent of Western medicine. In Christ's own time the Jews were able to cast out devils, as is evidenced by our Lord's reply to the accusation that He was casting out devils by Beelzebub.¹

¹ See St. Matt. xii. 22-28.

These non-Christian methods, or pre-Christian methods, as far as one can gather from the slender evidence available, are instances of cure by some kind of suggestion. The question as to whether both organic and functional diseases were cured cannot be answered with any certainty. But the practice of spiritual healing during the last 1,900 years draws its authority and its practice from our Lord's ministry of healing, together with His definite injunction to His followers to heal the sick.

Examination of the healing miracles of Christ, so far as the records go, shows that the conditions dealt with fall into three principal groups: (1) functional disorders, such as some forms of paralysis, hysterical outbursts, etc.; (2) organic disease, such as leprosy and issue of blood; (3) death. The methods employed are chiefly word and touch, often accompanied by a symbolic action. In some cases our Lord dealt specifically with the patient's spiritual condition, in addition to healing the physical disability; but as a rule there is no mention made of such separate treatment. The great essential seemed to be belief in Christ's power on the part of the patients and their friends. In fact, lack of this belief limited Christ's power. Prayer and fasting were also spoken of as important in serious cases. It is open to critics to-day to doubt the sufficiency of the evidence in the Gospels as to whether a disease was organic or functional, or whether those who were raised from the dead were actually dead at all. But if the documentary evidence of the broad facts of the cases is satisfactory, the question as to whether a condition was organic or functional is not of the first importance so far as the Gospel miracles are concerned. Even if all the conditions dealt with were functional, the field of spiritual healing is vast enough to engage the attention of the followers of Christ to-day. The healing of organic conditions through spiritual means may soon be more

comprehensible, as another part of this essay will go to show. The patient's own powers may be reinforced. It seems evident that contact with Christ's personality brought healing in its train. Calm and quiet were brought to the most excited and agitated households. Confidence and hope were inspired in the most despondent and helpless folk. The assurance of God's power and will to heal was made very real to those who were sick and oppressed. Christ brought them a new outlook, and helped them to attain a new attitude of mind.

There were cases which Christ healed without ever seeing the patient. He cured the centurion's servant and the daughter of the Syrophœnician woman, while they were at a distance. Lack of knowledge makes it impossible to form an opinion as to how these cures were effected.

Accounts of healing in the Acts of the Apostles go to show that the Early Church continued the practice followed by Christ, and healing came to be one of the natural results of the Gospel in action. In addition to the ordinary methods of healing, we read that people brought their sick into the streets of Jerusalem, so that the shadow of St. Peter might fall on them and heal them. And in Ephesus handkerchiefs or aprons were carried from St. Paul to the sick and diseased, and evil spirits were expelled.

During the ministry of Christ we read that the disciples "cast out many devils and anointed with oil many that were sick, and healed them,"¹ and St. James bids the sick man send for the elders of the church that they may anoint him and pray for his recovery: "Is any among you sick? let him call for the elders of the church; and let them pray over him, anointing him with oil in the name of the Lord: and the prayer of faith shall save him that is sick, and the Lord shall raise him up; and if he have committed sins, it shall be forgiven him."² This injunction of St. James

¹ St. Mark vi. 13.

² Jas. v. 14, 15.

is usually taken as the authority for the practice of unction, which has been one of the methods of healing most frequently employed since the days of Christ. This subject is dealt with by Canon Mason in Appendix I. of the Report of the Committee on the Ministry of Healing, in which he quotes from Father Puller's work *The Anointing of the Sick*. He there discusses its historical aspect. There seems to have been no great uniformity of practice; but formulæ for blessing the sacred oil are contained in most of the ancient service-books from about the year 215. Anointing was originally used for the *healing* of the sick, but by the beginning of the ninth century unction began to be regarded as a preparation for death by remission of sins. Healing of the body fell into a second place, and the rite of Extreme Unction appeared in the Church in both East and West. It was generally applied only when the patient was *in extremis*, and the healing of the body was not looked for except as a remote possibility. This seems to be the practice in the Eastern and in the Roman Church to-day. It is a question as to whether the possibility of healing receded into the background owing to the fact that cures were rather rare.

In the first seven or eight centuries records of cures by anointing occur in various writers, such as Tertullian, St. Jerome, and Bede. Bede describes cures performed by St. Cuthbert by anointing with oil as well as by holy water and consecrated bread.

In addition to unction, and rather replacing it in the Middle Ages, was the use of relics, which were generally kept in shrines associated with some Cathedral or Abbey Church. The practice, which began in the Catacombs at Rome, soon spread through East and West. The tombs were originally the scene of prayers, and people used to take oil from the lamps, or touch the tomb with a garment or some other object and take them away. After the ninth century the

tombs began to be violated, and fragments of relics were carried all over Europe and Asia Minor and deposited in shrines. By degrees certain shrines acquired a reputation for cures; pilgrims flocked to them in their thousands and many found relief. The pilgrim was a familiar figure everywhere. Great preparations were made for the journey, and to many it was the event of their life. Anyone who has seen the Russian pilgrims visiting the Church of the Holy Sepulchre in Jerusalem and prostrating themselves in simple faith at the sacred sites will realise something of the suggestibility and devotion of the mediæval pilgrim. The sophisticated twentieth-century invalid yearns for something less humbling, but more grotesque, to bring him to such a hopeful frame of mind. But the pilgrimage churches of Europe to-day bear their testimony that there are still simple-minded folk who find the religious atmosphere of a church like that of Notre Dame de Laghet above Monte Carlo, or of the Madonna del Sasso above Lake Maggiore, sufficiently stimulating for the cure of their troubles, as the large number of votive offerings in the churches testify.

A curious practice, said to have arisen out of the acts of Edward the Confessor, was that known as "Touching for the King's Evil." It was carried on from the days of Henry VII. to the reign of Anne, though William III. refused to do it. Charles II. laid hands on over 90,000 persons, chiefly for scrofula. There was a regular religious rite published in some prayer books up to the time of George I. The custom was greatly abused, and many people came to be touched for the sake of the money which was distributed at the same time.

That certain individuals seem to have the power of conveying healing to sick people is evident by the account which Dr. Dearmer gives of saints and worthies who have performed cures from the seventh century to the present day. This includes people

like St. John of Beverley, St. Francis of Assisi, St. Catherine of Siena, Martin Luther, George Fox, John Wesley, and Father John of Cronstadt. From the various accounts it seems clear that the strength of the individual personality, together with the suggestion of God's power, combined to bring about a state of mind which allowed a cure.

To-day the Christian Science Movement is the biggest organisation claiming to carry out spiritual healing. Its practitioners heal large numbers of people who have been treated unsuccessfully by medical men. But, on the other hand, there are many people who are not helped in this way. It is difficult to get well-attested information as to the actual details of cases healed, but it is no exaggeration to say that the exponents of Christian Science claim to be able to heal any kind of sickness. They base their treatment on the belief that there is no such thing as mind or body or sickness, and that God knows nothing about illness, because it has no reality. To quote from Mrs. Eddy:¹ "The hosts of Æsculapius are flooding the world with diseases, because they are ignorant that the human mind and body are myths."

Without discussing the truth or absurdity of this statement, it is sufficient to point out that such a suggestion to many sick people would be of immense benefit. If your illness is unreal, there is nothing more to worry about. All over the world Christian Science practitioners are carrying on their work, quite independently of medical men. In many cases it seems to have been quite sufficient for the patient to read *Science and Health* to be cured from diseases like cataract, consumption, and valvular disease of the heart, or even a broken arm. Any intelligent person who reads the chapter "Fruitage," which comprises one-seventh of *Science and Health*, will know what to make of the evidence there set forth from patients who have been

¹ *Science and Health*, published in 1875, p. 150f.

cured. It is difficult to attach very serious weight to it. The question of diagnosis is apparently of slight importance.

We must be content with quoting from one "testimony" only; it is headed "Cancer and Consumption Healed." The patient states, "I was a great sufferer for many years from cancer and consumption. I was treated by the best physicians in New York, Minneapolis and Duluth, and was finally given up as incurable, when I heard of Christian Science. A neighbour who had been healed of consumption, kindly loaned me *Science and Health*, by Mrs. Eddy, which I read and became interested in. In three months I was healed, the truth conveyed to me by this book being the healer, and not only of these diseases, but I was made whole mentally as well. I have not been in bed one day since, or rather in eleven years." Other testimonies include headings such as "Astigmatism and Hernia Healed," "Substance of Lungs Restored," "Liver Complaint Healed," "The Textbook makes Operation Unnecessary." The remarkable thing is that such a book as *Science and Health* should be so widely read and heeded. But in spite of its contradictions and crudities it is obvious that Christian Science does embody ideas which are able to bring hope and confidence to the minds of many people, and its influence does help and cheer large numbers of unhappy folk.

It is impossible to mention all the various other healing movements in existence, but it is necessary to speak of one or two more, such as the Emmanuel Movement in Boston, U.S.A., which works always in conjunction with medical men. Its exponents combine spiritual and physical means, as described in *Religion and Medicine*, and believe in using any combination of methods according to the special needs of patients; they endeavour to take into account all the factors involved. They do not claim to treat organic disease.

The name of Lourdes is a household word all over the world as a centre of spiritual healing. This little town in the Pyrenees has been the goal of countless pilgrims since 1858, when a peasant girl of fourteen declared that the Blessed Virgin had appeared to her several times in a grotto, and had ordered a sanctuary to be erected on the spot. The grotto contained a spring, and reports of miraculous healings effected by its waters swelled the number of pilgrims. The water of the spring is carried off into baths and taps. Water from the latter is drunk, or carried away in bottles. Patients are usually immersed in the baths or the affected part is bathed with the water. But only a small proportion of the pilgrims are sick folk, the rest are mainly friends and sympathisers. It is estimated that about 600,000 pilgrims visit Lourdes every year. Between 1892 and 1908 2,440 cases of cures were officially filed at the Bureau des Constata-tions, Lourdes, which examines all claims to be regarded as cures. A medical man is attached to the Bureau to examine persons who claim to have been cured. Any medical man is allowed to join in this examination. Patients are required to bring a medical certificate on their pilgrimage. This must be produced at the Bureau if a cure is claimed. Various persons who have been connected with the patient at Lourdes are questioned, and their evidence tested. The patient is then required to procure a second certificate on his arrival home, if possible from the doctor who wrote the first, in order that the change in the patient's condition may be described. The patients are not examined at the Bureau on arrival at Lourdes, but only if a cure is claimed. The examination is more or less superficial, as there are no facilities for bacteriological or pathological work, and there is no X-ray apparatus. So practically none of the usual methods of scientific investigation are carried out.

In a recent book, *Twenty Cures at Lourdes, Medically*

Discussed, by Dr. de Grandmaison (English translation), cures of the following diseases are described among others: pulmonary tuberculosis, gastric ulcer, cancer of the tongue and cancer of the breast, tubercular disease of the spine, ulcer of the leg of twelve years' duration, compound fracture of the leg of eight years' standing, fracture of the femur of three months' standing. The dates of cure range from 1875 to 1911. It must be admitted that the accounts given of the cases are not always very convincing.

But the fact remains that sick folk continue to flock to Lourdes and kindred places. And the atmosphere of Lourdes during the pilgrimage season is very wonderful; the air is charged with emotion. Consider the pilgrim of to-day, like the pilgrim of old, starting out in great hope after a time of careful preparation, and coming to a place where thousands of other believing people are gathered together. No one who has visited Lourdes could fail to be impressed by the extraordinary scene of religious devotion with all that that implies of healing suggestion. The beauty of the surrounding mountains, many of them making a silent appeal through the Calvary on the summit; the fervour of the immense crowds which throng the grotto and its precincts; the procession of the Host and the blessing with It of the sick people gathered round the square; the singing of hymns and the addresses which are constantly being given in various centres; all combine to produce a state of extreme suggestibility and hopefulness in the minds of the sick folk, who are given the first place in everything. Pilgrimage churches of this kind exist all over Europe, and similar scenes to those described at Lourdes are witnessed in many other places.

It will be seen that great emphasis is laid upon the healing of the physical disability, and less upon the patient's actual spiritual condition. But in the organisations which exist in England, Canada, and the

United States of America, more emphasis is laid upon the mental and spiritual attitude of the patients. The chief agencies of this kind in England are the Guild of Health, which is an interdenominational society of members of the Christian Church, and the Guild of St. Raphael, which lays emphasis on Holy Unction and the laying on of hands for healing. Its members seek to promote the well-being of the sick on sacramental lines by Holy Communion and repentance and faith. They prepare for the rite of Holy Unction by a preliminary service, in which emphasis is laid on the power of God to heal. The Guild of Health seeks for the inspiration of the Holy Spirit in all efforts to heal the sick. It desires to exercise healing by spiritual means, in complete loyalty to scientific principle and method, and to cultivate both individual and corporate health. Its members seek to prevent sickness by promoting right ways of thought, and they deal with it by helping patients to a reasonable attitude to it and by correcting the wrong outlook which may have led up to it. Both Guilds are doing very useful work in making more widely known the implications of the teaching of Christ in connection with health of soul and body.

A word of mention must be made of mass meetings for healing, which have taken place in various parts of the world. The Church of England, especially overseas, has witnessed Healing Missions, conducted usually in association with the clergy of the district. Conflicting reports are circulated as to the results of these missions, but those who believe in their value state that many sick people are cured and that the spiritual life of many more is quickened. It is obvious that much more powerful suggestion will be obtained with a crowd than by individual treatment, and accounts which have reached England bear witness to this. In Australia the Mission made a great impression, and was the object of a pastoral letter from the Bishops, who

spoke of the great blessings, both physical and spiritual, which resulted.

This survey will show the variety of methods employed in spiritual healing—in one case the power of a personality; in another, prayer, individual and collective; in another, faith in relics and wells—and also the emphasis on the miraculous healing of bodily disease, on the one hand, and on the necessity for spiritual regeneration on the other.

2

At the outset of our enquiry a problem presents itself for our consideration. Can all diseases, bodily and mental, be cured by spiritual means? In principle, if we believe at all in the power of God, we must believe that God *can* cure by direct means of all kinds. Most spiritual healers, therefore, refuse to place any limitations to the exercise of spiritual healing; in answer to prayer, God can cure an abscess in a tooth as easily as an ill temper. That God *can* do so may be admitted; that God *does* do so is another question. If God has designed other means for the cure of organic diseases, it is presumptuous in the spiritual healer to devise other methods.

We shall perhaps best examine the question from the points of view of:

1. The relation of body and mind.
2. The evidence of psychotherapy.
3. The evidence of the facts of spiritual healing.

Without entering into a discussion of the relation of body and mind, we may accept the evidence of observation and common sense, that the mind can affect the body, and the body the mind, but that each can function without a *corresponding* change in the other. This would encourage us to believe that all diseases, even those of the body, can be influenced and cured

by spiritual means. Experimental evidence is forthcoming to confirm this. There are several cases on record in which the body temperature has been raised and lowered by pure suggestion, and stigmata such as blisters have been produced by such mental influences alone. This implies a very marked change in the circulation, and if such physical conditions can be produced directly by means of suggestion, there is no reason why diseased conditions which depend largely on the circulation should not be very markedly influenced and even cured by mental influences also. Such a possible conclusion is one from which there is, we believe, no escape.

Nevertheless, medical men do not believe in treating all diseases by mental means, and restrict the use of this method to what are known as the psychogenic diseases—that is to say, those diseases which are deemed to be caused by mental and emotional disorders.

Medical men are in the habit of distinguishing between psychogenic or functional diseases, and organic.

(i.) The one class of disease is generally termed “organic,” such diseases being presumed to originate in disorders of the physical organism. Besides giving rise to ordinary physical symptoms, these diseases may produce disorders of a mental kind. The proof of this is found in experimental tests which prove (1) that a man’s conduct can entirely change when he is under the influence of some poison like that of alcohol or gout, (2) that when treated by organic means, not only is the body cured, but the mind is restored to sanity.

Of such cases some of the most remarkable are those due to disturbance of the glands of internal secretion, like the thyroid and sex glands. The deficiency or excess of these secretions in the body has a remarkable effect on character. Certain cases of pathological lying and stealing seem to be due to deficiency in these glands.

(ii.) Other diseases, bodily and mental, to which

we are subject appear to originate in the mind, and are therefore termed "psychogenic." Of such are the so-called functional nervous disorders—hysteria, anxiety neuroses, obsessions. The evidence for the belief that they are psychogenic and emotionally caused is based on the fact that—

(a) No organic lesion, such as disease of the brain, poisoning, or other physical cause, can be found to account for their existence.

(b) They are sometimes produced by an emotional shock, in the absence of any obvious physical cause—*e.g.*, a cabin-boy was smitten with hysterical blindness in a terrific storm in the Channel.

(c) They disappear, sometimes as the result of an emotional shock—*e.g.*, a man regains his speech at an exciting episode at the cinema—sometimes as the result of specific psychological treatment, such as suggestion and analysis.

(d) These diseases can be reproduced by suggestion. This was first demonstrated by Charcot; and we have personally produced paralysis, blindness, sickness, and other physical conditions, besides such abnormalities as hallucinations, anæsthesia, and headaches, by suggestion alone. By experiments in hypnotic suggestion we may reproduce any of the pathological conditions caused by morbid emotional conditions. In these hypnotic states the mind is made to control not merely the voluntary muscles of arms and legs, but the involuntary muscles and even the sensations. Thus the movements of the intestines and the circulation, neither of which is normally under the control of the will, may be regulated by suggestion, and severe pains and headaches, even with nausea and vomiting, may be induced.

An interesting feature, however, of these conditions is that whilst they appear to be mentally originated, they seem to be beyond the control of the will, so that people with nervous disorders of this kind are quite

incapable of controlling their symptoms by force of will. They are presumed, therefore, to belong to a part of the mind in some way independent of the will, and variously described as "dissociated" or "repressed." A further characteristic of the region of the mind from which these functional nervous disorders spring is that it is unknown to normal consciousness, for there is none who suffers from these disorders who is aware of the motives of his illness, which remain unconscious. Indeed, the origin can only be discovered by the use of special psychological methods, such as hypnotism and psycho-analysis, by which means the so-called "unconscious" material is brought under the control of the will.

It is true that we cannot make an absolute distinction between organic and functional diseases, because of the extraordinary interaction between mind and body. But in practice medical men distinguish between them and treat them by entirely different methods.

It is not that we deny the influence of the mind over organic conditions; we are prepared to admit the enormous power that the emotions have on the vegetative life of the organism. Hope and faith will not, we believe, cure an abscess in the chest; nevertheless, the medical man does not fail to encourage and strengthen the patient, nor does he despise this aid to recovery. In this part of the treatment he has, in times past, been ably backed by the clergyman or minister who, in his visitations of the sick, breathes hope and encouragement to the patient. This has always been recognised as a most valuable function of the clergyman. We have illustrated more fully elsewhere¹ the influence which the mind may have on conditions like tuberculosis and cancer. What the medical man holds is not that mental conditions cannot actively affect physiological functions, but that in our

¹ *Psychology and Morals* (Methuen).

present state of knowledge treatment by organic means, such as medicine, operation, or open-air treatment, is the most efficient form of cure of organic diseases, and to treat such a patient primarily by suggestion, unction, or prayer, is to deny him the best chance of a cure. Against the doctor are quoted cases in which diseases have been diagnosed by doctors as organic, but have been cured by spiritual healing or by suggestion. This we believe to be a perfectly true statement of the case. Every psychotherapist has seen and cured such cases previously diagnosed as organic, which have passed through the hands of many physicians. But it would be rash to conclude that these are cured of organic disease, for there are several possible fallacies. One is as regards diagnosis. The fact that a case has been diagnosed as "organic" is not conclusive. An eminent medical authority has recently stated that a medical man does well if he makes 75 per cent. correct diagnoses. Keeping in view the natural prejudice of medical men in favour of the physical origin of symptoms, it is not surprising that many conditions of a functional or mental origin are diagnosed as organic. When such a diagnosis is one of a serious and perhaps hopeless character, the patient may seek cure from a psychotherapist or a spiritual healer, who may therefore cure him of his supposed organic disease. Every psychotherapist, like many spiritual healers, has treated and cured cases of this kind, but he regards them, not as cases of organic disease cured by mental means, but as cases of wrong diagnosis. In the second place, it is quite possible to treat a genuinely organic disease and dismiss the symptoms without curing the disease. The disease of locomotor ataxia, for instance, is an incurable disease of the nervous system in the region of the spinal cord. One of the most distressing symptoms of this disease is an acute crisis of pain called the "gastric pains." Such pains can often be successfully cured by sugges-

tion or by prayer, and the healer who so "cures" this symptom may be under the delusion that he has cured the disease, whereas he has merely dispelled the symptoms and masked the disease, leaving behind the radical disease to work the ultimate death of the patient.

In some cases such treatment is quite justified, for if the disease is incurable, to dismiss the pain and give relief to the patient is to render him the greatest service. This is a proper use of suggestion and spiritual healing in the sphere of organic disease.

But the case is different with the majority of organic diseases, which are not incurable, and for which the most adequate and proper treatment should be that of surgical and medical means. To treat such a patient by spiritual healing alone is to deprive him of the best chance of recovery.

We are thus led to the consideration of the third question, What evidence is there for healing by spiritual means? Most spiritual healers claim that they can cure diseases of all kinds, including organic diseases, by spiritual means, maintaining that there are no limits to the power of prayer. An investigation, however, was made by a special committee appointed by the Archbishop of Canterbury, which came to the conclusion that there is no evidence that spiritual healing can produce cures of a kind which cannot be paralleled by similar cures wrought by scientific psychotherapy without religion. Besides this there are instances of *spontaneous* healing, which often occur even in the gravest cases, such as cancer, which "cure themselves," and the cure of which is quite naturally but wrongly attributed to the actual treatment prescribed, whether prayer, suggestion, or vegetarianism. This, we know, is denied by members of certain cults like the Christian Scientists and by certain Christians such as the authorities at Lourdes. The former seem to affirm that all disease may be cured by

mind, simply by denying the distinction between organic and functional disease, or, indeed, denying the existence of disease at all. Such a belief will undoubtedly get rid of many functional diseases, such as hysteria, and moral diseases of temper and character; it may, and we believe often does, produce a calm tranquillity of mind and a strong character. But its supposed cure of organic disease is one open to the objection of false diagnosis mentioned above. The authorities at Lourdes honestly make an investigation of their cases, though it is superficial from the scientific point of view, and admit as "miracles" only those which cannot be classed as hysterical or psychogenic. Such cases of "real miracles" are, however, so few and far between that one is tempted to believe that they are cases of mistaken diagnosis, even though the mistake is an honest one. We must remember that even conditions like skin disease may be the outcome of a neurotic condition of mind which on account of worrying produces lack of nutrition with consequent devitalisation of the skin, which is left to the mercy of micro-organisms ever ready to attack any part of the body which is so devitalised.

Yet this is a question on which dogmatism is not called for. If, by confidence or hope, a diseased state of body can be more rapidly cured, is there any reason why the rapidity should not increase to the extent of being virtually instantaneous, and therefore "miraculous"? There was a time when people said that "miracles do not happen," the implication being that the narratives of miracles in the Gospels are untrue. Nowadays practically all the healing "miracles" of the New Testament have been reproduced in shell-shock hospitals over and over again. So it may be that those who maintain that the mind may have instantaneous effect on morbid bodily conditions may prove to be right. But so far they have not proved themselves to be right; and we must, for the time

being, accept the verdict of those who maintain that no disease can be cured by spiritual healing which cannot be cured by psychotherapy. We may grant that the enquiries of this committee were not sufficiently exhaustive to warrant us in accepting this as a final verdict. But considering the comparatively few organic conditions claimed to be so cured, and considering the probability of false diagnosis, the possibility of spontaneous cure, and the fact that many of these took considerable time to cure, and so might be regarded as cases which would have been cured anyway, we are justified in requiring very much more positive proof before being convinced of their claims, and accepting this as a distinctive feature of spiritual healing.

We may assume, then, that cures of functional disease occur by spiritual healing as they do by psychotherapy, but there is no sufficient evidence that organic disease is or can be so cured. The problem as far as it has reference to the New Testament miracles has been very accurately studied by E. R. Micklem in his book *Miracles and the New Psychology*.¹ An accurate diagnosis, as he points out, is not possible, since we are presented only with the main symptoms of the diseases, and we now know that hysterical diseases can simulate practically every organic disease. "On the other hand, the particulars of the miracles of healing upon which most reliance can be placed are not themselves incompatible with the view that such healing was accomplished through the agency of ascertainable psychological laws." Micklem points out, however, that our Lord's method seems to have been not merely "to suggest away symptoms, but He restored the whole personality of the sufferer, placing him in a new and right relation to life as a whole." The "faith which Jesus undoubtedly taught to be

¹ *Miracles and the New Psychology*, by E. R. Micklem, M.A., B.Litt. (Oxon) Oxford University Press).

imperative if a cure was to be wrought was ultimately a confidence in God, and involved a living relationship with God."

3

We must now come to the question of the methods employed in spiritual healing, and for this purpose we shall again find a reference to scientific psychotherapy of great assistance.

In psychotherapy, three general methods are used: Persuasion, Suggestion, and Analysis. Persuasion seeks to change the mental state by reason and argument, and is often immediately successful. Most neurotic symptoms are unreasonable, and if we make our reasoning strong enough, it will be sufficient to dispel the symptom, at least temporarily. A large number of cures are effected in this way, both by physicians and by others. They are rarely lasting, for the simple reason that they deal with the symptom, but they do not deal with the underlying cause.

Suggestion is also, as a rule, directed towards the symptom, but it proceeds not by reasoning, but by influencing the subconscious mind, from which the symptom springs. It attempts to supplant the morbid symptoms by healthy thoughts and confident emotions. Thus a person who fears may be made confident; a person with a paralysed leg made to walk; and the blind man to see.

Analytic treatment, instead of dealing permanently with the symptom, deals with the latent cause, which, in the latest teaching, is supposed to be in unconscious conflicts: instead of suggesting healthy and energising thoughts it seeks to liberate the emotional energies, the repression of which causes the disease, and to redirect them to healthy aims.

In spiritual healing we observe all these factors at work. The *analytic* technique finds its religious counterpart in confession, and those healing cults

which insist on confession and penitence as a preliminary to the healing are acting in conformity with modern scientific methods and ideas. *But confession does not go nearly far enough.* It necessarily deals only with the material of which the patient is conscious. This may be sufficient in dealing with conscious sins, but not in treating the neuroses, the sources of such morbid disorders being hidden from consciousness. For instance, in a condition of morbid remorse, the confession of sin may produce no healthy result, since it may be due to a forgotten sin of long ago, unrepented at the time, the suppressed emotion of which has become transferred to some more recent fault, which is therefore charged with far more blame than it deserves. The unaccepted guilt of a bad habit of childhood may thus transfer itself to a trifling fault of the present day and swell its shame. It is obvious that to confess this recent sin will be beside the point. Or, again, such remorse may be due to a masochistic tendency which takes the form of a morbid love of self-depreciation and mental self-laceration; or it may be due to a fantasy of moral superiority. The sense of sin is for many people a form of self-gratification, which can be cured only by the exposure of this self-indulgence.

But a mere glance at the various forms of spiritual healing will convince us that the methods more commonly conform to the psychological method of suggestion—*i.e.*, the implicit acceptance of an idea depending upon the dominance of the mind by an emotional state. Under such conditions we are swayed by our emotions, and reason plays a secondary rôle. If, therefore, any idea is suggested to the mind forcibly enough and with sufficient persistence, the mind waives its normal function of criticising the truth of the statements and accepts them implicitly and without question.

Now, when we look at the methods of spiritual healing we find all the conditions for inducing a sugges-

tible condition of mind. In mass movements of healing, like the pilgrimage to Lourdes and the "missions" of healing, the number of people and the atmosphere of expectancy reproduce exactly the emotional conditions necessary to suggestibility, for in such soil both faith and credulity flourish, and cures are consequently performed.

Again, treatment by suggestion relies very largely upon the credentials of the suggesting party; and a Church, as an organisation claiming to command the life and soul of men not only in this life, but in the next, has just that authority which carries suggestive power. Such suggestions given in the name and under the authority of God have just that power to create reverence and awe which is characteristic of such forms of suggestibility. Having secured the condition of suggestibility, it matters little what method is employed, whether unction or the laying on of hands, just as any *method* of producing hypnosis is immaterial, whether it is by use of words, of fixed gazing, or of passes, so long as the patient expects it to be successful.

The laying on of hands by a person of authority, and specially ordained for that purpose, is a ceremonial calculated to induce a condition of suggestibility.¹ When the sick person is in a suggestible attitude, any idea from the priest or minister carries with it the force of a suggestion, the mind becoming completely dominated by the idea, which tends to work itself out in action.

Similarly with the use of unction. Viewed from the psychological point of view this sacrament, impressive as it is to the patient, is a means of inducing a suggestible frame of mind, and as such may be used as legiti-

¹ M. Coué is always insisting that the patient cures himself because he gives the suggestions to himself. He omits to emphasise that the most important condition of such suggestions being successful—namely, suggestibility—is provided from without; the enthusiastic meetings, the hearing letters read from other patients who have been cured, the personal charm of M. Coué himself—all these influences produce the suggestibility of mind which is the most essential feature and without which suggestions would be futile.

mately as the various means employed by the doctor preliminary to his giving suggestions—*e.g.*, the relaxed position of the body, the fixed gazing, the use of a metronome. These contrivances are not really necessary, but they assist in the production of the suggestible state of mind and so facilitate the healing. They do not possess any virtue in themselves, their virtue lies in what they suggest.

Other means of cure, such as holy wells and the use of relics, obviously follow the same principle. Considered in this light, these methods of spiritual healing are merely aids to a suggestible condition of mind, the prelude to successful cure. They depend chiefly on their reputation to heal, and the bones of a criminal are as effective as the bones of a saint, provided they are believed to be the relics of a saint.

The use of prayer in spiritual healing is hardly in the same category as the other methods, for whereas the use of unction and the laying on of hands are incidental to the cure, prayer is considered to be essential. The subject of the psychology of prayer is dealt with elsewhere and goes beyond the scope of this paper. For us it is only pertinent to say that there is no sufficient evidence that prayer does actually produce cures which cannot be effected by psychotherapy. It is not a question as to whether God can cure directly by means of prayer; the question is whether God does in fact so cure, or whether he does not employ other means which we call scientific.

There is thus a distinct place for suggestion in the treatment of functional nervous disorders, whether this suggestion be of the scientific or the religious kind. It is immensely valuable as an expedient in acute cases, for the alleviation of pain, or when analysis is impossible. But it has certain defects that should be considered.

Take the illustration of a girl who has a functionally paralysed hand following a car accident. It is possible

we could have cured her hand by the methods of "persuasion," so successfully used during the War; or we might have cured it by suggestion. A priest might have cured it instantaneously by prayer or unction. In doing so, we should have cured the physical symptom, but failed to cure the moral disease, which was at its root. In her case the repressed complex, which perpetuated the paralysis of the hand, was a craving to be the centre of interest, the desire towards self-display, and more deeply still, a morbid exhibitionism. A man with a "nervous headache" may really be suffering from a latent craving to escape responsibility, although he may be quite unaware of this cause of his headache, and in fact may make a determined effort to meet his responsibilities. In such cases investigation brings to light these moral failings which lie at the root of the physical disorder.

No treatment can be considered adequate which does not deal with the moral cause at the root of the disease. We should have been wanting in our duty as physicians if we had cured the symptoms by suggestion or otherwise, without curing the cause—namely, the self-display or the shrinking from responsibility. For any doctor to concentrate upon the healing of the physical symptom and leave the moral cause untouched is unscientific; yet he may excuse himself on the ground that he is concerned merely to cure the physical ailment. It is unscientific in the doctor, it is inexcusable in the priest or spiritual healer, whose functions are particularly concerned with the moral regeneration of the patient. Indeed, in thus "miraculously" curing the paralysed girl we may actually encourage her morbid desire to be interesting, by making her a "wonder."¹

The main criticism we should raise against treatment such as the laying on of hands and unction is *that they treat diseases essentially moral by non-moral and quasi-*

¹ It may have been for such a reason that Christ insisted that some of His patients should "tell no man."

magical agencies. Even when the treatment is accompanied by moral re-education, the specific moral cause is not necessarily touched. It may be accompanied by prayer, but such prayer is not necessarily moral, for it may encourage superstition, or it may encourage a selfish attitude towards life which is opposed to the development of Christian character.

It is not denied that it is possible to cure these diseases by suggestion, unction, or prayer or holy water. Failing other cure, it is, of course, better to cure the symptom than to cure nothing. But there are distinct moral as well as physical dangers in treating ordinary functional nervous disorders by spiritual healing, and this should never be undertaken unless the main endeavour of the treatment is directed towards the moral disorders which lie at the back of the bodily disease.

We must therefore conclude that, viewed psychologically, the methods employed by spiritual healers are essentially the same as those used by psychotherapists—mainly analysis and suggestion. There is no reason to discredit the fact that they perform similar cures, and it is probable that they are subject to the same limitations with regard to the cure of organic disease.

4

Are we, then, to conclude that, after all, "spiritual healing" has no significance as distinct from scientific psychotherapy? Are the healing forces at work in spiritual healing essentially no different from those operating in scientific psychotherapy?

We must remember that the nature of the healing force is in any case a mystery. There is this that links up every form of healing, bodily, mental, and spiritual—namely, that it is never the healer who heals. When the surgeon operates, it is not he that heals; he merely removes morbid conditions which have

hindered the flow of life. The great French surgeon wrote on the walls of his hospital: "I dressed the wound, God healed it." Even the stitching up of the abdomen would be useless, were it not for that mysterious *vis naturæ medicatrix* which actively unites the opposed surfaces. So in psychotherapy, we do not *give* strength even in suggestion—we rather liberate energies in the soul of man, energies the nature of which we understand but little. So in spiritual healing all our endeavours are simply to put the patient in a condition of mind receptive to the working of certain forces we call spiritual, but of the nature of which we are ignorant. All forms of cure are, therefore, alike in this, that they merely liberate certain curative forces, call them the *vis naturæ medicatrix*, instinctive emotional forces, or spiritual forces, which are alone the agents of healing. No physician, surgeon, psychotherapist, or spiritual healer ever healed anyone; they only put the patient in the way of healing.

It is obvious, therefore, that we cannot tell if spiritual healing is different from psychotherapy, until we know something more than we do at present of the nature of the healing forces of nature, and whether there be spiritual forces of a different kind from the natural forces already at the disposal of scientific healing. Nevertheless, spiritual healing, even if we exclude consideration of the direct divine intervention claimed by most spiritual healers, has certain advantages over scientific psychotherapy.

1. Spiritual ideals have a greater power of arousing our emotional states and so liberating the repressed emotions. By placing before the patient an ideal different from that of a mere desire to get well, it awakens him to a new love, which lifts him out of self-centredness into healthy activity.

Further, if this ideal is a Personal one, as in Christianity, it may have the power so to arouse our latent forces that the repressing and inhibiting complexes

are swept away by the omnipotence of love. So in religious conversion we frequently find that not only is the character changed, but old neurotic and hysterical diseases disappear. Could we command such a revolution of love in the soul, it would be at once the most direct and the most effective treatment for those diseases now laboriously treated by psychotherapy. But "we cannot kindle when we would the fire that in the soul resides."

2. The spiritual ideal has a greater power of harmonisation. In psychotherapy it is not sufficient to liberate the repressed emotions; these must find some outlet in which they may be directed in harmonious expression. This is commonly left for the patient to do for himself. Mistakes are sometimes made by the analyst trying to lead the patient to conform to a type of character, whether libertine or moral, to which the physician himself adheres. It is nevertheless necessary, if the patient is to find harmony and happiness, that he should have some principle in life, some aim or purpose to which his liberated instinctive impulses may be redirected. The psychotherapist as such is not primarily concerned with what are the ultimate ideals, but only with the cure of the patient's morbid condition. The function of the minister goes a step further; he seeks for that ultimate ideal by which man may attain happiness. If he believes he has found it, there is no reason why he should not offer it to his patient for the cure of his soul and for happiness.

3. In every form of healing the personal element counts, even in the treatment of physical disorders like pleurisy and indigestion. It counts very much more in psychotherapy, in which the relation of physician to patient means so much. In suggestion there is the rapport between patient and physician; in analysis the confidence of the patient in the analyst, which sometimes develops into a phenomenon called "transference," in which the personal relation between

the two becomes morbid and of dominating importance. Where the relation consists of confidence in the skill of the physician, it is normal and valuable for cure. But in so far as the treatment depends on a personal relation, it may lead to distortion of character; for in so far as the physician is not perfectly adjusted to life or psychologically healthy, the patient's mind will so far be distorted and maladjusted.

When, on the other hand, the individual is brought into relation with a personality of the moral purity and spiritual power of our Lord, the adjustment of his life is healthy. In true spiritual healing we are brought into personal relation with a God who is as perfect as we can conceive Him, and not with an imperfect man. In the Christian religion we discover our ideal in the life and character of our Lord, to whom our adjustment is made, and the personal relation between Him and the sufferer, pre-eminently a relation of love, can sweep away the repressing barriers of egotism and liberate the forces lying latent in the soul of the patient, restoring him to life and health. Every neurosis and functional nerve disorder is based on selfishness and a return to infantile egotism; for the characteristic of the child is to be loved, and of the adult to love. Anything that can awaken the soul to real love will liberate it from its self-centredness and therefore incidentally from its neurotic symptoms. Every mission which seeks to achieve this conversion from selfishness to love will inevitably be a healing mission. The "religious" man who remains a neurotic has not experienced that true miracle of religion.

We conclude, then, by saying that in spiritual healing we are not so much dealing with a force different in kind from that which operates in other healing, but that it is spiritual in the sense that it brings the diseased soul into conscious personal touch with the spiritual, and that these religious influences have a

power to awaken love and to bring peace and happiness unpossessed by scientific treatment alone. The strength of the Church's position in treating moral diseases by modern methods is that she is in a position to present to the patient a personal ideal by which alone the individual can be completely synthesised.

But perhaps the most promising field for the exercise of spiritual healing is that of moral disorders. Probably two-thirds of those who at present go to psychotherapists for treatment suffer from disorders which are not merely mental and moral in origin, but moral in symptom—sex perversions, morbid aggressiveness, jealousy, obsessing evil thoughts, impure habits. The term "spiritual healing" may most aptly be referred to the treatment of these disorders, for they may not be sins in the ordinary sense of being voluntary, but are diseases in the sense that they are beyond the power of the patient to control or cure, and require the special ministrations of those who can be real physicians of the soul. These may be treated and cured by suggestion, but in this case they are liable to emerge in some other form. We may "cure" fear and produce intolerance; we may cure self-abuse and produce egotism, which is its psychical counterpart; we may "cure" vanity and produce self-righteousness. The only satisfactory means of cure of such moral conditions is to discover, liberate, and redirect the repressed emotions which emerge in these perversions, but which, rightly directed, may be utilised under the full control of the will. It is a task to which those who are interested in the lives and conduct of men should seriously address themselves. It is, however, essential that those who would seek effectively to practise such spiritual healing shall study the causes of these diseases of the soul in order that they may adequately deal with them.

We hold that all who have to deal with the soul—teachers, doctors, and clergy—should take the greatest

advantage of all modern knowledge in psychology. An understanding of such conceptions as "unconscious motive," "over-compensation," "repression," etc., is invaluable to a proper understanding of character. There can be no objection raised by the medical profession to *thoroughly trained* psychotherapists within the Church treating, by the most up-to-date and scientific methods, moral diseases that are not only moral in symptom, but moral in origin, in the sense that most complexes are due to the repression of emotional conditions by the conventions of morality. But the public has the right to demand that both moral and nervous diseases should be the specific care of experts, and not left to untrained people, inexperienced in disorders of character. The methods they adopt should be in line with the most advanced scientific knowledge of the time, whether they be clergy or doctors. Anything short of the most skilled and expert knowledge should neither be sanctioned by the Church nor countenanced by those who have the highest good of humanity at heart.

IX

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SECTARIANISM,
SCHISM, AND REUNION

BY

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IX

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SECTARIANISM, SCHISM, AND REUNION

"SECTARIANISM," as a term of reproach, involves an ideal repudiated. "Schism" implies a previous unity of some kind which is now broken. The Church cannot be divided unless it is already one in some sense and is by its nature divisible. Nor can there be any "reunion" which is not the restoration of unity.¹ Hence it is plain that any treatment of the "Psychology of Sectarianism, Schism, and Reunion" must begin with the psychology of Christian unity. All Christians would agree that the Church is ideally one. What is the psychological nature of this unity?

I

Psychologists, whether they accept the existence of a specific "herd-instinct" or not, agree that man is instinctively gregarious. He is impelled to find satisfaction in the company of his fellow-men. And this gregariousness is not merely one habit among many, side by side with other habits. It vitally affects the whole constitution and conduct of the individual. It renders him sensitive to suggestions arising from such association, and this suggestibility is a quality derived from gregariousness. The individual desires to be at one with his fellows, and feels uncomfortable unless this is attained. Thus his behaviour, when acting with others, may often be very

¹ Cf. T. A. Lacey, *Unity and Schism*, a book to which this essay owes much.

different from when he is acting alone. But at this point arises a most important distinction. Social psychology recognises two main and sharply contrasted types of association, though there are many intermediate and mixed forms which in varying proportion combine some of the characteristics of both. At the one end of the scale stands the "Herd," at the other the "Group." The unity of the herd is the direct product of gregariousness; it is unorganised and controlled by imitation and suggestion. The group is organised and its life is based upon instinct in large measure directed by reason.

The mere crowd affords an excellent example of the power of herd-instinct. It enjoys a collective life, being united temporarily by some common interest. By participating in its mental life the emotions of the individual are stirred to a pitch that he seldom or never attains under other conditions. He is carried out of himself, he is delivered from the sense of isolation. He experiences a feeling of enlargement and liberation, and appears to himself to be wielding new and unknown powers. This is specially true when the crowd possesses a well-defined common interest, as at a political meeting or a concert or a religious gathering. The results of collective emotion are so striking that it has seemed to many that the crowd is dominated by some spirit more than human. Further, not only are the emotions of simple crowds excessively strong, but they are mainly limited to certain crude, simple, and elementary types. They are such as can be shared even by those members who are incapable of the more subtle and complex emotions. Thus while the crowd is capable of deeds of heroism or can be carried away by admiration at some noble deed or by indignation against an act of tyranny or brutality, it is incapable of discrimination or reflection. Its emotion, even though it be generous, is of a coarse and elementary kind. More often its moral level falls below that of

many of the individuals who compose it. Crowds are notorious for deeds of cruelty and impatience. They are violent, fickle, and inconsistent. Their collective actions are marked by a low degree of intelligence, far lower than that possessed by even the less intelligent members of them. Partly this is due to the suggestibility of the members of the crowd, and partly to the fact that the motives for action must be such as can be appreciated even by the lowest order of minds. The individual has largely lost his own self-consciousness and become depersonalised. His sense of responsibility for any decision is weakened, and his power of self-control is impaired. The crowd, as such, has no self-regarding sentiment, and no reputation to lose. The individual's more refined ideals are overwhelmed. So he accepts some assertion or proposal with acclamation, which his own intelligence and critical power would lead him to reject with amusement or scorn, because it now has behind it the force of herd-instinct. This suggestibility is increased by that access of emotional excitement to which we referred above. Who does not know that correct reasoning and a fair estimate of a situation are impaired by strong emotion? All these factors co-operate to reduce the moral and intellectual life of the crowd to low level. A mere crowd is not capable of resolution or volition in the strict sense of the words, but only of impulse. It is at the mercy of any leader who can play upon its emotions. "Its behaviour is like that of an unruly child or an untutored passionate savage in a strange situation, rather than that of its average member: and in the worst cases it is like that of a wild beast rather than like that of human beings."¹ From this it is clear that membership in a crowd is, on the whole, demoralising. It tends to reduce men to a level that is animal rather than human. It places them at the

¹ McDougall, *The Group Mind*, p. 45. A standard work, on which this section is largely based.

mercy of crude instinct uncontrolled by reason. The satisfaction that it gives is dearly bought, since it hinders progress towards the highest levels of life.

In contrast with the mere crowd stands the fully organised group. The characteristics of the crowd are modified in proportion as it begins to approximate to the nature of a true group. What then are the marks of the group, and what distinguishes group-life from herd-life? In the first place group-life demands some degree of continuity of existence, based upon the awareness of a common and enduring purpose in the minds of those who compose it. The members are conscious of themselves as constituting a group for the carrying out of some common aim. Thus they are able to build up a sentiment of loyalty to the group, and this group-loyalty may be stimulated by interaction with other groups, especially in the form of conflict. Further, the group is organised—that is, the individuals and classes which compose it are differentiated in function. They contribute something of their own to the life of the whole. As we saw, the crowd tends to reduce all its members to one common level. Individual distinctions are obliterated and individual initiative is absorbed; individual thought is dissolved. The crowd is intolerant of any attempt to question or dispute its desires. On the other hand, in the group differences are not reduced and absorbed, but recognised and integrated. The individual does not cease to be himself. Rather he becomes more himself by making his contribution to, and sharing in, the common group-life. He finds himself anew. The group-will is not simply the sum total of the wills of all its members, but it is a truly collective will. It is more than the direction of the wills of all the individuals who compose it to the same end. Rather it is motivated by impulses awakened within the sentiment for the whole to which they belong. Also the general effect on the individual of membership in a group is the

opposite to that of membership in a crowd. While he finds a true satisfaction for his social instincts, he does so in a way that lifts him up to a higher plane of life. "The collective actions of the well-organised group, instead of being, like those of a simple crowd, merely impulsive or instinctive actions implying a low degree of intelligence and of morality far inferior to that of the average individual of the crowd, become truly volitional actions expressive of a high degree of intelligence and morality much higher than that of the average member of the group—*i.e.*, the whole is raised above the level of its average member; and even by reason of the exaltation of emotion and organised co-operation in deliberation above that of its highest members."¹ In a later passage Dr. McDougall develops the thought when he writes, "The group spirit plays an important part in raising the intellectual level of the group. . . . Each member . . . willing the common end, accepts the means chosen by the organised collective deliberation, and in executing the actions prescribed for him makes them his own immediate ends and truly wills them for the sake of the whole, not executing them in the spirit of merely mechanical and unintelligent obedience or even of reluctance."² So in the group, herd-suggestion is transformed so as to raise, not depress, the individual. Not only does this operate by example, by suggestion, and by emotional contagion, but each member feels a real responsibility for the well-being and reputation of his fellow-members. Conversely each acts knowing that the eyes of his fellows are upon him, hoping for the reward of their approbation and fearing their disapproval.

Here we must point out that the group principle permits, and indeed, in the case of large groups, necessitates, the formation of smaller groups within the bigger. So we may get a hierarchy of groups in which

¹ McDougall, *op. cit.*, p. 53.

² P. 63.

each bigger group includes the lesser and the lesser does not lose its peculiar life and characteristics, but integrates them into the life of the larger whole. In general the development of an attachment to one group facilitates rather than hinders the development of a like attachment to other groups, not least when they are related as parts to wholes. The child at home learns loyalty to the family, and this will increase his power of learning loyalty to the larger community such as the school or village, and will prepare the way for loyalty to the largest whole. It is a false policy to suppress all local loyalties or groupings in the supposed interest of the community as a whole. A strong sentiment for the all-inclusive group can, in most cases, only be developed by way of smaller group-sentiments. The true method is not merely collective, but rather organic. It aims not at superseding, but at integrating a diversity of group loyalties. The ideal arch-group is not exclusive but inclusive. The true group can find a place for such differences as the crowd cannot. We must also insist on a point which will be vital later on—namely, that when we turn from the relatively simple structure of a military group to the more complicated structure of a society such as a state, we find that there occurs an increased variation, both in the character of the minor groups and in their relations to one another. The same individual may belong to several different and autonomous groups which express different sides of his life. There may be, for instance, neighbourhood groups and occupational groups and amusement groups, and the like. Yet the unity of the arch-group need not be imperilled. They can all enrich and be integrated into one common life, but the process is less simple and direct than the grading into wholes and parts outlined above.

Lastly, several writers on psychology, approaching the question of the group from various sides, agree in stressing the importance of the group-leader. Dr.

McDougall brings forward the important part played by great leaders in uplifting social tradition. Others, again, argue that groups with leaders can develop differentiations in a way that groups without leaders cannot. To begin with, the members of a group stand in a different relationship to their leader from their relationship to one another. They employ the term "faith" to describe this relation of the individual to the group-leader as opposed to suggestion, which they use to describe the relation of one member to another. And they describe the process of faith as "of a far more witting kind" than the suggestion that proceeds from the leaderless herd. From a very different standpoint Professor Freud, in his criticism of Dr. McDougall, also insists on the supreme importance of the leader in group-life, and distinguishes between groups which have a leader and leaderless groups. He finds the great principle of group-life in a "libidinal" tie. Because the members of a group share the love of a common leader they will "identify" themselves with one another. "A primary group of this kind" (*i.e.*, possessing a leader and not too much organised so as to acquire secondarily the characteristics of an individual, which Freud regards as the aim of group-organisation) "is a number of individuals who have substituted one and the same object for their ideal ego, and have consequently identified themselves with one another in their ego."¹ Thus Freud holds that a love-relationship constitutes the essence of group-life, and explains that this is why the individual is willing to give up his distinctiveness and to allow others to influence him by suggestion. "Many equals, who can identify themselves with one another and a single person superior to them all—that is the situation that we find realised in groups which are capable of subsisting."²

¹ Freud, *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego* (English translation), p. 80.

² P. 89.

We may now begin to apply these conceptions to the psychology of Christian unity. We study the question from the standpoint of the ideal presented in the pages of the New Testament. There the visible Church is plainly an organised group. Its unity is a unity of life and process—that is, a unity of purpose. We may find a foreshadowing of this in the teaching of Christ Himself. In many parables He employs illustrations borrowed from the subordinations and social relations of the ordinary community, as if to teach the social and organic nature of life within the Kingdom. So, too, in St. John, the union of Christ with His disciples is likened to that of the vine and its branches, or to that of the shepherd and his flock. In the Epistles this idea becomes more explicit. If, in places, the Church is compared to a building whose parts stand in a purposive but merely mechanical relation to one another, the inadequacy of the metaphor is corrected by the assertion that Christians are “living stones.”¹ St. Paul often compares it to a living organism. It is the Body of Christ. “As the body is one, and all the members of the body, being many, are one body; so also is Christ. For in one Spirit were we all baptised into one body, whether Jews or Greeks, whether bond or free; and were all made to drink of one Spirit. For the body is not one member, but many.”² But there is also the complementary and perhaps even more fundamental idea which is implicit in the word “ecclesia.” The Christian Church is the “People of God,” the new Israel, or rather the old Israel purged and reformed by the Messiah Jesus. That is, it is compared not only to an organism,³ an analogy that has obvious limitations, but to a society of self-conscious individuals very variously interrelated;

¹ 1 Pet. ii. 5.

² 1 Cor. xii. 12-14.

³ In a social whole as distinct from an organism, the whole is present in every part not only for the outside observer, but for the part itself. Also in an organism each organ has only one function to perform; in a group the individual may perform more than one function.

to a nation, yet a nation freed from all limitations of race or birth or locality, and united by a common loyalty to one king, even Jesus Christ. Christians are a new race. Putting all these metaphors together, we reach a conception very similar to that of the highly organised group. The Church enjoys continuity of existence, and this continuity has from the first been maintained by common sacraments, common worship, common ministry, and common scriptures. There exists, too, in the minds of Christians a definite idea of the Church as such, and round this idea sentiments of love and loyalty are organised. Further, especially at certain times and in certain places, Christians are aware of themselves as distinguished from other groups which express different purposes and ideals. The Church has always been no crowd, but an organised body. It possessed a band of leaders, the Twelve, under the supreme leader Christ. It put forth new organs, such as the Seven, and later the presbyterate and diaconate, to meet definite needs of the corporate life. The functions of its constituent members are differentiated and specialised. Each is held to be endowed with some gift to contribute to the welfare of the whole. By sharing in the mental life of the Church the individual is raised to new levels, not only of emotional but of moral and intellectual life.

Again, the Church, like the nation, embraces in itself a system of groups standing in varying relations not only to one another, but to the whole, ministering to the organic life of the whole, even as their members do to their own life. The most obvious of these groups are the local churches scattered about the heathen world like oases in a desert, or, again, the small house-churches in a large town such as Rome. St. Paul plainly teaches that the whole Ecclesia is ideally present in the local gathering, just as the whole Roman Empire was ideally present in the group of Roman citizens residing in a given city. Twice in the first Epistle

to the Corinthians he tries to express this truth in words that can only be paraphrased, not translated: "Ye are body of Christ" (xii. 27), and "Ye are temple of God" (iii. 16). He does not mean either that the Corinthians by themselves constitute the one body of Christ and the one temple of God, or that they form one body and one temple among many. Rather as Christians they are members of the one Church, but this membership as a matter of practical fact is actualised through the local group. Elsewhere he reminds the Corinthians that though they are the church in Corinth, they are not the whole Church of God (cp. i. 2., xi. 16., xiv. 33, 36). In this same Epistle we see the possibility of another kind of grouping, in this case undesirable, due to the following of popular leaders. Men were saying, "I am of Paul; I of Apollos; I of Cephas," and we get the indignant protest, "Is Christ divided?" (i. 12, 13). Elsewhere we read of the open conflict between parties, on the one hand the Judaisers, on the other, the followers of St. Paul. It is most instructive to consider the conduct of St. Paul in dealing with this controversy at Antioch. It would have been simple and easy to have allowed the formation of two sects, a Jewish sect observing the Law of Moses, and insisting on circumcision for all Gentiles, and a Gentile Christian sect content only with baptism and the moral law, each with its own Eucharist and Agape. But that would have denied the true unity of the Body of Christ. The disputing parties must be integrated into one fellowship, not as parties but as Christians. There must be one common meal to express the truth that every Christian, Jew or Gentile, is baptised into the one Body of Christ and not into any part of it. So the Church did not become either merely an extended Judaism or a merely Gentile community accepting Jewish ethics, but in a real sense a new and all-inclusive Israel. That is the thought that dominates the Epistle to the Ephesians. Christ has made Jew

and Gentile one, and broken down "the middle wall of partition," "that he might create of the twain one new man." In short, whatever groups are recognised in the theology of the New Testament, they are not allowed to interfere with the ideal of the one all-inclusive family of God, including within its life a diversity of gifts and operations and integrating into its fellowship many differences of place, tradition, and temperament.

Here we must face a vital issue. The Church claims to be a more than human society. How does this affect the application to its life of the categories and laws of ordinary social psychology? Christians believe that God has a purpose for the world which He has created, and that in Christ the eternal Word or Son of God became man in order to be the instrument through which this should be realised. It is the Father's will to sum up all things in Christ. And the Church is, in truth, His Body. It stands to Him in His ascended life in that relation in which a man's body stands to a man—namely, as the organism through which He continues to fulfil His purpose in this visible world even as He did through His physical body during His earthly ministry. Christians are members or limbs of this body, and so of Christ Himself. Each member has his contribution to give to the life and activity of the body, and only finds his true life by so doing. He is filled not simply with the spirit of the group, but with the Holy Spirit of God. Thus the will and purpose which animate the Church spring not from any merely collective human will, but are the will and purpose of Christ Himself. As the Church grows and develops, so Christ Himself comes to His completion. The Church "is his body, the fulness of him who all in all is being fulfilled."¹ We must, therefore, in considering such a group, include factors which lie outside the range of ordinary sociology. But

¹ For this translation see Armitage Robinson on Eph. i. 23.

we still maintain that the psychical mechanism through which the Church functions as a visible society in this present world is subject to the laws which govern group-life. Here, as always, the supernatural works through and perfects the natural, but does not supersede or annihilate it. The life of the Church is at once natural and supernatural. Men become its members not simply by birth or by human choice, but by the call of God and by the operation of the Holy Spirit. The special gifts which they contribute to the life of the whole are not mere natural endowments, but are bestowed by the Holy Spirit "dividing to each one severally even as he will." The organs through which the body performs certain vital functions are not as it were self-appointed or evolved by any merely natural processes, but are divinely appointed. Thus the moral and spiritual unity which the Church in one sense already enjoys, and in another has yet to achieve, is not the goal of unaided human effort, but is the gift of God, and flows from co-operation with divine grace. It is impeded and destroyed by that refusal to work with God which Christians call sin. In all this, we repeat, the natural is not destroyed, but consummated by the supernatural.

Of special importance is the position assigned to Christ. This at once fulfils and transcends that assigned to the group-leader by psychologists. He can be the object of faith, reverence, and obedience to an unlimited degree, holding together the group by a unique bond of personal loyalty to Himself. He is also the supreme object of love, and it is in Him that Christians love one another. The marvellous outburst of fellowship that followed Pentecost and lasted on when more startling manifestations of the Spirit's presence had died down, was a fellowship of love inspired by the Spirit whom Christ sent, and in whose coming Christ Himself came. In the New Testament "agape" holds the first place among Christian virtues,

and it is, for practical purposes, a new word selected to express a new experience. It is significant that both McDougall and Freud call the Church an "artificial" group as opposed to a natural group. We should prefer to employ a category which they do not appear to possess, and call it a supernatural group. We go further and claim that potentially the Church is the one and only perfect group, and Christ is the one and only perfect group-leader. Being what He is, He can stand in that relation to all men alike. He has the right to demand an unlimited faith. He loves all men alike with an equal love. He is the truth and meaning of every human life. Freud is mistaken when he argues that the Christian religion, even if it be the religion of love, must be hard and unloving to all who do not belong to it. No doubt the attitude of certain Christian bodies historically gives him every excuse for his mistake. But if the Church is true to itself, it looks upon all men as potential members needed by Christ for the completion of His body, and it strives to win them by exhibiting towards them gentleness and love. Ideally the Church's goal is to attract all mankind into the fellowship of its life. It needs no competition or conflict with other groups to develop the richness of its own life. Rather the unsearchable riches of Christ will produce a manifold internal variety. Only when all the many activities of all the races of mankind are organised under the guidance of the Holy Spirit within the one body of Christ, can God's purpose be fulfilled for this world and mankind find its true satisfaction.

2

In the light of these conceptions we may approach the problem of those breaches of Christian unity which make the actual life and process of the Christian Church so different from the ideal. What is sectarianism? Though the name has popularly acquired an evil

reputation, in itself it denotes a process that is perfectly sound and, indeed, beneficial—namely the formation of a sub-group within the arch-group. A “sect,” let us remember, means a “following.” The Christian Church itself began as a sect. It consisted of those who followed a Master and were distinguished from the rest of the world by so doing. So within the Church from the earliest days great leaders and teachers have arisen. Progress, indeed, is largely due to such. And those who follow them are a sect in the making. Or, as Freud suggests, in groups of a less primitive type the place of a leader may be taken by an idea or an abstraction, or even “a common tendency, a wish in which a number of people can have a share.” Hence in sects the bond of union may be less loyalty to a person than the common upholding of a certain doctrine or a certain principle of worship or organisation or discipline, usually one that has been overlaid or neglected. Yet, even so, the maintenance of this will probably be associated with one or more leaders. To quote Freud again, “This abstraction . . . might be more or less completely embodied in the figure of what we might call a secondary leader, and interesting varieties would arise from the relation between the idea and the leader. The leader or leading idea might also, so to speak, be negative; hatred against a particular person or institution might operate in just the same unifying way, and might call up the same kind of emotional ties as positive attachment.” The arising of such groups within the Church, then, is a sign of vitality. Whether the persistence of a particular sect is healthy or unhealthy depends first on its organic relation to the all-inclusive group and to its fellow groups, and secondly, on its fidelity to the true group principle in its own inner life. A sect is not necessarily schismatic, though it may incline to schism and indeed result in schism. Nor, conversely, is a schism necessarily due to sectarianism. Many schisms have

been caused, in part, at least, by causes that lie outside the life of the Church.

To return, then, to the sect: a leader arises, or a new or forgotten truth or principle emerges, and is welcomed by many minds. But originality is seldom popular at first. In a religious society authority tends to rest in the hands of the older members, as the very term "priest" (= "presbyter" = elder man) constantly reminds us. These, as a rule, dislike unfamiliar ideas. They belong to the class of the stable-minded. Accordingly, in opposition to the coldness or hostility of the bulk of the community the followers of the new leader or idea tend to draw together. Probably they form some organisation to propagate their views, an organisation that may cut across other groupings. There we have the beginning of the sect.

The right interaction between the sect and the arch-group follows from the psychology of the group. Ideally all expressions of Christian life should be integrated. All truth should be welcomed. That is not to say that all leaders lead aright or that all teaching which claims to be Christian is true. It needs to be tested. But even most heresies have derived their attraction from the rediscovery of some forgotten truth. The other groups within the Church should charitably assume, till the opposite is proved, that any new movement represents some value hitherto unappreciated or ignored which is needed for the enrichment of the whole, and conversely the new sect should have the modesty to confess that it does not possess the complete and entire truth, and that even doctrines and customs against which it protests probably contain some counter-truth or complementary devotional value which is also needed. At this point we may protest against the tendency, plain in Dr. McDougall and rampant in Professor Freud, to regard the military group as the typical form of group-organisation and the unity of the army as comparable to the unity of the

Church. This is a relic of war-time mentality, pardonable then, but always mischievous. The principles of Christian fellowship and authority are fundamentally divergent from those which necessarily prevail in the army. Thus Freud writes, "A church and an army are artificial groups—that is, a certain external force is employed to prevent them from disintegrating and to check alterations in their structure. As a rule, a person is not consulted, or is given no choice as to whether he wants to enter such a group; any attempt at leaving it is usually met with persecution or with severe punishment, or has quite definite conditions attached to it."¹ His words apply to certain places and times when the Christian Church has forgotten its own principles and turned aside to methods of force and repression, but they entirely misrepresent the principles of Christ and the New Testament.²

We shall get more light on the problem by examining the teaching of such a book as Miss M. P. Follett's *The New State*. She finds in the Committee the most familiar example of the true group process. Here the group idea is produced not by any mechanical aggregation, but by the intermingling of the different ideas of the members. It is not that one member's idea supplements another's, but that a truly corporate idea is evolved. "The course of action decided upon is what we all together want, and I see now it is better than what I wanted alone. It is what I now want."³ This ideal unity of purpose is contrasted with lower forms of unity. "As the psychic coherence of the group can be obtained only by the full contribution of every member, so we see that a readiness to compromise must be no part of the individual's attitude. . . . Compromise is still on the same plane

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 42.

² Later we read that the tie that unites an army is that "the Commander-in-Chief is a Father who loves all his soldiers equally, and for that reason they are comrades among themselves." This is indeed theory divorced from facts!

³ P. 25.

as fighting.”¹ Nor does the right kind of harmony come from the domination of one man or of a majority. Rather it is the evolving of a collective thought and will in which all the differences are brought out and integrated; and every member in identifying himself with it is aware of enjoying a larger and higher life than he had before. “The essential feature of a common thought is not that it is held in common, but that it has been produced in common.”² “The like-mindedness which is now to be demanded of us is the like-mindedness which is brought about by the enlargement of each, by the inflowing of every other one. Then I go forth a new creature”;³ accordingly, differences must not be ignored or minimised or repressed, but brought out into the open and faced and harmonised, so as to result in a richer life. That is where an analogy with animals is misleading. It is true that animals find greater satisfaction for their gregarious instinct the closer the similarity of those with which they associate; but that is just because they are animals. So far as man acts rationally he transcends this. The higher the degree of social organisation, the greater the variety that it can embrace. Clearly this kind of unity which aims at compounding and co-ordinating differences so as to attain the fullest possible content of life is not the unity of military organisation. Miss Follett would make the lowest unit of political life the neighbourhood group, and from this work upward to a truly unified and all-inclusive state: “Every group once become conscious of itself instinctively seeks other groups with which to unite to form a larger whole. . . . As individual progress depends upon the degree of interpenetration, so group progress depends upon the interpenetration of group and group.”⁴ At the same time, she fully recognises the place and claims of other kinds of groups—*e.g.*, occupational. To this we shall return later.

¹ P. 26.² P. 34.³ P. 37.⁴ P. 249.

Her picture of the ideal leader is equally non-military: "The skilful leader . . . does not rely on personal force; he controls his group not by dominating it, but by expressing it. He stimulates what is best in us, he unifies and concentrates what we only feel gropingly and scatteringly, but he never gets away from the current of which we and he are both an integral part. . . . The person who influences me most is not he who does great deeds, but he who makes me feel that I can do great deeds. . . . The community leader is he who can liberate the greatest amount of energy in his community."¹

These principles apply almost as they stand to the Christian Church. The neighbourhood group corresponds in many points to the local church. The ideal of the leader in following whom the individual finds a new possibility of his own self-realisation, finds a complete fulfilment in Christ and a partial fulfilment in every true Christian leader. So, too, the true method of Church progress is not the imposition of an external law on ever greater numbers so as to produce uniformity and stifle initiative, but rather the consecration to a single divine purpose of the free activities of infinitely varied men and women. It is when we consider groupings other than local that we reach the real difficulties. Some sociologists distinguish between thought-associations and will-associations. The Church clearly cannot be limited to either. It is rather a life association.² Within it there is need both of thought and will-associations. A sect may be of either type. And an individual may for certain of his Christian activities belong to a thought-sect and for others to a will-sect. He may even belong to several of both types. So we get cross-grouping of a complicated kind. How can these overlapping groups be integrated? The same problem is to be

¹ P. 230.

² Elsewhere, in *Theology* of January, 1925, I have described it as a "supernatural life organisation."

found in the State. Once again Miss Follett is most suggestive.

In the State the line of solution seems to lie in the consideration of the individual citizen. He is a member of the State not mediately, but immediately. That is, he belongs to the State as a citizen, not as a member of this or that smaller group. He shares a manifold group-life, but yet he is an individual. He is one, and all of him belongs to the State. "The State cannot be composed of groups, because no group nor any number of groups can contain the whole of me, and the ideal State demands the whole of me. No one group can seize the whole of me; no one group can seize any part of me in a mechanical way, so that having taken one-tenth, there are nine-tenths left. My nature is not divisible into so many parts as a house into so many rooms. My group uses me, and then the whole of me is still left to give to the whole. This is the constant social process."¹ "The groups are the indispensable means for the discovery of self by each man. . . . One group creates me, another group creates me, and so on and on. The different groups bring into appearance the multiple sides of me. . . . But my relation to the State is always as an individual. . . . The unit of society is the individual coming into being and functioning through groups of a more and more federated nature. Thus the unit of society is neither the group nor the particularistic-individual, but the group-individual."²

Again, we can apply these principles with little change to the Church, if we substitute the word "Church" for "State." As we saw, the individual is baptised into the Christian Church, not into any minor group, local or sectarian. Yet it is through membership in smaller groups, few or many, that his various religious capacities are developed. Ideally there should be no contradiction between these several developments. Alike

¹ P. 291.

² P. 292.

in the life of the individual and of the Church they should be integrated. When the group-life of the sect is healthy, it makes its members better and not worse members of the Catholic Church. They come to share the life of the whole, able to contribute more because the sect has drawn out one side of their nature. As members of the sect they are able to give what otherwise they would not have been able to give. No doubt in actual life this ideal is not always realised. But many examples can be given of healthy sect life. The Religious Orders in the Roman Church are in a true sense sects. They possess a highly developed life of their own, but always in loyalty to the whole. Their members are enabled to render an ampler service to the whole body by their association in their several orders. And there is no danger of schism. So, too, in the English Church we have societies, guilds, and movements of many kinds to foster and develop the various sides of religion, and these aim at making their members better churchmen. Assuming that all such groupings are the organs of one single pervading life—the life of Christ—there cannot be ultimately any irreconcilable opposition between them.

Still, sectarianism in the bad sense is only too easy and common. The responsibility for failure to integrate a sect may lie either with the sect itself or with the Church at large, or more often with both. The authorities of the Church often attempt to take a short cut to unity, to impose harmony by false methods. A church whose unity is imposed upon its members by external or mechanical methods is in danger of falling from the group level and sinking to the mental level of the mere crowd. Its unity is no longer the expression of its collective mind. Certain elements in that mind are denied their full expression. Though the individual may submit, he does not contribute his full self. Considerable outward and immediate success may be attained, and awkward differences may

be stifled, but it is at the cost of fulness of life. The contribution that the sect had to make is lost. And sooner or later the truth or value which has been suppressed takes its revenge.

On the other hand, the mental life of the sect itself degenerates, whenever it refuses to be integrated into the life of the whole. Instead of finding its completion in ministering to the life of the arch-group, it becomes self-centred and antagonistic to the rest of the body. In proportion as it is excluded from its true function, it becomes itself exclusive. It is tempted to forget that truth is many-sided and to exaggerate the truth for which it stands until it becomes almost untrue. It loses "the proportion of faith." By insisting unduly on some things, it neglects or denies others. Sectarian unity is a much easier and simpler thing than Christian unity. It makes little demand for patience or moral effort, because it is the unity of those who agree. It resembles that animal unity to which we referred above. It is based on similarities. The sect tends to revert to the mental level of the crowd, to lose that variety and differentiation which is one mark of true group-life. It substitutes its own well-being for the well-being of the whole. It loses sight of the common purpose, and loyalty to the sect may shut out loyalty to Christ. Here lies the great danger. The unity of the sect becomes a substitute for the larger unity of the Body of Christ, and it goes a long way towards satisfying ordinary human nature. The individual satisfies his social instinct in the sect where brotherhood is easy. He enjoys an emotional enlargement and sense of power. And the sense of unity is deepened by the consciousness of differing from those outside. Thus the process of organising the social instincts so as to make possible the all-inclusive group is as it were cut short, and the psychical energies being detached from their true end and confined to the narrow loyalty of the sect only serve to deepen and emphasise group

antagonisms. The same instincts which make possible, if rightly directed, an all-embracing group unity, if side-tracked into sectarianism only serve to lend power to group conflict. The sect, like the crowd, is often able to achieve results of a kind more rapidly than a true group, but these results are on a lower moral and spiritual plane. The very narrowness of the outlook seems to increase the intensity of the emotion. But the sect, though it may flourish for a time, cannot endure. It is an attempt to harmonise human nature on an incomplete basis and in the long run must fail.

3

When we pass from the sect to the schism, much of what we have just said holds good. Many schisms are the logical result of sectarianism. As the sect grows more exclusive and hostile to the rest of the body it easily passes into actual schism. In the early Church the Novatian and later the Donatist schism are sectarian in origin. They both represented the desire to keep the life of the Church pure and ended in narrowing down Christianity. The Donatists at least ultimately claimed to be the entire Church. Again, the Wesleyan Methodists began as a sect within the Church of England. In their class-meetings and devotional gatherings they emphasised a side of religion which was being sadly neglected, but they still continued to attend their parish church and receive Communion there. Indeed, John Wesley rebuked the holding of services at the same time as those of the parish churches. But after his death the sect became a schism. The real centre of the Methodists' religious life had come to be their own society. They were not truly integrated into the life of the Church of England, and when the strong personality of their leader was removed a split was almost inevitable. It is not our place to apportion the blame. The Church was unsympathetic, and at

times antagonistic. Wesley was not always gentle or wise, and his teaching and methods were often unbalanced.

But schism may also be due to influences not religious at all. Thus the Nestorian and Monophysite schisms were largely due to political causes. There was, doubtless, teaching at either extreme which was really incompatible with the traditional belief of the Church, but the subtleties of Christological dogma lay far beyond the grasp of the ordinary man. Loyalty to either party was not simply sectarian enthusiasm for a new or recovered truth. In the background were secular jealousies. Alexandria and Antioch loved neither one another nor the upstart city of Constantinople, and this political rivalry had its counterpart in ecclesiastical rivalry. Further, Christianity in Egypt and Syria had served to revive national life, and this, in turn, desired to find its own expression in religion. Both Nestorianism and Monophysitism were largely a national revolt against the Greek domination of Constantinople. Racial antagonism easily allied itself with religious antagonism, since the Greek Church was in the closest dependence upon the Greek empire and Orthodoxy was enforced by imperial edicts. Decent theological reasons could be found for these schisms and real differences of thought and outlook existed, but these would hardly have caused actual division in the Church if they had not been reinforced by racial and political hatred.

So, too, the great schism between East and West was due to causes that were, to a large degree, neither religious nor theological. Among them, it is true, were the claims of the Papacy, and the occasion of the breach was the dispute about the insertion of the Filioque clause in the Creed. But here the theological disagreement was less serious than the resentment at the manner in which the clause had been inserted. The schism reflected that growing sense of division

and lack of sympathy which had deepened ever since the separation of the Empire into two parts.

Again, in any study of the Reformation we find that religious differences are intermixed with political and national antagonisms. Luther's protest was originally sectarian in the best sense of the word. His theses, put forward for discussion, were an attempt to recall the Church to forgotten truths and to a reform of abuses. The papacy met the attempt in the wrong way, and very soon theological controversy became entangled with secular quarrels, and the rising spirit of nationalism saw in Papal edicts only the tyranny of a foreign Italian state. So in England; few who have studied the facts will deny that the Church was in need of reform, but the whole series of events which resulted in the final breach of union committed by the Pope in 1570 shows us a tangle of religious, national, and political struggles complicated by the matrimonial ambitions of Henry VIII. For our present purposes the important point that emerges is the failure of the Church to recognise and consecrate national and political life, and to find room for full expression of racial differences. In the West the Papacy was right in striving to maintain a supernational unity, but its methods were wrong. It confused unity with uniformity. It failed to realise the growth of national spirit. By becoming itself a state, and using weapons of force and intrigue to enforce its authority, it reduced the Church to the worldly level. The result of the Reformation to the Church of Rome itself has been to reduce it to a sect, though it is the greatest of the sects. It contains within itself, no doubt, a great variety of life, but only up to a point. It has driven out certain Evangelical values the lack of which impoverishes its own life. It enforces orthodoxy by methods which are fatal to truth. Above all, it displays all the bitterness and exclusiveness of the sect at its worst. It denies that other bodies have any contribution to make.

Rome is right and everybody else is wrong. We look to Rome in vain for a complete example of group unity.

It would appear, then, that we need a new consideration of the true relation between the Church and the State. This can only start from a frank recognition of their mutual independence. The autonomy of the State in its own sphere can only be integrated with the autonomy of the Church when it is frankly recognised that they are distinct. We fall back upon the principle laid down above in discussing the relation of groups inside the Church. The individual is the unit of Church and State alike. He is immediately related to both. If the world were Christian, the State would consist of Christian men grouped for the purpose of performing certain necessary functions of human life. It would have a life of its own. It would be Christianised not by being dominated by or identified with the ecclesiastical group, but by the way in which its members, being Christians, carried a Christian spirit and outlook into their political activities. Government would be carried on along Christian lines, but the State would constitute an independent sphere of action. It would not be the Church on its secular side, even though—in an ideal world—composed of the same persons. Rather as individuals they organise themselves independently in the two spheres, and each group has an autonomous life of its own. On the other hand, since the same persons are members of both, they cannot contradict themselves in their different activities. They are still Christians, though they are engaging in politics, and they are still, say, Englishmen, though they are occupied in religion. Thus the two groups are integrated not by being dominated the one by the other, nor by being fused, nor by being merely balanced, but by being co-ordinated in the actual conduct of their individual members. If this could be accomplished, the secular causes of schism would be removed, though the possibility of sectarian schisms would still remain.

But at present we are in a world that is far from being integrated. Not only are many citizens not Christians, but the Church is rent by schisms and has largely lost the vision of unity. Hence through no fault of his own the individual may at any moment be involved in a conflict between incompatible group loyalties. Since the State, quite rightly, admits to the highest posts men who do not even profess to be Christian, it may make demands for obedience which the Christian, out of loyalty to Christ, must refuse. Nor is there any generally accepted theory of the relation between Church and State. In wars, for instance, religion tends to be dragged at the tail of politics. The cause of the nation is almost automatically identified with the cause of God. The Church supports popular enthusiasm and embellishes it with a halo of religion. A war becomes a holy war. Thus religion, instead of promoting fellowship, only reinforces and embitters national antagonisms. The victory of my country and the slaughter of the enemy become the subjects of public and private prayer. There is no need to elaborate the picture. It is well to remember, however, that the same phenomenon is to be seen when the enemy countries are both Roman Catholic. French and Bavarian did not kill each other the less eagerly because they acknowledged the same Pope. The failure lies deep down in a false conception of the relation of the Church to the State. The fault lies not in Christianity itself, but in the failure to think out and act up to Christian principles, and in the disunion of the Church itself.

The vitality of the Church is impaired by internal conflict. The tendency to dissociation that is to be found in the sect, if not rightly integrated, becomes complete dissociation in the schism. The result is a waste of energy comparable to that which follows upon dissociation in the individual mind. Perhaps here we have the best psychological illustration of the

present unhappy condition of the Church. It is the Christ mind dissociated. While the Church needs all the varied gifts and endowments of all races and classes for the enrichment of its group-life that it may fully express Christ, schism parts these gifts asunder into competing groups. Learning is found here, enthusiasm there, gifts of organisation elsewhere, and so on. These qualities and powers are in part wasted because they are not supplemented by one another in the common group-life. The instinct of pugnacity that should be sublimated into conquering the world for Christ finds its satisfaction in fighting against fellow-Christians. So the world that should see in the Church the supreme group-force that makes for unity sees instead disintegration and conflict. Only a united Church can give peace to the world.

4

What practical suggestions can psychology make as to reunion? First and foremost it can recall us to the true Christian ideal and to the laws that condition it. It sets before us the right kind of unity to desire. The Church is to become increasingly the Body of Christ and the People of God, the progressive expression in life of the one divine purpose. This is a group, not a crowd ideal. As such the Church must aim at giving to all its members full scope for their instinctive energies in subordination to the one purpose. It must be inclusive, not exclusive. It must seek not to repress, but to direct and to consecrate. It must desire not uniformity, but unity. It must encourage experiments of many kinds—theological, devotional and practical—so long as they are recognised on all hands as being experiments made in loyalty to Christ and subject to the test that in due time they can be integrated into the life of the whole. Though the Church exists in all its fulness by actual growth and

experiment, it has an essence of its own, and you cannot have as much or as little of it as you please. In willing the group purpose, members must will all the conditions that go to its efficiency. Christian fellowship will always have a stern and negative side. Not all devotion is found to strengthen Christian character. Not all practical organisation ministers to Christian living. Not all teaching is consistent with those truths that form the Christian message. What is inconsistent must be rejected. The Church could never have integrated Arianism. Mohammedanism and atheism are not experiments in Christianity, but denials of it. The Christian faith cannot be so extended as to become meaningless. Again, the world in its natural state is not Christian. The Church consists of those who are redeemed out of the world. And there is such a thing as apostasy from Christ. All this must be remembered. It makes the group-ideal difficult, because it demands at once unlimited spiritual sympathy and profound moral discrimination. But we should strive at all costs to be loyal to the mind of Christ.

Accordingly we must rule out many methods which seem to promise a short cut to unity. There is, for instance, the method of the Roman Catholic Church, a method that proceeds from unity of outward organisation. The Roman Church claims to be the one true Church, and the test of unity is very simple—to be in communion with the Pope. All that remains is for other bodies to submit. Our reply would be that this would be not to achieve unity, but to perpetuate sectarianism. The Roman Church succeeds in integrating a large number of Christian values and truths, but it gives no scope to others which are compelled to remain outside to find full expression. The Roman Church does not represent the complete mind of Christ. Further, its methods of promoting and maintaining unity are too much those of the military group, and the kind of unity with which it is content is too

often little removed from that of the crowd. It is suspicious of new movements and subordinate loyalties. It distrusts free discussion. Quite apart from the truth or falsehood of any particular doctrine, to enforce belief simply by the appeal to the authority of the Church is to misuse authority. Since the Council of Trent theological debate, except within narrow limits, has been more and more discouraged. All that has been desired is the willingness to accept certain dogmas and to shout with the rest of the crowd. Herd instinct is preferred to reason. Local varieties of worship have increasingly been eliminated and ceremonial standardised. In all this we see a tendency to substitute the easy and immediate unity of the crowd for the hard and slowly won unity of the group. Many priests of the Church of England would be willing to submit even to some form of reordination which did not involve any denial of their previous ministry, if such were necessary to obtain reunion into a truly Catholic Church, but they would not be willing to do so only to enlarge the Roman Catholic Church as it now exists. That would be to deny certain truths which find expression in the Church of England. It would not be integration, but absorption. Similarly, though we hold that the Church of England aims, however imperfectly and unsuccessfully, at a nobler but more difficult ideal than that of Rome, in seeking to find room for all types of Christian experience, we do not want others to reunite with us only to produce a more numerous Church of England. We want their contribution based on their differences from us. We long for a unity based on interpenetration, not on mere standardisation.

Nor, again, can we be content with a mere federation and intercommunion. Such involves a false idea of the interrelation of groups. It suggests a balancing and conjunction of originally independent units, but no group within the Christian Church is of this type.

As we have always insisted, a Christian is not baptised into any local or partial group, but into the Catholic Church. We cannot conceive of any true Christian unity that does not include a ministry that is universally valid as having behind it the authority of the whole body, or of a Eucharist that is not that of the whole Church. But the idea of federation and intercommunion implies a conception of smaller groups included in the arch-group but essentially independent of it, and of the arch-group as formed by the desirable but voluntary adding together of such smaller groups. It makes intercommunion a step to unity, not an expression of it. It contradicts the great principle that Christian unity is something given by God, and not man's unaided achievement. It usually goes with a theory of an invisible Church, a theory that has no meaning for psychology, and does not even possess an ideal of unity.

Our hope of achieving the highest type of unity depends on the supernatural character of the Church, and the place that Christ holds in it. A popular writer on social psychology writes: "Socialised gregariousness is the goal of man's development. A transcendental union with his fellows is the destiny of the human individual, and it is the attainment of this towards which the constantly growing altruism of man is directed. Poets and prophets have at times dimly seen this inevitable trend of nature, biology detects unmistakable evidence of it, and explains the slowness of advance which has been the despair of those others by the variety and power of man's mind, and consoles us for the delay these qualities still cause by the knowledge that they are guarantees of the exactitude and completeness that the ultimate union will attain."¹ And again, "The need and capacities that were at work in the primitive amœba are at work in him" (*i.e.*, man). "In his very flesh and bones is the

¹ Trotter, *Herd Instincts in Peace and War*, p. 167.

impulse towards closer and closer union in larger fellowships. To-day he is fighting his way towards that goal, fighting for the perfect unit which Nature has so long foreshadowed, in which there shall be a complete communion of its members, unobstructed by egoism and hatred, by harshness or arrogance or the wolfish lust for blood. That perfect unit will be a new creature, recognisable as a single entity; to its million-minded power and knowledge no barrier will be insurmountable, no gulf impassable, no task too great."¹ Such a statement has many points of contact with the Christian ideal, but without Christ there are few solid grounds for this optimism. We, too, believe that in working for unity we are working with nature, not against it, but we believe that behind nature there is the purpose of a God who Himself lives and wills fellowship, a point at which Dr. Trotter hints when he writes "Nature." Nor, again, does he distinguish sufficiently between the different types of unity. We cannot accept the view that progress towards unity is man's "inevitable" "destiny" or a "biological drift."² It is not automatic. Fellowship does not, as a matter of course, widen out into ever larger circles. The family may become the foe of the State and the State of international concord. Just as evolution does not necessarily mean progress, so the gregarious instinct may hinder rather than promote fellowship. Dr. Trotter amply recognises that, on the human level, instinct must be directed by "conscious and instructed intellect."³ We equally insist that it depends on moral and spiritual effort which man is free to refuse to make. Our present troubles are largely due to the fact that our intellectual advance has, in many directions, outrun our moral and spiritual advance. Above all, on this plane man must work in conscious union with God. He needs the supernatural to complete the natural.

¹ Trotter, *Herd Instincts in Peace and War*, p. 213.

² P. 122.

³ P. 255; cp. p. 162.

Here we are faced with the problem of sin, the refusal of loyalty to God's purpose. Man is not only undeveloped, but misdeveloped, and nothing has done more to destroy unity than sin. Again, the personality of Christ is the decisive factor. He is at once the deliverer from sin and the bringer of a new power for right advance. Only in Him can the true and all-inclusive group-mind be realised. Only He can make possible a fully organised group consciously directed by a single purpose which each member feels equally to be the purpose of his own life, and in which he loses himself only to find himself more fully than he could in any other way. Such a group is indeed a "new creation."

So then, in all practical efforts after reunion, we must begin with the thought of our loyalty to Christ, and, in the light of this, of the kind of union that He desires. Reason must be dedicated to this end. We may apply to the Church some words of Dr. Bosanquet,¹ "Social life presupposes a guide and criterion beyond its current activities. No training in group-life will dispense with a direction of the social mind to the positive values which are not diminished by sharing: to beauty that is, to truth and to religion. . . . It is only devotion to these supreme values that can guide desire aright. . . . Life for and in the supreme positive values is the safeguard of patriotism and the criterion of the social will, because it is the only source of abiding satisfaction, and the only sure preventive of cupidity." For this devotion to abstract values we may substitute the love of a living Saviour, in whom all that is best and highest is to be found. If Christians will only attend to the will of Christ, they will find in the fulfilment of that will the true satisfaction of all their instinctive energies, and these will be withdrawn from other and harmful channels.

This, however, is most difficult to achieve, because

¹ Introduction to the last edition (1922) of *The Philosophical Theory of the State*.


we have already formed sectarian and schismatical sentiments in our minds. These must be dragged out to the light and ruthlessly examined by the cold light of reason. The prejudices which have gathered round objects in themselves indifferent must be faced. Why should clothes and candles, for instance, be allowed to remain obstacles to Christian union? The hindrance lies not in them, but in the associations which have grown up round them. Psychology can explain and make suggestions for the sublimation of these perverse loyalties and hatreds. So, too, reason will show that herd-suggestion accounts for much enthusiasm about trifles which has got mixed up with religion. We may also propose that theological questions can be discussed by those competent to discuss them, in a calm atmosphere, with a single eye to truth. Above all, there must be mutual confidence based on a common love of Christ. It may be that the majority of men are incapable of directing their life by their own reason, but at least the suggestion given to them by those in authority may be rational rather than irrational. If all Christians will recognise the present unhappy condition of the Church, and really desire and hope for better things, a great step towards unity will have been taken.

Lastly, as we saw, the problem of reunion is bound up with the relations of the Church to other secular groups, of which the State is the chief. If we accept the claims of Christ, we are compelled to place loyalty to His mind and to the Church, so far as it represents His mind, first. When under present unideal conditions a clash of loyalties occurs, faithfulness to Him must be maintained at all costs. The Christian regards the Church as the supreme group transcending all other group claims. Such a Christianity plainly condemns all exclusive nationalism, and is bound to oppose selfishness in the State as in the individual. This may mean persecution at the hands of the State,

but in the end this loyalty to Christ would save both the Church and State alike, and make possible a true internationalism. It would recognise fully the autonomy of all secular groupings in their own sphere. It would make men better citizens or artists or politicians, because it would give them increased moral power to do their best work. So the group-life of the community in all its forms would be increasingly permeated by Christian principles, without losing its variety or being dominated by ecclesiasticism. Such is the goal of the Church-process, but it can only be attained when the whole world becomes Christian. Non-Christians will always threaten to impede the full integration of corporate Christian life. The Church cannot stop short of including all men and all departments of human life within its all-embracing group-life, not in the sense of absorbing, but of compounding and integrating them. Only so will all things be summed up on Christ, and the full purpose of Christian unity be realised.

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